The Making of a Lopsided Union: Economic Integration in the European Economic Community, 1957-1992

Informazioni relative al progetto

EURECON

ID dell’accordo di sovvenzione: 716849

DOI

10.3030/716849

Progetto chiuso

Data della firma CE 25 Gennaio 2017

Data di avvio 1 Marzo 2017

Data di completamento 31 Dicembre 2023

Finanziato da

• EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC)

Costo totale

€ 1 498 451,00

Contributo UE

€ 1 498 451,00

Coordinato da

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Italy

Periodic Reporting for period 5 - EURECON (The Making of a Lopsided Union: Economic Integration in the European Economic Community, 1957-1992)

Periodo di rendicontazione: 2023-01-01 al 2023-12-31

Sintesi del contesto e degli obiettivi generali del progetto

What is the problem/issue being addressed?

The project investigated European policymakers’ views about how to make the European Economic Community (EEC) fit for a monetary union. It assessed the origins of the issues that are currently bedevilling the EU. From the EEC's creation in 1957 to the decision to create the euro in 1992, several proposals were tabled to improve the functioning of the EEC as a possible Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Three interconnected domains are crucial to support an economic union in a currency union – the E of EMU – and were continuously discussed before 1992: macroeconomic policy coordination, fiscal transfers, and banking regulation/supervision. The project provided the first historical appraisal of these proposals and debates, and identified the dynamics of political and economic trade-offs and compromises, shifting priorities, and alternative approaches abandoned at the time but recycled later. The project also encouraged the study of the critical influence of non-EEC and non-state actors and factors on the European decision-making level.

Why is it important for society?

The project contextualised the current policy debates in the Eurozone and shed light on the post-Maastricht evolution of the EU thanks to a greater understanding of its foundations. The current system's shortcomings suggest that the analysis of how these structures were established and of the reasons for the choices made by European policymakers at the time will give a fresh perspective to future options in this major policy area.

Conclusions of the action?

The project provided a systemic analysis linking the three strands of economic integration – macroeconomic policy coordination, fiscal transfers, and banking regulation/supervision – in the EEC and how this economic integration was connected – or not – to the possible creation of a single currency. The results of the analyses highlight three aspects. First, research shows a much richer and more vivid debate than expected on the ‘E’ of EMU, as evidenced in the EURECON database. Second, the project underscores that the continued reluctance of EEC member states’ governments to centralise decision-making at the EEC level was central to the failure of proposals related to the E of EMU (Mourlon-Druol’s book). Third, research highlights that non-state actors were passive rather than proactive in the development of the E of EMU and anticipated little and often ill-understood the implications of a full European monetary union.

Lavoro eseguito dall’inizio del progetto fino alla fine del periodo coperto dalla relazione e principali risultati finora ottenuti

This overview is divided into two interconnected strands.

The first focuses on the EEC member states’ governments and the EEC itself, and resulted in the publication of 4 journal articles, 6 book chapters and 1 monograph.

[1] Based on unprecedented archival research spanning all EEC member states and EEC institutions, Mourlon-Druol’s book tentatively entitled The Resilience of the Nation State: How Monetary Union Shelved Economic Union, from Rome to Maastricht (under contract with Cornell University Press, forthcoming 2025/26) is the first analysis focusing on the E of EMU and covering 35 years of debates and quarrels on the issue. It shows that the incompleteness of EMU at Maastricht is not due to a lack of alternative ideas. It reinstates the richness of the debate and the voice of actors made invisible by an exclusive focus on the ‘great men’ of European integration. It argues that the main obstacle to creating a more balanced EMU was the opposition to the centralisation of decision-making at the EEC level.
[2] Drach and Mourlon-Druol’s article is the first to explore how the European Commission’s directorate general for economic and financial affairs developed from 1957 to 1992 and supported the creation of EMU.
[3] Mourlon-Druol and Bergamini’s article is the first to explore the records of the discussions that took place with the Delors Committee on EMU, and shows that ‘economic union’ was widely and actively discussed during meetings.

The second strand focused on the role of non-state actors. It resulted in 5 journal articles, 1 non-refereed article, 1 monograph, the defence of 2 PhDs and 2 forthcoming special issues in leading academic journals.

[1] Schnippering’s PhD and Andry’s publications uncover both the creativity and passivity of trade unions in the making of EMU.
[2] Drach’s publications highlight banks’ early opposition or scepticism on the development of EEC banking regulation/supervision as well as on the free movement of capital, and then their interest in the subject at a later stage.
[3] Komornicka showed the stable support but scant initiative of European business associations on EMU. A special issue in Business History (forthcoming in 2025/2026) will provide further case studies and connect EMU's business and financial histories.
[4] Todd explored the ambivalent influence of ordoliberalism on EMU in her PhD. A special issue in Contemporary European History (forthcoming in 2025/2026) will analyse the views of different economic schools of thought on the making of the euro.

Progressi oltre lo stato dell’arte e potenziale impatto previsto (incluso l’impatto socioeconomico e le implicazioni sociali più ampie del progetto fino ad ora)

This project went beyond the state of the art in the field regarding the argument and the methods.

Before the start of this project, the ‘E’ of EMU was barely explored in the literature, which focused essentially on monetary union. The project researched EMU in a complex framework involving up to twelve EEC member states, the EEC institutions, non-state actors, and economic thought. Conceptually, the project not only contributed to changing our understanding of the making of EMU. It also reframed the place of EMU in European cooperation and integration, broadly speaking. Indeed, several aspects studied as part of the “economic union” were only considered relevant in the literature for the development of the common/single market. For instance, the historiography on regional or social policy presents these policies as only related to the making of the common/single market. Conversely, Mourlon-Druol’s book shows how European policymakers also framed these policies as part and parcel of the making of an EMU.

Second, the project used the digital toolbox available to the historian fully. The article by Mourlon-Druol and Bergamini in the Journal of Digital History uses a wide array of methodologies – close reading, listening to audio tapes, text mining, network analysis – to open the “black box” of the records of the Delors Committee and provide evidence on the extent to which its members dealt with the issue of “economic union.” Mourlon-Druol’s book extensively uses network analysis to reinstate the role of actors made invisible by a focus on the ‘great men’ of European integration.

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