The first of ACCESS’ completed working papers, “Informational Barriers to Market Access: Experimental Evidence from Liberian Firms”, shows that the complex sourcing procedures used by large buyers which procure inputs through formal contracts (such as for example long and complex bidding forms for tenders) can and do in and of themselves deter many capable firms from bidding on and winning such contracts. The paper shows, through a randomized-controlled trial in Liberia, that a simple week-long training substantially increased initially-disadvantaged firms’ bidding on and winning of tenders and other formal contracts. The impact is due to about a quarter of firms for which informational market access barriers were initially binding. These firms win much bigger and new types of formal contracts after learning how to sell to large buyers. They are more likely to remain in operation and employ more worker also in the longer run. The paper’s results have important implications for the design of public procurement procedures and many related issues.
The second of ACCESS completed working papers, titled “The Missing Middle Managers: Labor Costs, Firm Structure, and Development”, shows that the middle managers firms with modern, hierarchical structures employ are almost as expensive in the world’s poorest countries as in rich ones, and that this appears to be a quantitatively important part of the reason why such structures and the job creation they enable are rare in poor countries. This has important implications for strategies to spur job creation there.