Projektbeschreibung
Online-Marktplätze genau im Blick
Online-Marktplätze bringen Verkaufende und Konsumierende zusammen. Sie erfreuen sich großer Beliebtheit, sodass heute tatsächlich ungefähr die Hälfte aller Verkäufe im elektronischen Handel über Online-Marktplätze getätigt werden. Einige der sehr großen Plattformen sind jedoch in die Kritik geraten, weil sie ihre Monopolmacht gegenüber ihren Nutzenden (Konsumierenden, Verkaufenden, Werbetreibenden) missbrauchen und wettbewerbsfeindliche Praktiken anwenden. Das ERC-finanzierte Projekt FAPoD wird deshalb die Doppelrolle der Online-Marktplätze (Marktplatz und Verkauf) untersuchen. Erkundet wird außerdem, wie die Plattformen die Konsumierenden zu den Verkaufenden lenken. Auch die Beschaffenheit von Empfehlungsalgorithmen, insbesondere das Zusammenspiel zwischen der Suche der Kaufenden und der Effektivität der Algorithmen, wird Gegenstand der Forschung sein. Die Ergebnisse werden Aufschluss über kartellrechtliche Abhilfemaßnahmen für digitale Marktplätze geben.
Ziel
Internet markets tend to concentrate in the hands of a very few large platforms. These platforms have been accused of abusing their monopoly power vis-a-vis their users (consumers, sellers, advertisers) and maintaining the latter through hostile behavior towards potential competitors. They are said to harm users by ‘self-preferencing’, data harvesting, creating 'monopoly positions' and extracting resulting rents with high fees, all the while avoiding competition by acquiring, copying and otherwise disadvantaging potential competitors. This proposal addresses these concerns in four parts. Part 1 focuses on the dual role of online marketplaces, whereby the platform both runs the marketplace and acts as a seller on it. I aim to understand how such hybrid marketplaces conduct themselves toward consumers and third party sellers. The model will be used to evaluate recent policy proposals and suggest ways to avoid significant unintended consequences. Part 2 studies how platforms steer consumers to sellers. As most platforms let sellers set prices and collect fees on revenues, a platform’s own algorithm and her choice to augment/replace it with a position auction may be consequently driven by revenue maximization. I plan to show that steering systems may drastically alter pricing, leading to ‘mediated’ competition. Part 3 explores the nature of recommendation algorithms, particularly the interplay between consumer search and algorithm effectiveness. I demonstrate that algorithms may be self-fulfilling and self-defeating, which determines their effectiveness and significantly alters the resulting allocations and their efficiency. Part 4 explains the circumstances in which an incumbent platform may acquire an upstart platform. These depend on, the overlap of existing user bases, increasing returns to data and monopoly power over advertisers. Acquisitions may be used in situations of both no and substantial overlap in user bases, with mixed welfare consequences.
Wissenschaftliches Gebiet
Programm/Programme
- HORIZON.1.1 - European Research Council (ERC) Main Programme
Thema/Themen
Finanzierungsplan
HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-BasedGastgebende Einrichtung
08002 Barcelona
Spanien