Projektbeschreibung
Präferenzaggregation in Multi-Agenten-Systemen bewältigen
Im komplexen Bereich der Multi-Agenten-Systeme stellt die Aggregation widersprüchlicher individueller Präferenzen eine große Herausforderung dar, insbesondere angesichts eigennütziger Agenten. Das Streben nach gesellschaftlich wünschenswerten Ergebnissen wird noch entmutigender, wenn die Agenten das System manipulieren können, indem sie über ihre Präferenzen lügen. Diese Hürde erstreckt sich auf verschiedene Anwendungen in der realen Praxis, von fairen Teilungsprotokollen bis hin zu sicheren Wahlsystemen. Im Rahmen des über die Marie Skłodowska-Curie-Maßnahmen unterstützten Projekts SEAL wird die Strategielogik genutzt, um einen logischen Rahmen für die formale Gestaltung und Überprüfung von Mechanismen zu schaffen, die die Komplexität sozialer Entscheidungen innerhalb von Multi-Agenten-Systemen steuern. Ziel des Projekts ist es, das Vertrauen in maschinell erstellte Mechanismen zu stärken. SEAL verspricht, die Landschaft der rechnergestützten Sozialwahl zu revolutionieren.
Ziel
"The design and evaluation of mechanisms for aggregating preferences is a central problem in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). In such setting, we need to be able to aggregate individual preferences, which are conflicting when agents are self-interested. More importantly, the mechanism should choose a socially desirable (or ""good"") outcome and reach an equilibrium despite the fact that agents can lie about their preferences. The real-world applications of designing and verifying mechanisms for social choice are manifold, including fair division protocols, secure voting, and truth-tracking via approval voting. Although logic-based languages have been widely used for verification and synthesis of MAS, the use of formal methods for reasoning about auctions under strategic behavior as well as automated mechanism design has not been much explored yet. An advantage in adopting such perspective lies in the high expressivity and generality of logics for strategic reasoning. Moreover, by relying on precise semantics, formal methods provide tools for rigorously analyzing the correctness of systems, which is important to improve trust in mechanisms generated by machines. This project aims to design a logical framework based on Strategy Logic (SL) for formally verifying and designing mechanisms for social choice. More specifically, we aim at (i) proposing an approach addressing the probabilistic setting (with Bayesian information, stochastic transitions and mixed strategies); (ii) identifying fragments of SL that enjoy both good complexity and satisfying expressive power for being applied to classes of mechanisms; (iii) modeling and reasoning about relevant problems from the state-of-the-art in computational social choice using the proposed logical framework; and (iv) methodically studying the obtained fragments in relation to the expressivity, model-checking and satisfiability problems."
Wissenschaftliches Gebiet
Schlüsselbegriffe
Programm/Programme
- HORIZON.1.2 - Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA) Main Programme
Aufforderung zur Vorschlagseinreichung
Andere Projekte für diesen Aufruf anzeigenFinanzierungsplan
HORIZON-TMA-MSCA-PF-EF - HORIZON TMA MSCA Postdoctoral Fellowships - European FellowshipsKoordinator
80138 Napoli
Italien