Moral Impossibility: Rethinking Choice and Conflict

Projektbeschreibung

Eine neue theoretische Struktur moralischer Unmöglichkeit

Moralische Unmöglichkeit beschreibt das, was außerhalb des Spektrums der Möglichkeiten liegt, die einer Person bei ihren Entscheidungen aus moralischen Gründen zu Verfügung stehen. Weit weniger offensichtlich prägen und begrenzen moralische Möglichkeiten alle Entscheidungen, oft im Verborgenen, einschließlich derer, die wir nie in Betracht ziehen, und derer, die nicht immer sinnvoll sind. Die Vernachlässigung der Rolle der moralischen Unmöglichkeit führt zu einer grundlegenden Fehldarstellung von Konfliktsituationen in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie. In diesem Zusammenhang wird das EU-finanzierte Projekt MIGHT eine neue theoretische Struktur der moralischen Unmöglichkeit entwickeln und eine Methode zur Analyse unlösbarer moralischer Konflikte vorschlagen. Es wird einen konzeptionellen Rahmen für die moralische Unmöglichkeit schaffen und deren umstrittensten Erscheinungsformen analysieren, um ein neues Verständnis für Ursachen und Bedeutung zu schaffen.

Ziel

The project aims to offer a theoretical framework for a significant yet under-explored set of phenomena which I will call ‘moral impossibility’ (MI), and to use the theoretical understanding achieved to propose a new approach to intractable moral conflict. MI refers to what – for moral reasons – lies outside the range of possibilities available in one’s choices. While empirical and logical impossibilities are widely accepted, moral ones are far less obvious, yet they shape and delimit, often silently, all choices. These include the possibilities we never consider, those we cannot make sense of (e.g. because too morally abhorrent), and those we consider but cannot bring ourselves to carry out. Neglecting the role of MI leads to crucial misrepresentations of situations of conflict in contemporary philosophy. Using recent case-studies, I propose to analyse intractable moral conflict in terms of moral possibilities that are not shared between the parties, in opposition to the dominant ‘disagreement’ model. The objectives of the research are 1) to construct a conceptual framework of MI, 2) to conduct a normative analysis of its most controversial manifestations, and 3) to use the conceptual and normative frameworks to offer a new understanding of the causes, meaning, and possible resolution, of intractable moral conflict. Each objective corresponds to a work package with a distinct methodology and contributing to a different branch of ethics: moral theory/moral psychology, normative ethics, and applied ethics. The action, proposed at a crucial stage in my research career, will be carried out at the Centre for Ethics as Study in Human Value at the University of Pardubice, where I will be trained in its distinctive research methods, case study analysis, and included in its wide European and global networks, and where I will in turn set up a new Czech-Irish link with my home institution (UCD)'s Centre for Ethics in Public Life.