Descrizione del progetto
Affrontare l’aggregazione delle preferenze nei sistemi multi-agente
Nell’intricato regno dei sistemi multi-agente (MAS), si profila la difficile sfida di aggregare preferenze individuali contrastanti, soprattutto in presenza di agenti auto-interessati. La ricerca di risultati socialmente desiderabili diventa ancora più scoraggiante quando gli agenti possono manipolare il sistema mentendo sulle proprie preferenze. Questo ostacolo si estende a diverse applicazioni del mondo reale, dai protocolli di divisione equa ai sistemi di voto sicuri. Con il sostegno delle azioni Marie Skłodowska-Curie, il progetto SEAL sfrutta la logica della strategia per forgiare un quadro logico per la progettazione e la verifica formale di meccanismi che navigano nella complessità delle scelte sociali all’interno dei MAS. Il progetto intende rafforzare la fiducia nei meccanismi generati dalle macchine. SEAL promette di rivoluzionare il panorama delle scelte sociali computazionali.
Obiettivo
"The design and evaluation of mechanisms for aggregating preferences is a central problem in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). In such setting, we need to be able to aggregate individual preferences, which are conflicting when agents are self-interested. More importantly, the mechanism should choose a socially desirable (or ""good"") outcome and reach an equilibrium despite the fact that agents can lie about their preferences. The real-world applications of designing and verifying mechanisms for social choice are manifold, including fair division protocols, secure voting, and truth-tracking via approval voting. Although logic-based languages have been widely used for verification and synthesis of MAS, the use of formal methods for reasoning about auctions under strategic behavior as well as automated mechanism design has not been much explored yet. An advantage in adopting such perspective lies in the high expressivity and generality of logics for strategic reasoning. Moreover, by relying on precise semantics, formal methods provide tools for rigorously analyzing the correctness of systems, which is important to improve trust in mechanisms generated by machines. This project aims to design a logical framework based on Strategy Logic (SL) for formally verifying and designing mechanisms for social choice. More specifically, we aim at (i) proposing an approach addressing the probabilistic setting (with Bayesian information, stochastic transitions and mixed strategies); (ii) identifying fragments of SL that enjoy both good complexity and satisfying expressive power for being applied to classes of mechanisms; (iii) modeling and reasoning about relevant problems from the state-of-the-art in computational social choice using the proposed logical framework; and (iv) methodically studying the obtained fragments in relation to the expressivity, model-checking and satisfiability problems."
Campo scientifico
Parole chiave
Programma(i)
- HORIZON.1.2 - Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA) Main Programme
Meccanismo di finanziamento
HORIZON-TMA-MSCA-PF-EF - HORIZON TMA MSCA Postdoctoral Fellowships - European FellowshipsCoordinatore
80138 Napoli
Italia