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Duality in Market Design: Theory and Applications

Description du projet

Concevoir des marchés équitables et efficaces

La conception de marchés d’appariement et d’enchères a permis de rapprocher la théorie et la pratique économiques. Mais de nombreux marchés importants, comme celui du logement, concernent des biens indivisibles, très hétérogènes et significatifs sur le plan budgétaire. Il est donc difficile d’en réglementer l’équité et l’efficacité. Le projet DUALMARKETS, financé par l’UE, permettra de concevoir des marchés équitables et efficaces pour les participants ayant des préférences et des effets de revenu variés. Les chercheurs examineront la dualité de l’existence d’un équilibre concurrentiel et la dualité du concept de solution coopérative entre des économies avec et sans effets de revenu en vue de créer différentes conceptions d’enchères multi-articles à offres scellées. Cela permettra d’établir un lien entre l’équilibre concurrentiel, les marchés d’appariement et les nouvelles enchères et aussi d’améliorer la boîte à outils de la conception des marchés, pour aboutir à une gestion efficace de la diversité des préférences.

Objectif

Market design uses economic theory to improve the function of real-world marketplaces, such as matching systems and auctions. In many markets, participants trade goods which are indivisible and highly heterogeneous. My focus is on settings in which participants also experience “income effects”. Income effects arise when participants face budget constraints or when transactions substantially affect participants’ wealth. Income effects are present in many important markets: from spectrum licenses and airport landing slots to jobs and houses. But designing well-functioning marketplaces for participants who experience income effects is challenging both in theory and in practice. As a result, income effects are often ignored in marketplace design, leading to unfair and inefficient outcomes.

The goal of DUALMARKETS is to understand how to design fair and efficient marketplaces for participants with diverse preferences and income effects. Marketplaces work well when supply equals demand and when participants cannot improve their outcomes by renegotiating. First, I will develop powerful novel conditions on participants’ preferences which allow for income effects and guarantee that market-clearing prices always exist. Second, I will analyse to what extent outcomes in multi-sided matching markets are robust to cooperative renegotiation among unsatisfied participants. To achieve these two objectives, I will establish a Competitive Equilibrium Existence Duality and a Cooperative Solution Concept Duality between economies with and without income effects. Finally, I will explore applications of these Dualities to auction design. Specifically, I will develop several designs of sealed-bid multi-item auctions in which bidders can experience income effects.

The new connections between competitive equilibrium, matching markets, and auctions developed in DUALMARKETS will substantially enrich the market design toolkit to better cope with the diversity of real-world preferences.

Régime de financement

ERC-STG - Starting Grant

Institution d’accueil

THE CHANCELLOR, MASTERS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
Contribution nette de l'UE
€ 1 060 381,00
Adresse
WELLINGTON SQUARE UNIVERSITY OFFICES
OX1 2JD Oxford
Royaume-Uni

Voir sur la carte

Région
South East (England) Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire Oxfordshire
Type d’activité
Higher or Secondary Education Establishments
Liens
Coût total
€ 1 060 381,00

Bénéficiaires (1)