REWiring the ComposItional Security VeRification and AssurancE of Systems of Systems Lifecycle

Informazioni relative al progetto

REWIRE

ID dell’accordo di sovvenzione: 101070627

DOI

10.3030/101070627

Progetto chiuso

Data della firma CE 20 Giugno 2022

Data di avvio 1 Ottobre 2022

Data di completamento 30 Settembre 2025

Finanziato da

• Civil Security for Society

Costo totale

€ 4 158 961,25

Contributo UE

€ 4 158 961,00

Coordinato da

GIOUMPITEK MELETI SCHEDIASMOS YLOPOIISI KAI POLISI ERGON PLIROFORIKIS ETAIREIA PERIORISMENIS EFTHYNIS
Greece

CORDIS fornisce collegamenti ai risultati finali pubblici e alle pubblicazioni dei progetti ORIZZONTE.

I link ai risultati e alle pubblicazioni dei progetti del 7° PQ, così come i link ad alcuni tipi di risultati specifici come dataset e software, sono recuperati dinamicamente da .OpenAIRE .

Risultati finali

Documents, reports (9)

D1.1 Project Handbook

A handbook describing the project management, quality control and risk assessment procedures adopted in the project.

D5.1 REWIRE Blockchain architecture, continuous authorisation, and on/off chain data management

Reports the progress of WP5 presenting the blockchain architecture and the specifications of the smart contracts, on/off chain data management and continuous authorisation based on verifiable credentials.

D7.1 Dissemination, Exploitation and Communication Plan

Report the project’s web site and on the planned dissemination, exploitation, and communication activities.

D2.1 REWIRE Operational landscape, requirements, and Reference Architecture - Initial version

Report on the complete documentation of REWIRE requirements of T2.1 and the REWIRE reference architecture of T2.2. It will also include the 1st report on the progress of T2.3-2.5 documenting the trust indicators, threat landscape, the modes of operation during design time, and runtime validation properties.

D3.2 REWIRE Design time secure operational framework - Initial Version

Report on the 1st unified REWIRE Design time architecture and framework including the Risk Assessment methodology.

D3.1 Architectural blueprint of formal verification tool chain, operation and interactions

Reports the progress of tasks T3.1-T3.3 on blueprinting the architecture of the tool chain to be used for the formal verification and theorem proofs.

D1.2 Data Management Plan

The DMP will provide an analysis of the data management policy that will be used by the applications regarding all the research datasets that will be generated by the project.

D4.2 REWIRE Runtime assurance framework - Initial Version

Report on the 1st unified REWIRE Runtime architecture including Runtime auditing and federated learning aspects.

Report the project's web site and on the planned dissemination, exploitation, and communication activities.

Report documenting the dissemination, communication, clustering, standardisation, and exploitation activities. Highlighting open-source contributions and workshop organization activities.

Other (1)

D4.1 Conceptual architecture of REWIRE customizable TEE and attestation models specifications

Reports the progress on blueprinting the architecture of the REWIRE TEE and attestation models.

Pubblicazioni

Conference proceedings (7)

Towards a Methodology to Design Provably Secure Cyber-physical Systems

Autori: Felipe Lisboa Malaquias, Georgios Giantamidis, Stylianos Basagiannis, Simone Fulvio Rollini, Isaac Admundson
Pubblicato in: ACM SIGAda Ada Letters, Numero 43:1, 2023
Editore: ACM Digital Library
DOI: 10.1145/3631483.3631499

Query Recovery from Easy to Hard: Jigsaw Attack against SSE

Autori: Hao Nie, Wei Wang, Peng Xu, Xianglong Zhang, Laurence T. Yang, Kaitai Liang
Pubblicato in: USENIX SECURITY 2024, Numero 2403.01155, 2024
Editore: arXiv
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2403.01155

Analyzing the Leakage Resistance of the NIST’s Lightweight Crypto Competition’s Finalists

Autori: Corentin Verhamme, Gaëtan Cassiers, François-Xavier Standaert
Pubblicato in: Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Numero 13820, 2023, ISBN 978-3-031-25319-5
Editore: Springer International Publishing
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-25319-5_15

Machine-Checked Proofs of Accountability: How to sElect Who is to Blame

Autori: Constantin Cătălin Drăgan, François Dupressoir, Kristian Gjøsteen, Thomas Haines, Peter B. Rønne, Morten Rotvold Solberg
Pubblicato in: Computer Security – ESORICS 2023, Numero 14346, 2024, ISBN 978-3-031-51479-1
Editore: Springer, Cham
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-51479-1_24

Non-Profiled Side-Channel Assisted Fault Attack: A Case Study on DOMREP

Autori: Sayandeep Saha, Prasanna Ravi, Dirmanto Jap, Shivam Bhasin
Pubblicato in: 2023 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition, Numero 10137176, 2023, ISBN 979-8-3503-9624-9
Editore: IEEE
DOI: 10.23919/DATE56975.2023.10137176

From the Standards to Silicon: Formally Proved Memory Controllers

Autori: Felipe Lisboa Malaquias, Mihail Asavoae & Florian Brandner
Pubblicato in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Numero 13903, 2023, ISBN 978-3-031-33170-1
Editore: Springer, Cham
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-33170-1_18

d-DSE: Distinct Dynamic Searchable Encryption Resisting Volume Leakage in Encrypted Databases

Autori: Dongli Liu and Wei Wang and Peng Xu and Laurence T. Yang and Bo Luo and Kaitai Liang
Pubblicato in: ArXiv & 33rd USENIX Security Symposium 2024, Numero abs/2403.01182, 2024
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2403.01182