Final Report Summary - DII (The Design of International Institutions: Legitimacy, Effectiveness and Distribution in Global Governance)
While international organizations (IOs) were long the exclusive preserve of member governments, the past decades have witnessed a shift toward more complex forms of governance, involving participation by non-state or transnational actors (TNAs), such as non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and philanthropic foundations. What can explain this "transnational turn" in global governance, and what are its implications for the problem-solving effectiveness, democratic legitimacy, and distributional outcomes of IOs? These questions have been at the heart of the project DII, directed by Professor Jonas Tallberg, and conducted within an internationally-composed research group at Stockholm University, Sweden, over the time period 2009-2014.
Combining statistical analyses and case studies in a comparative assessment of TNAs in more than 50 IOs, the project has produced cutting-edge research of great interest to both academics and practitioners. In brief, the project shows that:
* IOs have become increasingly open to TNAs over time. The institutional rules for inclusion of TNAs in IO policy-making are four times more generous in 2010 compared to 1950, and most of this increase came after the end of the Cold War. This shift in the nature of global governance permeates IOs in all policy fields and world regions. It suggests that IOs are more amenable to change than often thought.
* Two factors best explain the growth in IO openness to TNAs. First, growing cooperation in areas where TNAs can contribute functions or services that IOs need and are less well adapted for themselves, such as distributing aid to local populations, collecting information on human rights violations, and contributing expert information on environmental issues. Second, domestic democracy in the membership of IOs, which makes member governments more willing to adopt democratic principles of governance at the global level as well.
* TNAs make unequal use of these new opportunities for involvement in global governance. Northern and western TNAs are overrepresented, as are for-profit TNAs, such as business associations and firms. This suggests that resources matter for the possibilities of TNAs to take advantage of the greater access opportunities in global governance.
* When TNAs participate in global policy-making, those TNAs that rely primarily on the provision of expert information are more likely to be influential than those who rely mainly on public-opinion mobilization. This makes TNAs very similar to interest groups at the domestic level.
* Contrary to conventional expectations, greater involvement of TNAs in global policy-making does not lead to IOs being perceived as more legitimate by the public or TNAs themselves. One reason could be the recognition that resourceful TNAs more often participate in global policy-making.
* When assessing the legitimacy of IOs, it is essential to consider the distributional fairness of global policy-making. Too many scholars in recent years have concentrated on the democratic character of IOs’ decision-making procedures and neglected the importance of IO policy-making being fair and just in its consequences.
Combining statistical analyses and case studies in a comparative assessment of TNAs in more than 50 IOs, the project has produced cutting-edge research of great interest to both academics and practitioners. In brief, the project shows that:
* IOs have become increasingly open to TNAs over time. The institutional rules for inclusion of TNAs in IO policy-making are four times more generous in 2010 compared to 1950, and most of this increase came after the end of the Cold War. This shift in the nature of global governance permeates IOs in all policy fields and world regions. It suggests that IOs are more amenable to change than often thought.
* Two factors best explain the growth in IO openness to TNAs. First, growing cooperation in areas where TNAs can contribute functions or services that IOs need and are less well adapted for themselves, such as distributing aid to local populations, collecting information on human rights violations, and contributing expert information on environmental issues. Second, domestic democracy in the membership of IOs, which makes member governments more willing to adopt democratic principles of governance at the global level as well.
* TNAs make unequal use of these new opportunities for involvement in global governance. Northern and western TNAs are overrepresented, as are for-profit TNAs, such as business associations and firms. This suggests that resources matter for the possibilities of TNAs to take advantage of the greater access opportunities in global governance.
* When TNAs participate in global policy-making, those TNAs that rely primarily on the provision of expert information are more likely to be influential than those who rely mainly on public-opinion mobilization. This makes TNAs very similar to interest groups at the domestic level.
* Contrary to conventional expectations, greater involvement of TNAs in global policy-making does not lead to IOs being perceived as more legitimate by the public or TNAs themselves. One reason could be the recognition that resourceful TNAs more often participate in global policy-making.
* When assessing the legitimacy of IOs, it is essential to consider the distributional fairness of global policy-making. Too many scholars in recent years have concentrated on the democratic character of IOs’ decision-making procedures and neglected the importance of IO policy-making being fair and just in its consequences.