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The Origins of Elite Defections

Project description

Why some elites don't stay loyal to their regime

Autocrats use their elites to defend the safety of their system of power. These parties, coalitions and groups enjoy privileges and profits. In return, they are observed, blackmailed, and risk severe punishments for behaviours considered a threat to the regime. Despite this, members of elites often choose to oppose the system. Why do they do it? What is the role of factors like linkages to the opposition, international pressure, or regime popularity? The EU-funded Elite Defections project aims to research in-depth these questions applying quantitative and qualitative tools and a cross-regional comparative approach focusing on defectors in Latin America using comparison to African cases, such as Ghana and Uganda.

Objective

Autocrats cannot rule alone. To guarantee their personal safety/regime survival, they often build authoritarian parties/coalitions. In return for their services and support, authoritarian elites receive benefits, privileges, spoils and protection. This support, however, is not unconditional and autocrats know so. Therefore, they have to constantly watch over these elites -and resort to blackmail, repression, or jailing- to prevent splits and/or spin-off movements that could lead to regime collapse. In spite of the uncertainty and risks that come with defections, including losing privileges, benefits or protection, some elites still choose to break away. Why does this happen? Several studies have looked at the role of defectors in transition processes and have tried to answer why defections occur. They have found that spoil-sharing, institutional framework, co-optation, repression, economic crisis or liberalization (or lack thereof) can promote elite cohesion or, in turn, incentivize defections. While this scholarship makes important contributions, several questions remain. Given that defections do not always occur at once, what explains defections over time? To what extent do linkages to the opposition and their capacity to absorb defectors matter? Does international pressure hinder or promote defections? Does regime popularity inhibit defections? By using quantitative and qualitative tools and a cross-regional comparative approach, this project titled “The Origins of Elite Defections” will address these questions. So far there has been no systematic research on defectors in Latin America that combines both qualitative (elite interviews) and quantitative analysis (creation of original database on defectors), with a cross-regional comparison using African cases, such as Ghana and Uganda. In doing so, this project will shed light on the patterns and timing of defections thereby contributing to a better understanding of authoritarian demise and survival.

Fields of science (EuroSciVoc)

Keywords

Programme(s)

Topic(s)

Funding Scheme

MSCA-IF - Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships (IF)

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Call for proposal

(opens in new window) H2020-MSCA-IF-2020

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Coordinator

THE CHANCELLOR, MASTERS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
Net EU contribution
€ 271 732,80
Address
WELLINGTON SQUARE UNIVERSITY OFFICES
OX1 2JD Oxford
United Kingdom
Region
South East (England) Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire Oxfordshire
Activity type
Higher or Secondary Education Establishments
Links
Total cost
€ 271 732,80

Partners (1)