Final Report Summary - PLATO'S FICTIONS (Fictions and arguments of Plato's dialogues)
The study of 'Fictions and argument in Plato' departs from the question whether modern concepts of fiction are applicable to the work of Plato, but leads to broader conclusions about the philosophy of Plato. The study consists of five probe-enquiries into various types of fiction that might be attributed to Plato.
The first enquiry deals with the issue of epistemological fiction in Platonic method of hypothesis. The second fiction studied is the political fiction of the 'Noble lie' of the 'Republic'. The last three enquiries discuss the broad concept of literary fiction, viewed as the craft of story-making out of elements of various origin and nature and as a language conveying insights that the rational discourse cannot communicate.
The first enquiry analyses passages of 'Parmenides' two through a symbolic notation developed for this purpose. The symbolisation attributes to Plato a model of linguistic reference close to the medieval theory of suppositions, and radically different from Tarski's concept of satisfaction. The second enquiry discusses Platonic definitions of falsehood and lies and shows the places of the 'Noble lie' within the argumentative framework of the 'Republic'. This framework is built by a set of two hypotheses, one about human nature, and one about the nature of a city. The hypotheses are developed into two complementary images. The deep structure of the Form of Justice may be discerned in those images, but Plato's argument remains incomplete. The third enquiry analyses the myth of the 'Statesman' as a product of literary creation, in which author's freedom is guided by the traditions he invokes and by his philosophical goals. The fourth enquiry opposes the image of direct vision of forms to the Platonic methods and practices of indirect study of forms. The fifth enquiry discusses instances of Plato's late metaphor of writing and drawing in the soul in its role of rudimentary ontology of mind. Viewed in the light of arguments in the 'Parmenides', which deny presence of pure forms in human minds, the image loses its apparent literary character.
The conclusions of the enquiries unveil a coherent set of presuppositions about falsehood, language, cognition, and philosophy. Those presuppositions make it practically impossible to elucidate the work of Plato through the notion of fiction.
1. There is no clear idea of 'concept' in Plato. Our minds contain words and images only. Rather than to record an (imperfect) copy of a form, we learn about them through repeating and remembering arguments. The mysterious direct insight into Forms emerges only on the occasion of such argumentation.
2. Lacking clear idea of concept, Plato cannot discuss fictions. Only concepts understood as separate from the activity of knowing can be used in fictional propositions, deprived of literal truth-value. Speakers need to understand that they can play with concepts before they formulate fictional claims with a variety of purposes.
3. The idea of fiction presupposes a bipolar theoretical division of our claims into truths and falsehoods. For Plato, our falsehoods or fictions are rather distorted truths. Truth may be distorted deliberately, but is also present, as distorted, in erroneous cognition. Human cognition and usage of language is burdened with imperfections. In spite of that, human cognition is focused on truth. We deal with impure truths rather than pure falsehoods.
4. To purifying our imperfect usage of language, Plato allows a multiplicity of voices and meanings. His writings emerge as an internal dialogue: as memories of 'logoi', words and arguments that constitute the fabric of our cognition.
5. Therefore, Plato's philosophy evades labels of dogmatism and skepticism. It promotes, as a search for wisdom, a non-bipolar view of truth. Plato's truth is happening in us as we confront the world and allow an internal discussion about our experience rather than to be a truth existent outside us and apprehended as such.
The first enquiry deals with the issue of epistemological fiction in Platonic method of hypothesis. The second fiction studied is the political fiction of the 'Noble lie' of the 'Republic'. The last three enquiries discuss the broad concept of literary fiction, viewed as the craft of story-making out of elements of various origin and nature and as a language conveying insights that the rational discourse cannot communicate.
The first enquiry analyses passages of 'Parmenides' two through a symbolic notation developed for this purpose. The symbolisation attributes to Plato a model of linguistic reference close to the medieval theory of suppositions, and radically different from Tarski's concept of satisfaction. The second enquiry discusses Platonic definitions of falsehood and lies and shows the places of the 'Noble lie' within the argumentative framework of the 'Republic'. This framework is built by a set of two hypotheses, one about human nature, and one about the nature of a city. The hypotheses are developed into two complementary images. The deep structure of the Form of Justice may be discerned in those images, but Plato's argument remains incomplete. The third enquiry analyses the myth of the 'Statesman' as a product of literary creation, in which author's freedom is guided by the traditions he invokes and by his philosophical goals. The fourth enquiry opposes the image of direct vision of forms to the Platonic methods and practices of indirect study of forms. The fifth enquiry discusses instances of Plato's late metaphor of writing and drawing in the soul in its role of rudimentary ontology of mind. Viewed in the light of arguments in the 'Parmenides', which deny presence of pure forms in human minds, the image loses its apparent literary character.
The conclusions of the enquiries unveil a coherent set of presuppositions about falsehood, language, cognition, and philosophy. Those presuppositions make it practically impossible to elucidate the work of Plato through the notion of fiction.
1. There is no clear idea of 'concept' in Plato. Our minds contain words and images only. Rather than to record an (imperfect) copy of a form, we learn about them through repeating and remembering arguments. The mysterious direct insight into Forms emerges only on the occasion of such argumentation.
2. Lacking clear idea of concept, Plato cannot discuss fictions. Only concepts understood as separate from the activity of knowing can be used in fictional propositions, deprived of literal truth-value. Speakers need to understand that they can play with concepts before they formulate fictional claims with a variety of purposes.
3. The idea of fiction presupposes a bipolar theoretical division of our claims into truths and falsehoods. For Plato, our falsehoods or fictions are rather distorted truths. Truth may be distorted deliberately, but is also present, as distorted, in erroneous cognition. Human cognition and usage of language is burdened with imperfections. In spite of that, human cognition is focused on truth. We deal with impure truths rather than pure falsehoods.
4. To purifying our imperfect usage of language, Plato allows a multiplicity of voices and meanings. His writings emerge as an internal dialogue: as memories of 'logoi', words and arguments that constitute the fabric of our cognition.
5. Therefore, Plato's philosophy evades labels of dogmatism and skepticism. It promotes, as a search for wisdom, a non-bipolar view of truth. Plato's truth is happening in us as we confront the world and allow an internal discussion about our experience rather than to be a truth existent outside us and apprehended as such.