Algorithms for Complex Collective Decisions on Structured Domains

Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games

Autori: Birmpas, Georgios; Gan, Jiarui; Hollender, Alexandros; Marmolejo-Cossío, Francisco J.; Rajgopal, Ninad; Voudouris, Alexandros A.
Pubblicato in: NeurIPS'20, Numero 34, 2020
Editore: NeurIPS Fundation

Multiwinner Candidacy Games

Autori: Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov, Edith Elkind, Marek Grzesiuk
Pubblicato in: AAMAS'20, 2020
Editore: IFAAMAS

On Swap Convexity of Voting Rules

Autori: Svetlana Obraztsova, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski
Pubblicato in: AAAI'20, 2020
Editore: AAAI Press
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5560

The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods

Autori: Xiaohui Bei, Xinhang Lu, Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Numero 28, 2019, Pagina/e 81-87, ISBN 978-0-9992411-4-1
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/12

Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queries

Autori: Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros Voudouris
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Numero 34/02, 2020, Pagina/e 1782-1789, ISSN 2374-3468
Editore: AAAI Press
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5544

Fairly Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Items

Autori: Warut Suksompong
Pubblicato in: Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, SAGT 2017, L’Aquila, Italy, September 12–14, 2017, Proceedings, Numero 10504, 2017, Pagina/e 333-344, ISBN 978-3-319-66699-0
Editore: Springer International Publishing
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_26

Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections

Autori: Dominik Peters
Pubblicato in: AAMAS'18, 2018
Editore: IFAAMAS

Margin of Victory in Tournaments: Structural and Experimental Results

Autori: Brill, Markus; Schmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike; Suksompong, Warut
Pubblicato in: AAAI'21, Numero 35, 2021
Editore: AAAI Press

The Price of Connectivity in Fair Division

Autori: Bei, Xiaohui; Igarashi, Ayumi; Lu, Xinhang; Suksompong, Warut
Pubblicato in: AAAI'21, Numero 35, 2021
Editore: AAAI Press

Keeping Your Friends Close: Land Allocation with Friends

Autori: Edith Elkind, Neel Patel, Alan Tsang, Yair Zick
Pubblicato in: IJCAI'20, 2020
Editore: IJCAI Organisation
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2020/45

The Condorcet Principle for Multiwinner Elections: From Shortlisting to Proportionality

Autori: Haris Aziz, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Martin Lackner, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017, Pagina/e 84-90, ISBN 9780-999241103
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2017/13

On the Complexity of Extended and Proportional Justified Representation

Autori: Haris Aziz, Edith Elkind, Shenwei Huang, Martin Lackner, Luis Sanchez-Fernandez, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018, Pagina/e 902-909
Editore: AAAI Press

Single-Peakedness and Total Unimodularity: New Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Multi-Winner Elections

Autori: Dominik Peters
Pubblicato in: Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018
Editore: AAAI Press

Cooperative Games With Bounded Dependency Degree

Autori: Ayumi Igarashi, Rani Izsak, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018
Editore: AAAI Press

Manipulating Opinion Diffusion in Social Networks

Autori: Robert Bredereck, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017, Pagina/e 894-900, ISBN 9780-999241103
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2017/124

Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules

Autori: Martin Lackner, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation - EC '18, 2018, Pagina/e 47-48, ISBN 9781-450358293
Editore: ACM Press
DOI: 10.1145/3219166.3219170

On Recognising Nearly Single-Crossing Preferences

Autori: Florian Jaeckle, Dominik Peters, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018
Editore: AAAI Press

Fair Division of a Graph

Autori: Sylvain Bouveret, Katarína Cechlárová, Edith Elkind, Ayumi Igarashi, Dominik Peters
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017, Pagina/e 135-141, ISBN 9780-999241103
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2017/20

Proportional Rankings

Autori: Piotr Skowron, Martin Lackner, Markus Brill, Dominik Peters, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017, Pagina/e 409-415, ISBN 9780-999241103
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2017/58

Multiwinner Elections With Diversity Constraints

Autori: Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Ayumi Igarashi, Martin Lackner, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018, Pagina/e 933-940
Editore: AAAI Press

Justified Representation in Multiwinner Voting: Axioms and Algorithms

Autori: Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: 37th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2017), Numero annual, 2017, Pagina/e 1-10
Editore: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2017.1

Effective Heuristics for Committee Scoring Rules

Autori: Piotr Faliszewski, Martin Lackner, Dominik Peters, Nimrod Talmon
Pubblicato in: Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018
Editore: AAAI Press

Precise Complexity of the Core in Dichotomous and Additive Hedonic Games

Autori: Dominik Peters
Pubblicato in: Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2017, 2017, Pagina/e 214-227
Editore: Springer International Publishing
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_15

OWA-Based Extensions of the Chamberlin–Courant Rule

Autori: Edith Elkind, Anisse Ismaili
Pubblicato in: 4th International Conference on Algorithmic DecisionTheory, 2015
Editore: Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_29

Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: Recent Progress

Autori: Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, Dominik Peters
Pubblicato in: Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016
Editore: IJCAI/AAAI Press

Trembling Hand Equilibria of Plurality Voting

Autori: Svetlana Obraztsova, Zinovi Rabinovich, Edith Elkind, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings
Pubblicato in: Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016
Editore: AAAI/IJCAI Press

Pairwise Diffusion of Preference Rankings in Social Networks

Autori: Markus Brill, Edith Elkind, Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi
Pubblicato in: Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016
Editore: IJCAI/AAAI Press

Complexity of Finding Equilibria of Plurality Voting Under Structured Preferences

Autori: Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016
Editore: IFAAMAS

Hedonic Games with Graph-restricted Communication

Autori: Ayumi Igarashi, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016
Editore: IFAAMAS

Manipulating Citation Indices in a Social Context

Autori: Chrystalla Pavlou, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016
Editore: IFAAMAS

Preferences Single-Peaked on Nice Trees

Autori: Dominik Peters, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016
Editore: AAAI Press

Price of Pareto Optimality in Hedonic Games

Autori: Edith Elkind, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini
Pubblicato in: Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016
Editore: AAAI Press

Social Choice Under Metric Preferences: Scoring Rules and STV

Autori: Piotr Skowron, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
Editore: AAAI Press

What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain

Autori: Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jean-Francois Laslier, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon
Pubblicato in: 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
Editore: AAAI Press

Group Activity Selection on Social Networks

Autori: Ayumi Igarashi, Dominik Peters, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
Editore: AAAI Press

Proportional Justified Representation

Autori: Luis Sanchez-Fernandez, Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, Norberto Fernandez, Jesus A. Fisteus, Pablo Basanta Val, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
Editore: AAAI Press

Recognising Multidimensional Euclidean Preferences

Autori: Dominik Peters
Pubblicato in: 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
Editore: AAAI Press

Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle

Autori: Dominik Peters, Martin Lackner
Pubblicato in: 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
Editore: AAAI Press

Phragmen’s Voting Methods and Justified Representation

Autori: Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, Svante Janson, Martin Lackner
Pubblicato in: 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
Editore: AAAI Press

Winner Determination in Huge Elections with MapReduce

Autori: Theresa Csar, Martin Lackner, Reinhard Pichler, Emanuel Sallinger
Pubblicato in: 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
Editore: AAAI Press

Multiwinner Approval Rules as Apportionment Methods

Autori: Markus Brill, Jean-Francois Laslier, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
Editore: AAAI Press

FPT Approximation Schemes for Maximizing Submodular Functions

Autori: Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, 2016
Editore: Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_23

Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Classification and Hierarchy

Autori: Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon
Pubblicato in: Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016
Editore: IJCAI/AAAI Press

Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success: Complexity Results for Approval-Based Multiwinner Rules

Autori: Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Nimrod Talmon
Pubblicato in: 2017 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2017
Editore: IFAAMAS

On Parameterized Complexity of Group Activity Selection Problems on Social Networks

Autori: Ayumi Igarashi, Edith Elkind and Robert Bredereck
Pubblicato in: 2017 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2017
Editore: IFAAMAS

Doodle Poll Games

Autori: Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov, Zinovi Rabinovich and Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: 2017 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2017
Editore: IFAAMAS

False-Name-Proof Recommendations in Social Networks

Autori: Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah
Pubblicato in: 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016
Editore: IFAAMAS

Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs

Autori: Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill, Yuqian Li
Pubblicato in: 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016
Editore: AAAI Press

Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners)

Autori: Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, Vincent Conitzer
Pubblicato in: 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016
Editore: AAAI Press

Protecting Elections by Recounting Ballots

Autori: Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Svetlana Obraztsova, Zinovi Rabinovich, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, Pagina/e 259-265, ISBN 978-0-9992411-4-1
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/37

Hedonic Diversity Games

Autori: Robert Bredereck, Edith Elkind, Ayumi Igarashi
Pubblicato in: AAMAS'19, 2019
Editore: IFAAMAS

Correlating Preferences and Attributes: Nearly Single-Crossing Profiles

Autori: Foram Lakhani, Dominik Peters, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, Pagina/e 414-420, ISBN 978-0-9992411-4-1
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/59

Schelling Games on Graphs

Autori: Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Ayumi Igarashi, Warut Suksompong, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, Pagina/e 266-272, ISBN 978-0-9992411-4-1
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/38

Fairness Towards Groups of Agents in the Allocation of Indivisible Items

Autori: Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Edith Elkind, Yair Zick
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, Pagina/e 95-101, ISBN 978-0-9992411-4-1
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/14

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals

Autori: Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation - EC '19, 2019, Pagina/e 751-752, ISBN 9781-450367929
Editore: ACM Press
DOI: 10.1145/3328526.3329557

Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Sampling and Tree Recognition

Autori: Jakub Sliwinski, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, Pagina/e 580-586, ISBN 978-0-9992411-4-1
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/82

Multigoal Committee Selection

Autori: Maciej Kocot, Anna Kolonko, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Nimrod Talmon
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, Pagina/e 385-391, ISBN 978-0-9992411-4-1
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/55

Portioning Using Ordinal Preferences: Fairness and Efficiency

Autori: Stéphane Airiau, Haris Aziz, Ioannis Caragiannis, Justin Kruger, Jérôme Lang, Dominik Peters
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, Pagina/e 11-17, ISBN 978-0-9992411-4-1
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/2

Single Transferable Vote: Incomplete Knowledge and Communication Issues

Autori: Manel Ayadi, Nahla Ben Amor, Jérôme Lang, Dominik Peters
Pubblicato in: AAMAS'19, 2019
Editore: IFAAMAS

Almost Envy-Freeness in Group Resource Allocation

Autori: Maria Kyropoulou, Warut Suksompong, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, Pagina/e 400-406, ISBN 978-0-9992411-4-1
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/57

Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules and Strategic Voting

Autori: Martin Lackner, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018, Pagina/e 340-346, ISBN 9780-999241127
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2018/47

A Quantitative Analysis of Multi-Winner Rules

Autori: Martin Lackner, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, Pagina/e 407-413, ISBN 978-0-9992411-4-1
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/58

Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation

Autori: Bullinger, Martin; Suksompong, Warut; Voudouris, Alexandros A.
Pubblicato in: AAAI'21, Numero 35, 2021
Editore: AAAI Press

Algorithms for Swap and Shift Bribery in Structured Elections

Autori: Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Sushmita Gupta, Sanjukta Roy
Pubblicato in: AAMAS'20, 2020
Editore: IFAAMAS

Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation

Autori: Elkind, Edith; Segal-Halevi, Erel; Suksompong, Warut
Pubblicato in: AAAI'21, Numero 35, 2021
Editore: AAAI Press

Stable Roommate Problem with Diversity Preferences

Autori: Niclas Boehmer, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Numero 29, 2020, Pagina/e 96-102, ISBN 978-0-9992411-6-5
Editore: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2020/14

Mechanism Design for Defense Coordination in Security Games

Autori: Jiarui Gan, Edith Elkind, Sarit Kraus, Michael J. Wooldridge
Pubblicato in: AAMAS'20, 2020
Editore: IFAAMAS

Individual-Based Stability in Hedonic Diversity Games

Autori: Niclas Boehmer, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Numero 34/02, 2020, Pagina/e 1822-1829, ISSN 2374-3468
Editore: AAAI Press
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5549

United for Change: Deliberative Coalition Formation toChange the Status Quo

Autori: Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon
Pubblicato in: AAAI'21, 2021
Editore: AAAI Press

When Do Envy-Free Allocations Exist?

Autori: Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong
Pubblicato in: SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, Numero 34/3, 2020, Pagina/e 1505-1521, ISSN 0895-4801
Editore: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
DOI: 10.1137/19m1279125

Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules

Autori: Martin Lackner, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Artificial Intelligence, Numero 288, 2020, Pagina/e 103366, ISSN 0004-3702
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2020.103366

Contiguous Cake Cutting: Hardness Results and Approximation Algorithms

Autori: Paul Goldberg, Alexandros Hollender, Warut Suksompong
Pubblicato in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, Numero 69, 2020, Pagina/e 109-141, ISSN 1076-9757
Editore: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc.
DOI: 10.1613/jair.1.12222

Behavioural strategies in weighted Boolean games

Autori: Dongge Han, Paul Harrenstein, Steven Nugent, Jonathan Philpott, Michael Wooldridge
Pubblicato in: Information and Computation, Numero 276, 2021, Pagina/e 104556, ISSN 0890-5401
Editore: Academic Press
DOI: 10.1016/j.ic.2020.104556

Computing a small agreeable set of indivisible items

Autori: Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong
Pubblicato in: Artificial Intelligence, Numero 268, 2019, Pagina/e 96-114, ISSN 0004-3702
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2018.10.001

Campaign Management Under Approval-Driven Voting Rules

Autori: Ildiko Schlotter, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Elkind
Pubblicato in: Algorithmica, Numero 77/1, 2017, Pagina/e 84-115, ISSN 0178-4617
Editore: Springer Verlag
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-015-0064-0

Envy-freeness in house allocation problems

Autori: Jiarui Gan, Warut Suksompong, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Pubblicato in: Mathematical Social Sciences, Numero 101, 2019, Pagina/e 104-106, ISSN 0165-4896
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.07.005

Swap Stability in Schelling Games on Graphs

Autori: Aishwarya Agarwal, Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Alexandros Voudouris
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Numero 34/02, 2020, Pagina/e 1758-1765, ISSN 2374-3468
Editore: AAAI Press
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5541

Protecting elections by recounting ballots

Autori: Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Svetlana Obraztsova, Zinovi Rabinovich, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Pubblicato in: Artificial Intelligence, 2020, ISSN 0004-3702
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2020.103401

Refining Tournament Solutions via Margin of Victory

Autori: Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Numero 34/02, 2020, Pagina/e 1862-1869, ISSN 2374-3468
Editore: AAAI Press
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5554

A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain

Autori: Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Social Choice and Welfare, Numero 54/1, 2020, Pagina/e 167-181, ISSN 0176-1714
Editore: Springer Verlag
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01216-3

The distortion of distributed voting

Autori: Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Evi Micha, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Pubblicato in: Artificial Intelligence, Numero 286, 2020, Pagina/e 103343, ISSN 0004-3702
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2020.103343

Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k -approval voting

Autori: Edith Elkind, Umberto Grandi, Francesca Rossi, Arkadii Slinko
Pubblicato in: Mathematical Social Sciences, Numero 108, 2020, Pagina/e 193-205, ISSN 0165-4896
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.07.001

Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX

Autori: Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros Hollender, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Pubblicato in: Theoretical Computer Science, 2021, ISSN 0304-3975
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2021.02.020

Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences

Autori: Elliot Anshelevich, Onkar Bhardwaj, Edith Elkind, John Postl, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Artificial Intelligence, Numero 264, 2018, Pagina/e 27-51, ISSN 0004-3702
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2018.07.006

Multi-attribute proportional representation

Autori: Jérôme Lang, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Artificial Intelligence, Numero 263, 2018, Pagina/e 74-106, ISSN 0004-3702
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2018.07.005

Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions: Charting the tractability frontier

Autori: Yair Zick, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis
Pubblicato in: Artificial Intelligence, Numero 271, 2019, Pagina/e 74-97, ISSN 0004-3702
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2018.11.006

Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods

Autori: Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Pubblicato in: Artificial Intelligence, Numero 277, 2019, Pagina/e 103167, ISSN 0004-3702
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2019.103167

On the number of almost envy-free allocations

Autori: Warut Suksompong
Pubblicato in: Discrete Applied Mathematics, Numero 284, 2020, Pagina/e 606-610, ISSN 0166-218X
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.dam.2020.03.039

On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences

Autori: Marie-Louise Lackner, Martin Lackner
Pubblicato in: Social Choice and Welfare, Numero 48/4, 2017, Pagina/e 717-745, ISSN 0176-1714
Editore: Springer Verlag
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1033-0

FPT approximation schemes for maximizing submodular functions

Autori: Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Information and Computation, Numero 257, 2017, Pagina/e 65-78, ISSN 0890-5401
Editore: Academic Press
DOI: 10.1016/j.ic.2017.10.002

Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives

Autori: Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon
Pubblicato in: Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, ISSN 0176-1714
Editore: Springer Verlag
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1126-4

Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods

Autori: Markus Brill, Jean-François Laslier, Piotr Skowron
Pubblicato in: Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2018, Pagina/e 095162981877551, ISSN 0951-6298
Editore: SAGE Publications
DOI: 10.1177/0951629818775518

A hybrid exact algorithm for complete set partitioning

Autori: Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Edith Elkind, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R. Jennings
Pubblicato in: Artificial Intelligence Journal, 2016, ISSN 0004-3702
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2015.09.006

Finding a collective set of items: From proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation

Autori: Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski, Jérôme Lang
Pubblicato in: Artificial Intelligence Journal, 2016, ISSN 0004-3702
Editore: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2016.09.003

Computational Aspects of Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates

Autori: Gábor Erdélyi, Martin Lackner, Andreas Pfandler
Pubblicato in: Journal of AI Research, 2017, ISSN 1076-9757
Editore: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc.
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1026-z

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-1024-x

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DOI: 10.1145/2963093

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0596-4

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DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012045

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DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2018.11.001

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ipl.2018.11.004

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DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011796

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DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5547

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DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2020.103357

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1112-x

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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.011

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_27

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_26

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