The project investigates whether the development of cooperative motives can encourage young children to transgress. For this purpose, we have conducted – or are in the process of conducting – 10 studies involving over 700 German children aged 4 to 8 examining their tendency to a) cheat in games, b) show partiality when enforcing rules, and c) engage in strategic ignorance, that is, to avoid information about the negative consequences their own behavior.
Cheating: We first demonstrated that, from a neutral observer perspective, 5-8-year-olds evaluate cheating negatively, even when it is prosocially motivated and when the beneficiary of the cheating act had previously benefited the transgressor. In behavioral experiments, however, 7-8-year-olds tended to cheat to benefit a partner, especially if that partner had previously shared a resource with them, indicating that the motive to reciprocate favors can encourage young children to violate rules they otherwise approve of. We now investigate from what age children display this tendency and whether also cheat more when collaborating with a partner towards a shared purpose compared to when acting alone.
Unequal norm enforcement: The impartial enforcement of norms and laws is a hallmark of fair societies. A series of experiments revealed that an appreciation of this fact develops early: children aged 5 and older consistently disapproved of individuals who enforce norms unequally. Further, by age 6-7 children accept mitigating circumstances as a reason for unequal norm enforcement but specifically condemn enforcers who selectively spare transgressors out of favoritism. In behavioral experiments, by contrast, children tended to protect transgressors whom they owed a favor, suggesting that the motive to live up to one’s cooperative obligations can compromise impartial norm enforcement already in young children.
Strategic ignorance: In a series of studies, we currently explore when children first deliberately avoid information they could easily acquire and if they do so strategically to license selfishness. Next, we investigate if children deploy strategic ignorance specifically for cooperative ends (e.g. when pursuing joint goals).
Thus far, the project has already accumulated strong evidence that, while showing a principled rejection of cheating and the partial sanctioning of transgressions, the motive to reciprocate favors can lead children to contribute to engage in these exact behaviors, revealing a dark side of cooperation already in early childhood.