A large body work in liberal-institutional political science literature highlights the demands of mobilized domestic groups and their respective power as the primary force that shapes state policy. In the realm of trade, examining the domestic foundations of international cooperation involves incorporating the role of firms in international rule-making and rule-abiding. Yet, even though the importance of domestic sources of support for international trade has been noted, the function of global corporations in influencing international economic policies has received scant attention. PROSPER contributed to this strand of the literature by demonstrating the role of multinational corporations in trade governance, the political activities of firms, and the extent to which gains from trade liberalization are distributed among firms.
The project has broadly contributed to the nascent literature on globalization of production - or the so-called "global value chains" and firm-centric views of trade policy. It highlighted how firms' internationalization incentivizes firms to go after policy objectives and how institutional elements in a country mediate gains and losses from trade opening. Moreover, the interdisciplinary article & special issue that appeared in Business and Politics shed light on multiple dimensions of the relationship of firms to global trade governance. Contributions examine the ability of these powerful economic actors to mobilize politically, counterbalance global regulation, push for trade-liberalizing policies, and strategically organize their operations through GVCs, all to their benefit. While contributing to several streams of research, the collection highlights the need to apply an interdisciplinary perspective to the study of firms and economic governance.
Overall, the societal implications are twofold. First, with regards to the activity of firms, the project has shown that indeed firms are central actors in trade governance and act together with enterprises in their network. This finding indicates that firms not only go after their policy objectives on their own, but also support the mobilization of their corporate family members. In turn, this finding highlights the relative decline of sector associations and the increase in firms' independent political activity. As a result, since particularly resourceful firms are able to carry their political demands to policymakers, interest representation might be skewed in their favor. Second, with regards to the impact of globalization of production on economic governance, my project and the results I have achieved so far show that the largest and most productive firms - i.e. multinationals - dominate the political scene. My results contribute to the literature by showing that firms employ various strategies to achieve their political goals and policymakers face important choices with regards to regulating their access to public policy making.
