Descripción del proyecto
Abordar la agregación de preferencias en los sistemas multiagente
En el intrincado ámbito de los sistemas multiagente (SMA), el enojoso reto de agregar preferencias individuales en conflicto se cierne sobre nosotros, especialmente ante agentes con intereses propios. La búsqueda de resultados socialmente convenientes se vuelve aún más desalentadora cuando los agentes pueden manipular el sistema mintiendo sobre sus preferencias. Este obstáculo se extiende a diversas aplicaciones de la vida real, desde protocolos de división equitativa hasta sistemas de votación seguros. El equipo del proyecto SEAL, que cuenta con el apoyo de las Acciones Marie Skłodowska-Curie, aprovecha la lógica de la estrategia para forjar un marco lógico que permita diseñar y verificar formalmente mecanismos que sorteen las complejidades de la elección social dentro de los MAS. El objetivo del proyecto es aumentar la confianza en los mecanismos generados por máquinas. SEAL promete revolucionar el panorama de la elección social computacional.
Objetivo
"The design and evaluation of mechanisms for aggregating preferences is a central problem in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). In such setting, we need to be able to aggregate individual preferences, which are conflicting when agents are self-interested. More importantly, the mechanism should choose a socially desirable (or ""good"") outcome and reach an equilibrium despite the fact that agents can lie about their preferences. The real-world applications of designing and verifying mechanisms for social choice are manifold, including fair division protocols, secure voting, and truth-tracking via approval voting. Although logic-based languages have been widely used for verification and synthesis of MAS, the use of formal methods for reasoning about auctions under strategic behavior as well as automated mechanism design has not been much explored yet. An advantage in adopting such perspective lies in the high expressivity and generality of logics for strategic reasoning. Moreover, by relying on precise semantics, formal methods provide tools for rigorously analyzing the correctness of systems, which is important to improve trust in mechanisms generated by machines. This project aims to design a logical framework based on Strategy Logic (SL) for formally verifying and designing mechanisms for social choice. More specifically, we aim at (i) proposing an approach addressing the probabilistic setting (with Bayesian information, stochastic transitions and mixed strategies); (ii) identifying fragments of SL that enjoy both good complexity and satisfying expressive power for being applied to classes of mechanisms; (iii) modeling and reasoning about relevant problems from the state-of-the-art in computational social choice using the proposed logical framework; and (iv) methodically studying the obtained fragments in relation to the expressivity, model-checking and satisfiability problems."
Ámbito científico
Palabras clave
Programa(s)
- HORIZON.1.2 - Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA) Main Programme
Régimen de financiación
HORIZON-TMA-MSCA-PF-EF - HORIZON TMA MSCA Postdoctoral Fellowships - European FellowshipsCoordinador
80138 Napoli
Italia