As of the project's midterm, we have conducted extensive research and development activities to address the first two key objectives: Systematic Analysis of Cross-layer Attacks and Detection and Evaluation Framework. Progress in these two objectives has equipped us with the necessary background to pursue subsequent goals.
To achieve the first key objective, we analyzed various cross-layer vulnerabilities and attacks targeting different processors and system-on-chip (SoC) architectures, including Intel, AMD, ARM, and RISC-V. Additionally, we organized the world's largest hardware capture-the-flag competitions, at the renowned systems conference DAC (Design Automation Conference) conferences in 2023 and 2024, in collaboration with Intel, and Synopsys, two giants in semiconductor domain, as well as our research partner Texas A&M University. In these competitions, we focused on the Google OpenTitan Root-of-Trust to introduce real-world vulnerabilities into this Root-of-Trust framework. These competitions and collaborations have yielded significant insights into various real-world hardware vulnerabilities, attack scenarios, the benefits and limitations of current hardware verification techniques, and the potential role of machine learning in hardware verification. We publish and open-source these results for research and educational purposes.
Based on our research and development results, a collaboration with MITRE Corporation has emerged. MITRE is an organization that primarily supports government agencies, particularly in cybersecurity. MITRE is renowned for its contributions to cybersecurity through the MITRE ATT&CK framework. It is a comprehensive knowledge base of cyber adversary behavior used worldwide to enhance security and incident response. This collaboration provided MITRE Corporation with practical examples across various hardware vulnerability categories (CWEs), contributing to over 20 published CWEs.
To accomplish the second key objective, we leveraged the findings from our systematic analysis of cross-layer attacks to develop several advanced detection and evaluation frameworks. These two aspects concern the first two goals of Hydranos, as mentioned above.
Specifically, we proposed novel hardware fuzzing techniques for different vulnerability categories, Hardware fuzzing for detecting processor bugs and vulnerabilities, uncovering timing side-channel leaks, and speculative execution leakages