Periodic Reporting for period 3 - ProblemShifting (Problem-Shifting between International Environmental Treaty Regimes: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions)
Periodo di rendicontazione: 2024-05-01 al 2025-10-31
Every month, governments around the world gather to make important decisions to solve global environmental problems. However, their decisions often lead to new, and sometimes even more chronic and severe, environmental problems – what is known as global ‘environmental problem-shifting’. With over a thousand international environmental treaties in force, the scale and complexity of environmental problem-shifting is severe and expected to increase. PROBLEMSHIFTING explains why problem-shifting occurs between international environmental treaties and examines the systemic effects of problem-shifting in global environmental governance. Building on these findings, we offer innovative governance solutions that help ensure our global environmental efforts add up to a net positive impact.
The project team has undertaken several types of research activities, including conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and empirical work. Data has been collected from a range of sources, including websites, databases, social media, interviews, surveys, literature, and documents. International environmental treaty regimes covered to date include those on climate change, biodiversity, wetlands, desertification, chemicals, hazardous waste, ozone depletion, marine pollution, plastics, space, plastics, and fisheries. A database on problem-shifting has been developed through a survey (www.problemshifting.directory) and further data collection is underway for a comprehensive mapping of problem-shifting between international environmental treaty regimes.
The project is on track to make a contribution to our understanding of the architecture of global governance by explaining why some regimes cooperate while others do not, and how the complex pattern of regime interaction affects collective performance. Although it is too early to draw conclusions, we are finding evidence to support the claim that international environmental regimes often choose to achieve their own goals by shifting problems onto others rather than solving them. We are finding conditions under which this happens. We are also finding that when there is an obvious risk of problem-shifting, some treaty regimes proactively counter the risk while others do not, and we are finding the reasons why. We are developing a comprehensive map of problem-shifting between international environmental treaty regimes, and are well on the way to exploring the systemic effects of problem-shifting beyond the regimes directly involved. We are also developing a set of responses to ensure that global environmental efforts have a net positive impact, based on a critical understanding of when and how they work.