Schellec has shed new light onto a research program developed at the turn of the 19th century, the so-called Naturphilosophie. This research program has usually been seen as mystical and incompatible with proper science. Counteracting this view, the project has shown that Naturphilosophie is a sort of philosophy of science that seeks to spell out the underlying epistemological model presupposed the by rise of modern natural sciences as well as the consequences thereof for our views of nature. Schellec has argued that one of the consequences extracted by Schelling from such a model is the view of nature as something amenable to processes of transformations. Chemistry, which is treated by Schelling as the science of the transformations of qualitative properties of matter, accordingly acquires a prominent role in such a philosophy of nature.
A further result of Schellec is that Schelling draws on his engagement with chemistry to work out a conceptual framework aimed at making sense of the rise of new scientific disciplines such as life sciences. The project has advanced the state of the art by arguing that key to this framework is not Schelling’s conception of life, but rather his conception of matter. Schellec has accordingly shown that the details of such a concept of matter are worked out in the context of Schelling’s engagement with a wide range of experimental sciences tackling both inorganic and organic phenomena.
Schellec has drawn on the previous results to argue that Schelling’s conception of nature as subject is the result of this philosophical engagement with chemistry and experimental sciences. Thus, what at first sight might appear as a mystical and far-fetched thesis is rather a consequence Schelling extracted from what he takes to be the epistemological model presupposed by certain sciences. This result is, in my view, important, as it neutralizes the objection that such an approach to nature is anti-scientific.
A key result beyond the state of the art consists in the contemporary relevance of Schelling’s project. Schelling’s conception of nature as subject is, on the one hand, implicitly presupposed in some contemporary attempts to view nature as a subject of rights, whereas, on the other hand, the conceptual implications of such a view are not explicitly tackled in debates in environmental ethics. This project has thus argued that Schelling’s philosophy of nature lays the groundwork for a position that is not as such represented in current debates in environmental ethics, even though it is highly relevant thereto.