Final Report Summary - FACIT (Faith-Based Organisations and Exclusion in European Cities)
The FACIT project concerns the present role of faith-based organisations (FBOs) in matters of poverty and other forms of social exclusion in European cities. A FBO is any non-governmental organisation (NGO) that refers directly or indirectly to religion or religious values and functions as a welfare provider or as a political actor. The central assumption is that FBOs tend to fill the gap left after the supposed withdrawal of the welfare state in several domains of public life. It is the beginning of a new type of welfare regime with a stronger focus on local policies and strategies and new interplays between local authorities and civil society organisations. FBOs have direct entrance to the 'poor side' of cities because of their activities in deprived urban neighbourhoods and among excluded groups and because their members often belong to deprived and excluded groups themselves. The project aims to answer the following questions: What is the position of FBOs in combating poverty and other forms of social distress in cities? How has this role changed over time and how do these activities contribute to combating social exclusion and promoting social cohesion? What are the implications for policies and the governance of European cities? There is a great need for better empirical and comparative data on what is going on in European cities in matters of poverty and exclusion policies and the contribution of FBOs in the reduction of the problems.
Project context and objectives
The research concerns the present role of FBOs in matters of poverty and other forms of social exclusion in cities.
FBOs
In this study, we define FBOs as any NGO that refers directly or indirectly to religion or religious values and which functions as a welfare provider or as a political actor.
(Urban) poverty and exclusion
We use 'social exclusion' as a generic concept that refers to situations and such as discrimination, poverty and inaccessibility. Social exclusion implies a hierarchical relationship between individuals, positions or groups and a separation by clearly discernible fault lines. Certain fault lines are the result of collective intervention, while others arise without explicit and deliberate intervention of social actors. Poverty is a network of instances of social exclusion that stretches across several areas of individual and collective existence. Poverty is a special case of social exclusion: it is an accumulation of interrelated forms of exclusion. These instances of exclusion concern various areas of social and individual life. Poverty has to do with non-participation or limited participation in various social commodities. These areas are interrelated. The incapacity of the poor to bridge this complex fault line on their own, underlines how powerful exclusion poverty is. Poverty possesses crucial characteristics of social exclusion, inequality and fault lines. Poverty concerns a multifaceted phenomenon.
Main ideas
The central idea is that FBOs tend to fill the gap left after the supposed withdrawal of the welfare state, particularly in social welfare and in social protection. This might be the beginning of a new type of welfare regime with a stronger focus on local policies and strategies and new interplays between local authorities and civil society organisations. The role of FBOs in combating social problems in contemporary (urban) society seems different from that in the past in that they clearly are not exclusively of the 'charitable' kind, they are not limited to the Christian faith and that they exert an increasing political and social impact.
Why focus on the city?
The city provides a scale that permits the gathering sufficient numbers of like-minded, faith-motivated and action-oriented people. Cities have always been the focus of developments regarding exclusion. First there is poverty, which has been mirrored by a concern of authorities, with helping the poor and later combating poverty not only out of care for the poor, but also as a strategy of self-preservation. Cities exhibit a diversity of ethnic and immigrant groups that mirror both the opportunities and problems of social integration. National level support for urban FBOs and support of national FBOs for the activities of fellow members among excluded groups make the urban arena important for attention.
Objectives
(1) To assess the significance of FBOs from a variety of faiths in the policy and practice of urban social policy, combating social exclusion and promoting social cohesion.
(2) To assess the institutional and political conditions under which FBOs have become increasingly present in urban social policies.
(3) To evaluate the extent to which FBOs have been informed and are operating in a context of a shadow state formed by the retrenchment of welfare states.
(4) To assess the relations that FBOs have developed with other NGOs and with national and local public authorities.
Working plan
Research was conducted in 21 cities in 7 countries, following several steps:
(1) theoretical conceptualisation will construct an innovative register for naming and framing social reality in focus;
(2) the mapping of FBOs and their role in social exclusion should provide an overview of the present situation;
(3) a survey, quantitative and qualitative data collection and transnational comparison will be conducted to assess and evaluate the role of FBOs, their relation to other NGOs, the political and institutional conditions and the context of welfare state retrenchment;
(4) results will be translated in terms of policy implications and will be disseminated.
Project results
The project is confined to FBOs that are active in combating social exclusion within participating countries and does not include FBOs that primarily operate in the international arena or that are involved in other areas such as school board associations. The basic assumption of the study is that the role of FBOs is increasing because they are filling the gap that was left after the supposed withdrawal of the welfare state, particularly in social welfare and social protection. Welfare states were built on the hypothesis of almost full-employment, which means that a large and lasting number of unemployed people result in overburdening the financial means of the system, leading to 'fiscal crisis of the welfare state'. Welfare states are challenged by offspring of former 'guest workers'. This generation is part of the working population less. As a result, the gap widened between supply of and demand for welfare provisions. This offered an opportunity for FBOs. Changes in ideological context brought a shift to more individual explanations for social problems.
We witnessed the increasing importance of values as an inspiration for secular society, a trend toward de-secularisation or post-secularism. This development could explain the increasing importance in welfare supply by FBOs. A growing number of individuals seem willing to volunteer. Volunteering in a FBO does not necessarily imply membership in any church or adherence to a religion. The urban dimension of poverty and other forms of social exclusion has remained as important as ever before and is the focus of FACIT. Both income inequality and relative poverty have risen over the last two decades. The rise has been significant and widespread, affecting more than three-quarters of OECD countries. The income gap between the richest and the poorest has grown. On the whole, the poor population grew by 1.3 % in OECD countries. However, these trends have not been universal.
1. Welfare state regimes
'Welfare society' refers to the non-state dimension of a regime, which is about the role that NGOs play in the provision of welfare. Analysis of welfare provisions should take into account welfare state and welfare society dimension and of the relation between both. In some countries, this welfare society is well developed, in other countries it is rather complementary because the social democratic character of the state remains strongly articulated. The specificity of welfare arrangements has not prevented the construction of a typology of welfare regimes. Three welfare regimes can be identified: the Nordic social-democratic regime, the continental conservative regime, and the liberal regime. This typology was completed with two 'residual' regimes: the 'Mediterranean' regime and that of the former Eastern Bloc countries. In both cases social insurance covering is weak and families and charity are expected to provide social care. Countries that do not fit into any regime are described as 'hybrid'.
The Nordic social-democratic welfare regime is largely universalistic; its goal is to realise a high level of social protection for everybody, while reducing income differences. Entitlement to social benefits is not related to a person's occupational class; everyone participates in the same scheme. Access conditions are based on citizenship rights and not on former employment history. Employment plays a crucial role in this regime and people are motivated to find work; active labour market policies and training programmes are widely available. Retirement age is high and women are actively supported to enter the labour market. If a minimum wage is present and the amount is low, which opens the labour market to low-production employment. Typical for the continental regime is the close relation between previous occupation and entitlement to social benefits: access and level are based on a history of paid contributions. Rights and entitlements often differ between occupational groups and welfare states sustain existing income differentials.
Continental countries emphasise the protection of families with children. Labour participation of women generally is low, because this regime is often fosters the traditional family structure. Retirement age is low, thus participation rates of the elderly are also low. Incentives for disabled people to work are low since eligibility for disability benefit is determined mainly by employment history. Amounts of social assistance are relatively low. The liberal welfare regime provides low means-tested benefits for a restricted number of beneficiaries. Strict access conditions are applied. The rest of the population is stimulated to purchase private social insurance plans. This results in a form of 'dual society', opposing a group of low-income state dependents to a group of people able to afford insurance plans. Because people are encouraged to participate in the labour force, the minimum wage is low and the pension age is high. The low levels of benefits and the strict access conditions encourage women to enter the labour market.
In Sweden, social democracy and the welfare state 'grew up together', hence why Sweden is commonly regarded as 'the' model of the Nordic Social Democratic welfare state. The state has extensive public responsibilities for social care, poverty reduction and preventive social work. Voluntary initiatives were primary actors in the delivery of welfare services. Today, the Swedish welfare state is highly institutionalised and is characterised by universalism. The Swedish welfare state caters for a large part of the population and is not primarily concerned with the needs of the poor.
Although Germany is the prototype the welfare state, all German governments regarded the Scandinavian welfare state model as their ideal. German reality has included many neo-liberal elements. Markets were increasingly liberalised and welfare state services reduced, which led to a retrenchment of the welfare state.
The characterisation of Belgium as a continental-corporatist country rests mainly on its continued protection of employed people. The direct link between occupation and entitlement to benefits is strongly embedded society. Only people with an employment history are well protected by the social security system. Unemployment benefits are fairly high and unrestricted in time. A guaranteed minimum income is part of the basic social protection scheme.
The United Kingdom (UK) represents a liberal welfare state, embodying a truncated universalism of limited benefits and low taxes resting on the longstanding demarcation of the deserving and undeserving. This regime is a mix of welfare involving a balance between welfare provision by the state, the market, the family/individual and the voluntary sector. Many statist elements remain in welfare provision, albeit subject to means-testing and growing residualisation of the most vulnerable. The UK has followed a complex, even contradictory path of state centralised mixed economy of welfare, whilst maintaining some degree of universal provision through institutions such as the national health service and national pension insurance. The UK welfare regime has undergone considerable changes. At present, primary responsibility for welfare provision is shared between citizens. There is a safety net of flat-rate entitlements and means-tested benefits for eligible socially excluded groups and a range of quasi-markets consisting of public funding for both non-profit voluntary organisations and for-profit private organisations that become enrolled into the welfare administration. Market-based logics of individual choice, economic efficiency and competitiveness inspire the design, delivery and evaluation of social welfare programmes.
Countries like Spain are defined as a highly fragmented 'corporatist' models with a hyper protected and an under protected section of the workforce. The latter refers to the unemployed with little income support and temporary contracts or informal economy. In certain respects, it is an amalgamation of the strict conservative model. The state traditionally played a weak role in terms of social expenditure; the family always acted as safety net. Having contacts is crucial in some areas and sectors to obtain a good job. Institutionally, there is a consolidation of a quasi-federal system in which regions assume most social policy responsibilities, which often results in each region having its own strategy. The increasing impact of the market approach led to reforms in terms of labour segmentation and the development of a low added value sector in detriment of industry. Important socio-demographic changes have taken place: a steep increase of the population and an increased share of migrants.
The Dutch welfare state shows hybrid characteristics. A typical example is the pension system. Other benefits are either in line with the continental or Nordic regime. Unemployment benefits are reasonably high and in line with the continental regime. In line with the Nordic countries, social assistance rates are fairly high as well. No distinction is made between occupational and non-occupational disability and as a consequence, non-occupational disability benefits are comparatively high. The recent de-centralisation of social policy and growing obligations in an otherwise generous welfare system are complementing recent rightwards shifts.
At first sight, its recent development brings Turkey closer to the liberal regime, although strong remains of a pre-industrial system of protection are present. Liberalisation and the establishment of a market-oriented system in most social and labour market sectors led to the decline of public welfare. For the liberal-conservative governments the way to social security was family and community and therefore they have given precedence to the family over the individual. The aim of liberal-conservative governments was to reduce state expenditures in the fields of education, health and social services, without paying much attention to the quality of public services. Education, social security and health expenditures occupy a small share in the national income when compared to developed countries. The state encouraged house ownership but followed a populist and laissez faire policy in the issue of squatter settlements. In 1986, a new social aid system was adopted.
Another division can be made according to religions. Countries should be differentiated first by a Catholic-Protestant divide, and Protestant countries into Lutheran and reformist. This results in three subtypes: Catholic countries, Lutheran countries and non-Lutheran or reformist countries. According to his model, FBOs are less frequent in Lutheran countries, while in reformist ones they are more widespread. In some countries, FBOs are more effective while they are secondary in countries with a strong centralist tradition. In these countries, FBOs are subsystems of the traditional welfare model.
2. The position and role of religion
Three historical structures have characterised governmental arrangements with religion: the national church, separation and the concordat. The national church model is directed to create vast religious structures, while 'separatist' states rather strive to laicise. The concordat state occupies a midway position between these types: the focus is on finding or creating authoritative and representative religious bodies with which government can negotiate. The concordat permits the religious collective to take advantage of their collective power to bargain for legal spaces specific to their religious tradition. It creates serious issues for religious groups that are not hierarchically organised and governed.
One common characteristic of Belgium and the Netherlands is that for the period between the end of the 1960s, the political, social and cultural landscape was characterised by its 'pillarisation', which refers to the vertical organisation of society according to dominant 'ideologies'. Education was the first sector to be pillarised; other sectors of society would follow, gradually strengthening the 'pillarisation' of both societies. This was called a 'consociational democracy'; the institutionalisation of religious and ideological diversity in the political system with confessional 'pillars' as strong bulwarks of organisations and subcultures. Increasing prosperity, higher levels of education and social mobility, individualisation, and mass secularisation weakened the collective and organised dimension of all Western European societies. 'Pillars' were the most visible victims of those trends. Belgium and the Netherlands were increasingly 'de-pillarised' and 'secularised', and the religious landscape drastically diversified as a result of immigration since the 1960s. So-called 'guest workers' stayed and brought their families in; their share in the population increased and so did the number of Muslims. Asylum seekers would further increase and diversify the Muslim population. The separation of state and church and the tradition of 'pillarisation' provided these 'new' religious minorities with favourable opportunity structures to establish places of worship, education and mass media. Second and third-generation Muslim migrants show lower levels of religious participation than their parents.
Sweden is a latecomer in terms of a formally secularised society. Religious freedom was legally introduced in 1951, but even today the monarch and the government minister responsible for ecclesiastical affairs are mandatory members of the Church of Sweden. Today, the Church of Sweden has the same status as other faith-communities, which are entitled to certain benefits. Those registered faith-communities include a vast array of orientations ranging from Christian, Muslim or Jewish to pagan devotees.
The Church of England and the state still are closely connected; the constitutional monarch still holds the position of head of the church and senior bishops still are entitled to a seat in the House of Lords. It increasingly uses its position to oppose state practice and the outcomes of state policy. Christianity remains the predominant religion in this country, but this group includes a wide variety of different denominations. After Christianity, the largest religious group is Muslim. Adherents of Christian religion are spread fairly evenly across the country, but other major faith groups are clearly concentrated in the major urban conurbations. Religion outside of Christianity forms an important part of the urban landscape in many UK cities.
In Germany, a majority of 36.9 % are Protestants, 36.7 % Catholics and 4.8 % non-Christians, of which the great majority are Muslims, followed by Hindus, Buddhists and Jews. Both Protestants and Catholics have lost adherents. Non-Christian denominations have increased in tenfold over the last 26 years and the share of persons without denomination has more than doubled. The reduced attendance of religious events is not interpreted by all scholars as secularisation, but as a trend toward individualisation of religion or religiosity. They argued that lower adherence to churches does not imply lower religiosity; instead, individuals take elements from different religions to create a 'patchwork religion', which cannot be identified with a single church.
Spain is an exceptional case when it comes to the position of religion in society. The legitimacy of the Catholic Church, which before the transition to democracy held the monopoly of education and welfare provision, decreased and consequently suffered important mutations. It no longer defines society's moral standards and values, but has become one actor among others in an explicit social, political and moral debate. A dualism exists within the Catholic Church. Whereas the hierarchy is rather conservative, other sectors of the church have a more progressive discourse in relation to poverty, exclusion and welfare.
The founding of the Turkish Republic was inspired by modern Western rules and values. In the process of nation building, religion was pushed out of public life, and replaced by modern structures and values. The founders of the Turkish Republic preferred to control religious affairs, and they did so through the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in 1924. Diyanet controls the Mosques and has adopted the Sunni cult of Islam, whereas the unique conditions of the Alevi sect contributed to the emergence of their own religious services and worship centres. Because they stayed out of the mosque, Alevi institutions gained a comparative freedom. That mosques always have been controlled by the state prevented the emergence of 'church-like' FBOs.
2.2 The religious dimension of FBOs' activities
2.2.1 Distinctiveness of FBOs in Europe
Christian FBOs in Europe are reticent about their faith identity. Many have reached a tolerable compromise between their faith and their work. This enables them to distance themselves from the worst excesses of their faith, access secular funding, keep a diverse staff team together and support partners in a variety of faith contexts. Muslim FBOs tend to be clearer about their faith identity. Being younger, more homogenously staffed and less dependent on public funds, Muslim FBOs have been less influenced by the secular environment. Faith identity can have profound organisational implications and can affect how they operate internally. It can alter how they relate externally and with whom. Most European FBOs operate in highly secular, 'post-Christian' societies. To a degree they are products of their environments. To survive they must adapt. In some countries, discussion of faith is taboo. Many do not want to emphasise the faith-base of their organisation because they fear that this will be interpreted as 'arrogance'. Others have downplayed the importance of faith in an effort to be more professional. The constitutional separation between state and religion makes European governments sensitive to FBOs using public funds to propagate one faith over another. 'Proselytising' may be perceived as being worse than corruption. While Muslim FBOs appear to have fewer problems explicitly integrating their faith with their work, the mainstream Christian FBOs have found this more challenging. Many FBO recipients of government money feel they have to separate out the spiritual dimension in their mission, which can be a disintegrating process.
2.2.2 Faith, dialogue and difference in community work
The involvement of religious faith is a natural consequence of faith being understood as a comprehensive worldview, with the potential to affect every part of a person's individual, social and spiritual life. Faith can be related more easily with alternative worldviews, facilitating an analysis of difference, which relates to both belief and action. This analysis, when applied to social action on social welfare issues impacts on the assumption that a 'neutral' secular state is the best arbiter of this difference. Some initial perspectives perceived good practice in terms of a professionalised neutrality supported by a basic awareness of possible cultural differences. Such perspectives quickly became challenged when practitioners had to address different potential purposes apparent in everyday situations which presented them with dilemmas. With conventional training denying or limiting any place for reflexion which incorporated faith as part of the own identity, practitioners were left to draw their own idiosyncratic conclusions. Just structuring in isolated opportunities to consider faith-related issues was considered problematic. Recognising difference and incorporating reflexion on difference within practitioner development is crucial. The ability of practitioners to develop their understanding of the relationship between identity, worldview and practice can help to handle difference within everyday practice. Deciding on a course of action can then flow out of an integrated worldview with a clearly-considered connection between personal and professional. The formation of a framework which enables them to make connections between these issues which facilitates future reflexion is crucial.
2.2.3 General narratives and country contexts
Most FBOs engaged in service delivery do not discriminate clients on the basis of faith. Most FBOs do not ask whether they serve a particular religious group. For few FBOs, conversion is part of their service delivery. The importance of evangelicalism varies from being explicit, implicit to being no goal of FBOs. New evangelical (migrant) churches on the other hand that have entered the scene recently are open about their mission: they want to help society by providing practical aid and saving souls. Many FBOs hire faith-members or ask from personnel to subscribe to their mission statement, but there are also FBOs that hire people irrespective of faith criteria. When FBOs are located in areas with high levels of secularisation, they often have to contract other religious or non-religious personnel. Some Christian FBOs try to attract personnel from different faith groups, in order to mirror the religious background of their target groups or to present themselves as post secular pluralist organisations. FBO hiring policies are subject to debates in several countries. While volunteers are often recruited from faith communities, there are examples of FBOs attracting non-religious volunteers as well. These volunteers want to join because of the outspoken identity of projects in terms of solidarity and justice, the target groups they address and the approach to individuals and families in need. The importance of missions varies from being an explicit, over an implicit to being no goal of FBOs. More recently established evangelical churches are more open and explicit about their mission. There are cross-country differences found within the same or related FBOs.
2.2.4 Networks of FBOs
FBOs interact with other FBOs or NGOs without any faith dimension. The reasons to do this depend on the specific social and political role of FBOs. The FBOs and NGOs gave the following reasons to cooperate:
- the possibility to get to know each other better and to be an 'open door' in church and the mosque;
- the opportunity to exchange information on services;
- the chance to initiate contacts for the future;
- to increase funds;
- the possibility to serve people in the right place at the right time;
- the ability to stay informed about each other's functioning and the chance to address problems.
There are also reasons not to cooperate with others. There may be lack of time and manpower, competition, different religious backgrounds or differences in visions on combating social exclusion. Irrespective of these barriers, there seems to be a growing interest to get into closer contact. However, public tendering creates competition and conflicts.
A great deal of work needs to be done to make better sense of what difference faith makes in the frame of theo-ethical questions of motivation, post-secular ethics of engagement, liminal, transitional and radical spaces of faith-based praxis and wider concerns of what it means to get something done in our post-political times.
3. Poverty and social exclusion
3.1 FBOs combating poverty
In Germany, six consolidated central organisations have a federalist structure; their member organisations are mainly legally independent and subdivided into a national, provincial and a local level. The associations of independent welfare work have their own ideological or religious motives and objectives. There are 'private welfare organisations', providing social services on an entrepreneurial basis.
For Britain, the traditional association between faith-groups and social welfare has resulted in a longstanding presence of faith in the provision of services. Several reasons could account for this: the long history of church schools, the seemingly timeless activities of some FBOs or the historic inflection of social politics in religious denominations such as Methodism. Even during the post-war development of a welfare state, faith motivated involvement in the welfare landscape has been a continuing feature of the UK. When the state took over most of the welfare programmes that FBOs ran, some of them entered into the compact contracts that were offered and they found themselves locked into controlled ways of operating. Some FBOs preferred to remain independent, thus leading to 'insider' and 'outsider' voluntary agencies. Insider agencies accept government funding, but will have to trade in part of their ethos and their character. Outsider organisations are more likely to work on limited budgets and rely on volunteers. Muslims participate in the delivery of welfare services in the UK, but their engagement tends to be through networks of independent mosques. The shortage of national Muslim welfare organisations can be explained in part by geographical distribution and urban clustering of the Muslim population. The majority of British Muslims exercise their anti-poverty efforts through individual actions.
In Spain, Catholic oriented FBOs are hegemonic, but there are different kinds of Catholic FBOs: religious congregations and orders, lay organisations with religious ends, and Catholic social action organisations. Other FBOs are just starting. Not all have a well-developed and oiled structure of social assistance, partly because they are relatively new, partly because they do not have a tradition of providing services beyond their community. Catholic FBOs are part of a complex institutional setting, which could be called a parallel institutional world. This world is dominated by a few big organisations, some medium sized initiatives, and by a huge amount of locally based projects. Many smaller organisations just perform their tasks as service providers for local or regional institutions, relying on their own resources.
Another dividing line within the Catholic FBOs runs between the more progressive initiatives which are close to the ideological left and which are strongly involved in issues and another set of organisations that are more conservative in values and tradition. Those are not as strongly committed to social action, but rather focus on prayer and proselytising. Regarding the degree of dependency vis-à-vis financing public authorities, being too dependent upon public money could reduce the FBOs capacity of advocacy on behalf of vulnerable groups in society. Some think that non-profit organisations just seek financing and that public authorities need their voluntary and professional labour force to cover the gaps in the social service network. Others fear that their economic dependency makes NGOs accept public sector targets and strategies and they are reduced to implement social policy. One step furthers goes the claim NGOs are increasingly becoming a legitimising channel of public policies and stabilising the social order in some of the most vulnerable sectors.
3.2 Poverty scenarios
Poverty scenarios have a lot in common since they are often the result of fairly similar processes. Globalisation is one of the main elements that connect dynamics in the European cities: immigration flows, the economic and financial impact of external processes, and changes in local productive logics. In each country, these common trends have produced different effects due to structural and policymaking variables.
The German welfare state provides material security, social and cultural welfare and education. Welfare provision is guided by the principle of subsidiarity. Private responsibility is regarded as more important than state responsibility. The state operates in those fields not covered by the third sector. In some cities, there is an increased polarisation and a deterioration of the situation in poverty areas. New forms of poverty have developed with new groups demanding for assistance, multi-problem situations and a decrease in social mobility.
Despite the strength of the Swedish welfare state and the high living standards of the population, there is poverty and social exclusion among some groups. This is regarded a local level problem rather than a national one. Poverty is overrepresented in certain city areas and affects residents of foreign origin. There are beneficiaries from social services living on public spaces in central areas or using them extensively. Some urban areas are increasingly experiencing segregation, social exclusion, poverty and violence.
There is a polarisation of poverty in Belgium along different lines: regional, urban-rural and within the cities. Several socioeconomic causes explain the concentration of poverty in specific neighbourhoods: industrial decay, neighbourhood stigmatisation, overrepresentation of low-income groups, social expenditure cuts. Social housing estates concentrate social exclusion in a vicious circle, which welfare and urban policy do not seem to be able to tackle successfully.
The context of poverty in the Netherlands seems to follow similar patterns for the three cities in this project. Even if there has been innovation and transition in the production system or the unemployment rates have been reduced, poverty is still higher in households of foreign origin people that tend to concentrate in specific areas of the city, generally out of the city centre. There are also vulnerable social groups with specific causes of exclusion living in more central areas.
Poverty in Spain has experienced socioeconomic dynamics that have redefined its maps: immigration, population ageing and fast economic growth followed by abyssal economic crises. Poor households concentrate in the city centres and post war peripheries of Madrid and Barcelona. Spanish city neighbourhoods are rather heterogeneous in social and ethnic composition due to the lack of big public housing estates that concentrate and reproduce problems they intend to solve.
Research describes the nature and dimensions of urban poverty in main Turkish cities as a result of poor planning, rural-urban immigration and low quality standards of housing and urban quality of life, among other structural reasons. Despite the importance of neighbourhoods with self-constructed houses without regular building permits, there are neighbourhoods of apartment buildings with high rates of poverty and social exclusion. Some inner city neighbourhoods share these conditions and the presence of highly stigmatised and marginalised groups. Urban social and demographic change have worsened the conditions of lower income residents due to the crisis of social and family institutions.
The UK probably best portrays the impact of welfare state retrenchment on poverty and social exclusion, and therefore the role of FBOs in combating them. Although poverty is not just an urban phenomenon, it tends to concentrate in urban agglomerations. Dramatic cuts in legal status of asylum seekers and new restrictive and discriminatory policy regulations have increased the importance of some poverty issues among this population. Although poverty has been reduced in absolute terms, it has increased in relative terms. Causes of poverty have been tackled with different degrees of success by public authorities. Poverty is regarded as an individual state and tends to blame the person as incapable or unwilling to integrate or move out of deprivation. Poverty affects families, single mother households and communities.
3.3 Policies and tools
Noteworthy is the role that ideology plays in poverty policies. Neo-liberal approaches have a big impact on the transformation of the Third Sector, both from an organisational point of view and the dimension of increased competition. Anti-poverty policies and the role of FBOs are influenced by the generosity of the regime when it comes to establish who is in and who is not.
The German research team provided two illustrations. One concerns public-private partnerships: the Cologne Sozialraumourientierung. This includes NGOs, FBOs, local administrations, private firms and citizens. The project targets vulnerable areas and allocates a budget to enhance community development and area activation, cooperation and participation. Other examples of anti-poverty policies are area-based policies.
The wide responsibilities of regional, provincial and local governments in Sweden have restricted FBOs to areas that the public sector does not reach. Despite public administration still funding the main body of social actions developed by FBOs, the scenario has changed with both the introduction of competition laws that have enhanced the public sector to intervene and with the literal privatisation of the public sector welfare agencies. There is a tradition of area-based policies with an integral approach, which is facing the challenge of worsening social conditions. The fact that local authorities have wide powers over social welfare policy implies that the definition of needs and strategies might rely on the views of the party in office.
Belgium has a centralised welfare service provision centred around Public Centres for Social Welfare present in every municipality. Information, eligibility and stigmatisation are barriers to benefit from social services. Belgium has not gone through the process of welfare service outsourcing, mainly because pillarised civil society organisations play a major role. The public welfare system relies on the third sector to cover the needs of those who are out of the system.
In the Netherlands, anti-poverty policies are designed and implemented at the municipal level, although districts reinforce the strategies with prevention and with enhancing the accessibility to programmes. Each city has its own policy style and different strategies to tackle poverty. Dutch welfare is comprehensive for those who are in, but marginalises those who are out. FBOs play a key role as welfare deliverers to these groups. The central level has initiated big city regeneration programmes that target vulnerable neighbourhoods with an integrated approach.
In Spain, policies combating social exclusion are designed and implemented at regional and local level in a framework of a Mediterranean version of the conservative corporatist welfare state. Macro programmes are implemented at national level and are generally universal. The Spanish welfare system is generous in terms of inclusion, but more limited in terms of social welfare. Welfare service provision increasingly has been outsourced to FBO and for-profit organisations.
The Turkish welfare state can be classified as belonging to the Mediterranean subtype of the conservative corporatist family. Despite the ongoing reform that seeks to provide universal health coverage, it has been launched in a context of the dominant neo-liberal policy design schemes. A number of social security institutions provide aid to specific groups in need. Family and kin networks are assumed to be part of welfare provision. FBOs play a substantial role in social action programmes tackling poverty and social exclusion in sectors that are out of the formal economy.
% LA wide range of national and local policy initiatives in the UK intend to fight poverty. The neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s radically redesigned and deregulated the protectionist presence of public welfare. There has been an attempt to redress dramatic imbalances, but the resources required are still lacking. The worsening situation of some social groups in terms of social exclusion is due to the impact of restrictive policies on asylum seekers. Anti-poverty measures generally emphasise the issues of 'workability' and 'activation' as a condition for entitlement to benefits. There has been a strong focus on poverty reduction in families, with some success. These programmes targeted the reproduction of poverty among younger members of the families. Youngsters are also targeted in security policies with punitive strategies towards so-called 'anti-social behaviour'. Welfare policies for the disabled have moved from reliance on the community to a new protective role of public authorities, but with severe restrictions of resources and accessibility to benefits. Poverty and social exclusion have been tackled through community regeneration programmes in area-based initiatives with a strong role of civil society in their implementation.
3.4 FBOs and social exclusion
Domains
There is a fairly wide range of domains in which FBOs develop their social actions. Most are shared at a national level, although this is not always the case. With the exception of Turkey, European FBOs devote their energy and resources to combat poverty with a wide array of means that range from direct intervention to advocacy, political activism and raising awareness in public opinion. Religion is relevant for the domains in which FBOs provide welfare. Catholic FBOs work with all sorts of beneficiaries regardless of their ethnic or religious background. In predominantly Protestant countries, Protestant NGOs deliver welfare on a universal basis, although the religious message is present and in some cases constitutes a critical part of the programme. Muslim and Muslim-based FBOs tend to focus more on their own communities, pursuing both integration and enhancement of their culture and traditions. In Turkey, the universal character of FBOs is quite self-evident, because the large majority of potential beneficiaries share the same religion.
The main Christian organisations in Germany provide services, solidarity, advocacy and policy guidelines for both mainstream population and excluded groups, regardless of ethnic or religious origin. These organisations are competing in the social service market. There are other Christian FBOs that provide support to the fringe groups. Non-Christian or immigrant FBOs mainly provide help to their own communities.
The space for social action in Sweden is narrower than in other countries. FBOs take care of people in the fringes of an opulent society and a broad welfare state. A major strategic role is to intervene as opinion builders, raise new social concerns and lobby the public institutions to keep their focus on fighting social exclusion efficiently.
FBOs work with the people in and beyond the fringes in Belgium. They develop three main kinds of activities: spreading the Gospel and disseminating their faith; providing material help to groups in need and enhancing the emancipation of people in need. They develop activities in fields such as health, education and culture. FBOs in the Netherlands differ in their relation with public administrations in the field of anti-poverty policies. Some big FBOs deliver services outsourced by the state in a regime of specialisation and quasi-monopoly. This generates tensions around principles and definitions of poverty and how to deal with it. Some Christian FBOs provide services for those who are not covered by the welfare state. Local churches or mosques provide help to members in need.
In Spain, both secular and faith-based NGOs have been delivering services for public administrations through contracts and grants. FBOs finance services from their own resources. Some of them are coordinated with public administrations, others act more independently. A minor, but active sector of Christian FBOs has an openly critical and challenging relation with public administrations around certain issues. In general, FBOs engage in a vast array of social action domains. Muslim and Jewish organisations are still at an early stage of development.
In some countries, FBOs play a leading role in anti-poverty activities. In Turkey, poverty is still understood as a 'natural' and unavoidable. The concept of social action is inspired by the Ottoman charity ethos. This is mixed with neo-liberal ideas that focus on personal responsibility and leaves aside structural causes of poverty. There is space for hegemonic FBOs that manage large budgets and distribute material aid to the neediest sectors of the population which are often outside the public welfare system and rely on informal economic strategies. Some FBOs provide training and incentives to develop small enterprises.
In the UK, the ideological framework is heavily indebted to the (in)famous saying that 'there is no such thing as society'. FBOs play a critical role in welfare provision in a wide range of welfare domains. The most vulnerable group consists of asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants, which face different forms of legal, material and social deprivation. Homelessness has been a traditional domain of FBOs in the UK. Another relevant domain is fighting household indebtedness by counselling and advice. Poverty is tackled through education and through the provision of specific services to the elderly and the disabled in aspects in which public assistance is insufficient.
Role of FBOs in combating poverty and social exclusion
There is a range of ways in which the role of FBOs is defined in the countries taking part in FACIT. The religious composition of the country is very relevant; the presence and potential of FBOs that represent mainstream cultural and religious values is sure. This translates into their roles in local governance networks, their capacity of action and their capacity of gathering public and private resources. Another relevant variable is the position between state and church. Strong links have eased in all countries, but they still play a significant role in the way FBOs regard state welfare and perceive their own role. The secularisation process has led to the transformation of some FBOs into quasi-FBOs. Organisations that were based on religious values and principles changed into secular NGOs to provide specialised services and to be able to compete with other NGOs.
In Germany, the importance of the main FBOs is related to the dominant religion in that part of the country. Although their legal position is weak, Muslim FBOs are relevant in Germany. Some mainly serve their own community. Anti- poverty action is not specifically addressed in a programme strategy, but rather through actions focused around the Mosque as a main centre of religious and social welfare. In the Jewish community, anti-poverty action is provided to individuals, both long-term residents and recent immigrants from third countries.
Swedish FBOs are different position than other FBOs regarding combating poverty and social exclusion. They mostly regard their function as complementary to the welfare state. The individual is given a predominant position in the processes of exclusion and its achieved independence from social ties will render him free from vulnerability. The long-standing welfare state culture has shaped the interpretation of social exclusion and poverty in Sweden around the citizen as an individual.
In Belgium, FBOs combat social exclusion from outside the system, although most of them are subsidised by government. Their activities include the provision of specific welfare services and helping less resourceful beneficiaries to gain or improve their access to public services. FBOs use a 'universalistic' logic.
FBOs in the Netherlands often operate in cooperation with public administrations. Big organisations always have been part of shared networks and platforms but currently, there is a trend to include smaller organisations. Other FBOs see themselves as outsiders; some because they challenge governmental policy strategies and others because they try to avoid the application of rules and regulations. Others are do-it-yourselves, because it is part of their philosophy to be independent and they have succeeded to get access to public resources.
The expansion of the third sector in Spain has given FBOs and NGOs a relevant role in its developed welfare state. The feeling exists that a substantial part of the most urgent social actions against poverty is taken up by FBOs. FBOs also act as policy advisers. Services are provided in three main ways: social welfare through grants or contracts funded by public institutions; programmes developed by FBOs, generally coming from a long tradition with different sources of funding; intangible social action by communities and congregations at a small local scale.
The role of FBOs in the UK is diverse. The traditional role of Christian organisations went through several stages related to the changes in welfare logics and ideologies. The current scenario is one of an increasing role in welfare provision by FBOs as a reaction to neo-liberal policies. Neo-communitarism has revamped FBOs' role in fighting social exclusion and poverty. In some domains, social action is provided as an outsourced service of the state. FBOs also complement public welfare where this is inefficient and provide services to groups that are out of the system. FBOs in the UK have a long-standing tradition of advocacy and political action through campaigning, protest and parliamentary lobby.
3.5 To whom
It can be assumed that groups in risk are rather similar in all countries. Vulnerability and poverty are a matter of social class, access to resources and capacity of developing what is considered desirable and acceptable for mainstream society. Often, this definition of social class is stained by the ethnic variable, but this conceptualisation cannot be taken for granted and other elements have to be considered. In general, the groups described as target groups can be included broadly into the categories from Marx, defined as: the unemployed, widows and orphans, the sick and the disabled, the technologically handicapped, the elderly and the marginal.
The main two FBOs in Germany provide social welfare in a broad range of domains and to a broad range of beneficiaries. The German welfare state and the third sector facilitate access for both integrated groups and those in a situation of vulnerability and social exclusion. Muslims, Jewish and Alevi communities tend to supply services to their own people. Swedish FBOs address beneficiaries through two main approaches: vulnerable and excluded people and non-excluded citizens. Social action might be highly institutionalised and outsourced by public authorities or can be focused on persons and behaviour labelled illegal or incompatible with the public order. Belgian FBOs provide services to marginalised groups and others in a situation of vulnerability or social exclusion that is not covered by the public system. Jewish and Muslim FBOs provide services to those from their communities in need. In the Dutch situation FBOs provide services to those who have an increased risk to or are in a clear situation of social exclusion. The main target groups for Spanish FBOs' are on the social exclusion map; they deliver services to those who are at the system's margins and to those who are outside. Their common feature is a lack of resources or sufficient access to existing resources. FBOs in the UK have a range of (potential) beneficiaries in their social action programmes which stretch from groups that have experienced downward social mobility to those who are in a situation of structural poverty with little or no chance of improvement. Minority FBOs mainly provide support to their own communities in domains related not only to cultural issues but also to discrimination and access to the labour market.
3.6 Functions of FBOs
It is relevant to consider the functions that FBOs have in relation to society. There are three broad groups: community-oriented functions, public opinion and participation and third sector and FBO-oriented functions. Most FBOs focus on community-oriented functions. The aim of this categorisation to stress the functions that are particularly relevant in each case. The categorisation of FBOs' functions in relation to the dimensions in which they take place: action or executive and spiritual dimensions account for the principles and primary aims of FBOs, while political, technical and organisational dimensions account for the ways in which those aims may be realised.
In Germany, the main Catholic and Protestant FBOs provide specific services to vulnerable groups that require them, but they regard poverty as a multidimensional process in which individuals require specific attention. They tackle poverty from an integral approach, seeking to identify and solve the causes. FBOs in Sweden usually tackle those issues that are not included and develop related aspects of the community-oriented functions. FBOs provide medical assistance and other services through volunteers as well as legal counselling and other supporting services. Muslim congregations focus on social inclusion through non-religious activities. Preventing social exclusion and marginalisation are among the main strategies of Belgian FBOs, together with providing assistance to the socially and legally excluded. The main functions can be summarised in three big sets; covering direct needs, detecting new needs and financial support. Dutch FBOs develop various roles: providing welfare services and charity to vulnerable and excluded groups. At community level, they provide informal care and mutual support, intangible services and they help to bridge the gap between demand and supply. FBOs in Spain cover a vast array of functions and anti-poverty strategies are implemented in different ways. The majority of FBOs belong to the sphere of the Catholic Church and they do not proselytise as the minority Protestant initiatives do. Mainstream FBOs in Turkey develop massive media campaigns to collect donations and funding. All have strong religious messages and are often used as propaganda tools. The solid third sector in the UK has developed a vast array of functions in its fight against poverty. The community-oriented functions of FBOs are dominant, but public opinion and participation functions are relevant as well.
3.7 Conclusion
A common pattern for FBOs is that they work with those 'beyond the fringes of society'. Sometimes they collaborate with public administration for those activities, sometimes activities are developed as a complement to public services, sometimes they even act in open confrontation. The FBO must be within the three main variables: the religious composition of the country, the relation of FBOs with the state and the process of secularisation.
4. The urban dimension
The spatial presence of FBOs in the city is highly variable, depending on the type of presence concerned, the development of specific fixed-space facilities, the operation of mobile or outreach services and the myriad contacts with socially excluded people. To a large extent, FBO activities reflect the marginal spaces of the city which are already inhabited by socially excluded people. FBO activity in the city also takes place beyond these marginal spaces. It has been widely recognised that FBOs represent the last remaining nexus of social capital in urban communities. FBOs are therefore a crucial site for bonding capital and bridging capital. One aspect is that the buildings used by religious congregations are typically used to provide support services, notably for the young and the elderly and physically or psychologically disadvantaged groups. Activities vary with geographical location, with buildings on the edge of marginal spaces in the city forming appropriate centres to reach out from or drop into, and other buildings offering centres for localised or specialised support; Peripatetic services that meet socially excluded people in their places of residence or performance.
Potential impact
The potential impact of the research can be measured by the participation of many organisations. The response to the survey was very high. The impact of the FACIT-project may be described in terms of increased visibility of the FBOs and their activities, higher political sensitivity for the position and the role of FBOs in combating poverty and social exclusion and better service provision towards beneficiaries through strengthening collaboration. Dissemination activities are diverse. A website was created and has been updated regularly (see http://www.facit.be online). Publications were distributed towards organisations interviewed and a larger public. Several publications are in preparation and two policy briefs were written. Two international conferences, an expert seminar and a workshop were organised.
1. Future trends
1.1. Elderly migrants
Due to the rising share of elderly migrants, demand for homes adapted to these people's customs is increasing. FBOs should take account of the specific needs of the elderly migrants and to invest in special elderly care initiatives and should establish mixed homes for the elderly, respecting the different religious customs. Such homes have the potential to become new arenas for integration.
1.2. The economic crisis
More people are in need as a result of the economic crisis, but less money is available. This gap is widening. Public authorities should support civil society actors. NGOs and FBOs are generally better placed when it comes to dealing with groups and situations in society's margins. Because less public funding is available, NGOs and FBOs will depend more on voluntary work.
1.3. Sustainability
The growing gap between increasing needs and limited public money puts pressure on public service provision and FBOs' activities and sustainability of FBOs becomes vital. Because more FBOs are needed to cater for the increasing problems public authorities should try to foster their sustainability. The creation of social enterprises should be encouraged: they create jobs for people outside the labour market, they provide low-priced quality goods and services and they contribute to reducing the ecological footprint. FBOs contribute to social cohesion, which may be seen as the social dimension of sustainability. Often FBOs play a positive role in cohesion through bringing people together and promoting mutual solidarity.
3. Country-specific policy
Governments should pay attention to the country context. In Belgium, new initiatives do not always successfully develop because civil society actors cannot live up to the existing administrative procedures. Migrant FBOs in Germany should be entitled to the legal status of welfare organisations. Then they would benefit from tax exemptions, have access to public money and be recognised as part of society. In order to maintain efficient service provision, there should be a collective bargaining deal for FBOs' and NGOs' hired professionals to grant adequate retributions and working conditions. The evaluation of services and programmes should be introduced. More active collaboration should be enhanced between public administrations and FBOs linked to minority religious groups that have a strong potential in social action. In stimulating interreligious cooperation in Sweden, local governments and FBOs should keep the gender dimension in mind and pay attention to the specific needs and demands of women.
FBOs should be open to cooperation with non-religious NGOs. Local governments should be sensitive to the needs and demands expressed by congregations of different religions when it comes to their physical presence in a city. Local governments and administration should be willing to enter into dialog with dedicated persons. They are important links between local government and civil society and should be met with respect. There is a need to raise awareness about the transnational dimension of the work of FBOs as part of a social justice agenda in European countries. It is crucial that training is made available to all religious groups, so that they have the same capacity to bid for contracts as secular organisations. Public authorities should pay more attention to good practices in which FBOs are providing innovative and successful practices of welfare, care and multi-faith activities.
Project website: http://www.facit.be
Jan Vranken (Prof. Dr Em.)
Danielle Dierckx (Prof. Dr)
University of Antwerp
Centre OASeS
Sint Jacobsstraat 2, 2000 Antwerp
Belgium
Tel: +32-326-55354
E-mail: jan.vranken@ua.ac.be
danielle.dierckx@ua.ac.be
Project context and objectives
The research concerns the present role of FBOs in matters of poverty and other forms of social exclusion in cities.
FBOs
In this study, we define FBOs as any NGO that refers directly or indirectly to religion or religious values and which functions as a welfare provider or as a political actor.
(Urban) poverty and exclusion
We use 'social exclusion' as a generic concept that refers to situations and such as discrimination, poverty and inaccessibility. Social exclusion implies a hierarchical relationship between individuals, positions or groups and a separation by clearly discernible fault lines. Certain fault lines are the result of collective intervention, while others arise without explicit and deliberate intervention of social actors. Poverty is a network of instances of social exclusion that stretches across several areas of individual and collective existence. Poverty is a special case of social exclusion: it is an accumulation of interrelated forms of exclusion. These instances of exclusion concern various areas of social and individual life. Poverty has to do with non-participation or limited participation in various social commodities. These areas are interrelated. The incapacity of the poor to bridge this complex fault line on their own, underlines how powerful exclusion poverty is. Poverty possesses crucial characteristics of social exclusion, inequality and fault lines. Poverty concerns a multifaceted phenomenon.
Main ideas
The central idea is that FBOs tend to fill the gap left after the supposed withdrawal of the welfare state, particularly in social welfare and in social protection. This might be the beginning of a new type of welfare regime with a stronger focus on local policies and strategies and new interplays between local authorities and civil society organisations. The role of FBOs in combating social problems in contemporary (urban) society seems different from that in the past in that they clearly are not exclusively of the 'charitable' kind, they are not limited to the Christian faith and that they exert an increasing political and social impact.
Why focus on the city?
The city provides a scale that permits the gathering sufficient numbers of like-minded, faith-motivated and action-oriented people. Cities have always been the focus of developments regarding exclusion. First there is poverty, which has been mirrored by a concern of authorities, with helping the poor and later combating poverty not only out of care for the poor, but also as a strategy of self-preservation. Cities exhibit a diversity of ethnic and immigrant groups that mirror both the opportunities and problems of social integration. National level support for urban FBOs and support of national FBOs for the activities of fellow members among excluded groups make the urban arena important for attention.
Objectives
(1) To assess the significance of FBOs from a variety of faiths in the policy and practice of urban social policy, combating social exclusion and promoting social cohesion.
(2) To assess the institutional and political conditions under which FBOs have become increasingly present in urban social policies.
(3) To evaluate the extent to which FBOs have been informed and are operating in a context of a shadow state formed by the retrenchment of welfare states.
(4) To assess the relations that FBOs have developed with other NGOs and with national and local public authorities.
Working plan
Research was conducted in 21 cities in 7 countries, following several steps:
(1) theoretical conceptualisation will construct an innovative register for naming and framing social reality in focus;
(2) the mapping of FBOs and their role in social exclusion should provide an overview of the present situation;
(3) a survey, quantitative and qualitative data collection and transnational comparison will be conducted to assess and evaluate the role of FBOs, their relation to other NGOs, the political and institutional conditions and the context of welfare state retrenchment;
(4) results will be translated in terms of policy implications and will be disseminated.
Project results
The project is confined to FBOs that are active in combating social exclusion within participating countries and does not include FBOs that primarily operate in the international arena or that are involved in other areas such as school board associations. The basic assumption of the study is that the role of FBOs is increasing because they are filling the gap that was left after the supposed withdrawal of the welfare state, particularly in social welfare and social protection. Welfare states were built on the hypothesis of almost full-employment, which means that a large and lasting number of unemployed people result in overburdening the financial means of the system, leading to 'fiscal crisis of the welfare state'. Welfare states are challenged by offspring of former 'guest workers'. This generation is part of the working population less. As a result, the gap widened between supply of and demand for welfare provisions. This offered an opportunity for FBOs. Changes in ideological context brought a shift to more individual explanations for social problems.
We witnessed the increasing importance of values as an inspiration for secular society, a trend toward de-secularisation or post-secularism. This development could explain the increasing importance in welfare supply by FBOs. A growing number of individuals seem willing to volunteer. Volunteering in a FBO does not necessarily imply membership in any church or adherence to a religion. The urban dimension of poverty and other forms of social exclusion has remained as important as ever before and is the focus of FACIT. Both income inequality and relative poverty have risen over the last two decades. The rise has been significant and widespread, affecting more than three-quarters of OECD countries. The income gap between the richest and the poorest has grown. On the whole, the poor population grew by 1.3 % in OECD countries. However, these trends have not been universal.
1. Welfare state regimes
'Welfare society' refers to the non-state dimension of a regime, which is about the role that NGOs play in the provision of welfare. Analysis of welfare provisions should take into account welfare state and welfare society dimension and of the relation between both. In some countries, this welfare society is well developed, in other countries it is rather complementary because the social democratic character of the state remains strongly articulated. The specificity of welfare arrangements has not prevented the construction of a typology of welfare regimes. Three welfare regimes can be identified: the Nordic social-democratic regime, the continental conservative regime, and the liberal regime. This typology was completed with two 'residual' regimes: the 'Mediterranean' regime and that of the former Eastern Bloc countries. In both cases social insurance covering is weak and families and charity are expected to provide social care. Countries that do not fit into any regime are described as 'hybrid'.
The Nordic social-democratic welfare regime is largely universalistic; its goal is to realise a high level of social protection for everybody, while reducing income differences. Entitlement to social benefits is not related to a person's occupational class; everyone participates in the same scheme. Access conditions are based on citizenship rights and not on former employment history. Employment plays a crucial role in this regime and people are motivated to find work; active labour market policies and training programmes are widely available. Retirement age is high and women are actively supported to enter the labour market. If a minimum wage is present and the amount is low, which opens the labour market to low-production employment. Typical for the continental regime is the close relation between previous occupation and entitlement to social benefits: access and level are based on a history of paid contributions. Rights and entitlements often differ between occupational groups and welfare states sustain existing income differentials.
Continental countries emphasise the protection of families with children. Labour participation of women generally is low, because this regime is often fosters the traditional family structure. Retirement age is low, thus participation rates of the elderly are also low. Incentives for disabled people to work are low since eligibility for disability benefit is determined mainly by employment history. Amounts of social assistance are relatively low. The liberal welfare regime provides low means-tested benefits for a restricted number of beneficiaries. Strict access conditions are applied. The rest of the population is stimulated to purchase private social insurance plans. This results in a form of 'dual society', opposing a group of low-income state dependents to a group of people able to afford insurance plans. Because people are encouraged to participate in the labour force, the minimum wage is low and the pension age is high. The low levels of benefits and the strict access conditions encourage women to enter the labour market.
In Sweden, social democracy and the welfare state 'grew up together', hence why Sweden is commonly regarded as 'the' model of the Nordic Social Democratic welfare state. The state has extensive public responsibilities for social care, poverty reduction and preventive social work. Voluntary initiatives were primary actors in the delivery of welfare services. Today, the Swedish welfare state is highly institutionalised and is characterised by universalism. The Swedish welfare state caters for a large part of the population and is not primarily concerned with the needs of the poor.
Although Germany is the prototype the welfare state, all German governments regarded the Scandinavian welfare state model as their ideal. German reality has included many neo-liberal elements. Markets were increasingly liberalised and welfare state services reduced, which led to a retrenchment of the welfare state.
The characterisation of Belgium as a continental-corporatist country rests mainly on its continued protection of employed people. The direct link between occupation and entitlement to benefits is strongly embedded society. Only people with an employment history are well protected by the social security system. Unemployment benefits are fairly high and unrestricted in time. A guaranteed minimum income is part of the basic social protection scheme.
The United Kingdom (UK) represents a liberal welfare state, embodying a truncated universalism of limited benefits and low taxes resting on the longstanding demarcation of the deserving and undeserving. This regime is a mix of welfare involving a balance between welfare provision by the state, the market, the family/individual and the voluntary sector. Many statist elements remain in welfare provision, albeit subject to means-testing and growing residualisation of the most vulnerable. The UK has followed a complex, even contradictory path of state centralised mixed economy of welfare, whilst maintaining some degree of universal provision through institutions such as the national health service and national pension insurance. The UK welfare regime has undergone considerable changes. At present, primary responsibility for welfare provision is shared between citizens. There is a safety net of flat-rate entitlements and means-tested benefits for eligible socially excluded groups and a range of quasi-markets consisting of public funding for both non-profit voluntary organisations and for-profit private organisations that become enrolled into the welfare administration. Market-based logics of individual choice, economic efficiency and competitiveness inspire the design, delivery and evaluation of social welfare programmes.
Countries like Spain are defined as a highly fragmented 'corporatist' models with a hyper protected and an under protected section of the workforce. The latter refers to the unemployed with little income support and temporary contracts or informal economy. In certain respects, it is an amalgamation of the strict conservative model. The state traditionally played a weak role in terms of social expenditure; the family always acted as safety net. Having contacts is crucial in some areas and sectors to obtain a good job. Institutionally, there is a consolidation of a quasi-federal system in which regions assume most social policy responsibilities, which often results in each region having its own strategy. The increasing impact of the market approach led to reforms in terms of labour segmentation and the development of a low added value sector in detriment of industry. Important socio-demographic changes have taken place: a steep increase of the population and an increased share of migrants.
The Dutch welfare state shows hybrid characteristics. A typical example is the pension system. Other benefits are either in line with the continental or Nordic regime. Unemployment benefits are reasonably high and in line with the continental regime. In line with the Nordic countries, social assistance rates are fairly high as well. No distinction is made between occupational and non-occupational disability and as a consequence, non-occupational disability benefits are comparatively high. The recent de-centralisation of social policy and growing obligations in an otherwise generous welfare system are complementing recent rightwards shifts.
At first sight, its recent development brings Turkey closer to the liberal regime, although strong remains of a pre-industrial system of protection are present. Liberalisation and the establishment of a market-oriented system in most social and labour market sectors led to the decline of public welfare. For the liberal-conservative governments the way to social security was family and community and therefore they have given precedence to the family over the individual. The aim of liberal-conservative governments was to reduce state expenditures in the fields of education, health and social services, without paying much attention to the quality of public services. Education, social security and health expenditures occupy a small share in the national income when compared to developed countries. The state encouraged house ownership but followed a populist and laissez faire policy in the issue of squatter settlements. In 1986, a new social aid system was adopted.
Another division can be made according to religions. Countries should be differentiated first by a Catholic-Protestant divide, and Protestant countries into Lutheran and reformist. This results in three subtypes: Catholic countries, Lutheran countries and non-Lutheran or reformist countries. According to his model, FBOs are less frequent in Lutheran countries, while in reformist ones they are more widespread. In some countries, FBOs are more effective while they are secondary in countries with a strong centralist tradition. In these countries, FBOs are subsystems of the traditional welfare model.
2. The position and role of religion
Three historical structures have characterised governmental arrangements with religion: the national church, separation and the concordat. The national church model is directed to create vast religious structures, while 'separatist' states rather strive to laicise. The concordat state occupies a midway position between these types: the focus is on finding or creating authoritative and representative religious bodies with which government can negotiate. The concordat permits the religious collective to take advantage of their collective power to bargain for legal spaces specific to their religious tradition. It creates serious issues for religious groups that are not hierarchically organised and governed.
One common characteristic of Belgium and the Netherlands is that for the period between the end of the 1960s, the political, social and cultural landscape was characterised by its 'pillarisation', which refers to the vertical organisation of society according to dominant 'ideologies'. Education was the first sector to be pillarised; other sectors of society would follow, gradually strengthening the 'pillarisation' of both societies. This was called a 'consociational democracy'; the institutionalisation of religious and ideological diversity in the political system with confessional 'pillars' as strong bulwarks of organisations and subcultures. Increasing prosperity, higher levels of education and social mobility, individualisation, and mass secularisation weakened the collective and organised dimension of all Western European societies. 'Pillars' were the most visible victims of those trends. Belgium and the Netherlands were increasingly 'de-pillarised' and 'secularised', and the religious landscape drastically diversified as a result of immigration since the 1960s. So-called 'guest workers' stayed and brought their families in; their share in the population increased and so did the number of Muslims. Asylum seekers would further increase and diversify the Muslim population. The separation of state and church and the tradition of 'pillarisation' provided these 'new' religious minorities with favourable opportunity structures to establish places of worship, education and mass media. Second and third-generation Muslim migrants show lower levels of religious participation than their parents.
Sweden is a latecomer in terms of a formally secularised society. Religious freedom was legally introduced in 1951, but even today the monarch and the government minister responsible for ecclesiastical affairs are mandatory members of the Church of Sweden. Today, the Church of Sweden has the same status as other faith-communities, which are entitled to certain benefits. Those registered faith-communities include a vast array of orientations ranging from Christian, Muslim or Jewish to pagan devotees.
The Church of England and the state still are closely connected; the constitutional monarch still holds the position of head of the church and senior bishops still are entitled to a seat in the House of Lords. It increasingly uses its position to oppose state practice and the outcomes of state policy. Christianity remains the predominant religion in this country, but this group includes a wide variety of different denominations. After Christianity, the largest religious group is Muslim. Adherents of Christian religion are spread fairly evenly across the country, but other major faith groups are clearly concentrated in the major urban conurbations. Religion outside of Christianity forms an important part of the urban landscape in many UK cities.
In Germany, a majority of 36.9 % are Protestants, 36.7 % Catholics and 4.8 % non-Christians, of which the great majority are Muslims, followed by Hindus, Buddhists and Jews. Both Protestants and Catholics have lost adherents. Non-Christian denominations have increased in tenfold over the last 26 years and the share of persons without denomination has more than doubled. The reduced attendance of religious events is not interpreted by all scholars as secularisation, but as a trend toward individualisation of religion or religiosity. They argued that lower adherence to churches does not imply lower religiosity; instead, individuals take elements from different religions to create a 'patchwork religion', which cannot be identified with a single church.
Spain is an exceptional case when it comes to the position of religion in society. The legitimacy of the Catholic Church, which before the transition to democracy held the monopoly of education and welfare provision, decreased and consequently suffered important mutations. It no longer defines society's moral standards and values, but has become one actor among others in an explicit social, political and moral debate. A dualism exists within the Catholic Church. Whereas the hierarchy is rather conservative, other sectors of the church have a more progressive discourse in relation to poverty, exclusion and welfare.
The founding of the Turkish Republic was inspired by modern Western rules and values. In the process of nation building, religion was pushed out of public life, and replaced by modern structures and values. The founders of the Turkish Republic preferred to control religious affairs, and they did so through the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in 1924. Diyanet controls the Mosques and has adopted the Sunni cult of Islam, whereas the unique conditions of the Alevi sect contributed to the emergence of their own religious services and worship centres. Because they stayed out of the mosque, Alevi institutions gained a comparative freedom. That mosques always have been controlled by the state prevented the emergence of 'church-like' FBOs.
2.2 The religious dimension of FBOs' activities
2.2.1 Distinctiveness of FBOs in Europe
Christian FBOs in Europe are reticent about their faith identity. Many have reached a tolerable compromise between their faith and their work. This enables them to distance themselves from the worst excesses of their faith, access secular funding, keep a diverse staff team together and support partners in a variety of faith contexts. Muslim FBOs tend to be clearer about their faith identity. Being younger, more homogenously staffed and less dependent on public funds, Muslim FBOs have been less influenced by the secular environment. Faith identity can have profound organisational implications and can affect how they operate internally. It can alter how they relate externally and with whom. Most European FBOs operate in highly secular, 'post-Christian' societies. To a degree they are products of their environments. To survive they must adapt. In some countries, discussion of faith is taboo. Many do not want to emphasise the faith-base of their organisation because they fear that this will be interpreted as 'arrogance'. Others have downplayed the importance of faith in an effort to be more professional. The constitutional separation between state and religion makes European governments sensitive to FBOs using public funds to propagate one faith over another. 'Proselytising' may be perceived as being worse than corruption. While Muslim FBOs appear to have fewer problems explicitly integrating their faith with their work, the mainstream Christian FBOs have found this more challenging. Many FBO recipients of government money feel they have to separate out the spiritual dimension in their mission, which can be a disintegrating process.
2.2.2 Faith, dialogue and difference in community work
The involvement of religious faith is a natural consequence of faith being understood as a comprehensive worldview, with the potential to affect every part of a person's individual, social and spiritual life. Faith can be related more easily with alternative worldviews, facilitating an analysis of difference, which relates to both belief and action. This analysis, when applied to social action on social welfare issues impacts on the assumption that a 'neutral' secular state is the best arbiter of this difference. Some initial perspectives perceived good practice in terms of a professionalised neutrality supported by a basic awareness of possible cultural differences. Such perspectives quickly became challenged when practitioners had to address different potential purposes apparent in everyday situations which presented them with dilemmas. With conventional training denying or limiting any place for reflexion which incorporated faith as part of the own identity, practitioners were left to draw their own idiosyncratic conclusions. Just structuring in isolated opportunities to consider faith-related issues was considered problematic. Recognising difference and incorporating reflexion on difference within practitioner development is crucial. The ability of practitioners to develop their understanding of the relationship between identity, worldview and practice can help to handle difference within everyday practice. Deciding on a course of action can then flow out of an integrated worldview with a clearly-considered connection between personal and professional. The formation of a framework which enables them to make connections between these issues which facilitates future reflexion is crucial.
2.2.3 General narratives and country contexts
Most FBOs engaged in service delivery do not discriminate clients on the basis of faith. Most FBOs do not ask whether they serve a particular religious group. For few FBOs, conversion is part of their service delivery. The importance of evangelicalism varies from being explicit, implicit to being no goal of FBOs. New evangelical (migrant) churches on the other hand that have entered the scene recently are open about their mission: they want to help society by providing practical aid and saving souls. Many FBOs hire faith-members or ask from personnel to subscribe to their mission statement, but there are also FBOs that hire people irrespective of faith criteria. When FBOs are located in areas with high levels of secularisation, they often have to contract other religious or non-religious personnel. Some Christian FBOs try to attract personnel from different faith groups, in order to mirror the religious background of their target groups or to present themselves as post secular pluralist organisations. FBO hiring policies are subject to debates in several countries. While volunteers are often recruited from faith communities, there are examples of FBOs attracting non-religious volunteers as well. These volunteers want to join because of the outspoken identity of projects in terms of solidarity and justice, the target groups they address and the approach to individuals and families in need. The importance of missions varies from being an explicit, over an implicit to being no goal of FBOs. More recently established evangelical churches are more open and explicit about their mission. There are cross-country differences found within the same or related FBOs.
2.2.4 Networks of FBOs
FBOs interact with other FBOs or NGOs without any faith dimension. The reasons to do this depend on the specific social and political role of FBOs. The FBOs and NGOs gave the following reasons to cooperate:
- the possibility to get to know each other better and to be an 'open door' in church and the mosque;
- the opportunity to exchange information on services;
- the chance to initiate contacts for the future;
- to increase funds;
- the possibility to serve people in the right place at the right time;
- the ability to stay informed about each other's functioning and the chance to address problems.
There are also reasons not to cooperate with others. There may be lack of time and manpower, competition, different religious backgrounds or differences in visions on combating social exclusion. Irrespective of these barriers, there seems to be a growing interest to get into closer contact. However, public tendering creates competition and conflicts.
A great deal of work needs to be done to make better sense of what difference faith makes in the frame of theo-ethical questions of motivation, post-secular ethics of engagement, liminal, transitional and radical spaces of faith-based praxis and wider concerns of what it means to get something done in our post-political times.
3. Poverty and social exclusion
3.1 FBOs combating poverty
In Germany, six consolidated central organisations have a federalist structure; their member organisations are mainly legally independent and subdivided into a national, provincial and a local level. The associations of independent welfare work have their own ideological or religious motives and objectives. There are 'private welfare organisations', providing social services on an entrepreneurial basis.
For Britain, the traditional association between faith-groups and social welfare has resulted in a longstanding presence of faith in the provision of services. Several reasons could account for this: the long history of church schools, the seemingly timeless activities of some FBOs or the historic inflection of social politics in religious denominations such as Methodism. Even during the post-war development of a welfare state, faith motivated involvement in the welfare landscape has been a continuing feature of the UK. When the state took over most of the welfare programmes that FBOs ran, some of them entered into the compact contracts that were offered and they found themselves locked into controlled ways of operating. Some FBOs preferred to remain independent, thus leading to 'insider' and 'outsider' voluntary agencies. Insider agencies accept government funding, but will have to trade in part of their ethos and their character. Outsider organisations are more likely to work on limited budgets and rely on volunteers. Muslims participate in the delivery of welfare services in the UK, but their engagement tends to be through networks of independent mosques. The shortage of national Muslim welfare organisations can be explained in part by geographical distribution and urban clustering of the Muslim population. The majority of British Muslims exercise their anti-poverty efforts through individual actions.
In Spain, Catholic oriented FBOs are hegemonic, but there are different kinds of Catholic FBOs: religious congregations and orders, lay organisations with religious ends, and Catholic social action organisations. Other FBOs are just starting. Not all have a well-developed and oiled structure of social assistance, partly because they are relatively new, partly because they do not have a tradition of providing services beyond their community. Catholic FBOs are part of a complex institutional setting, which could be called a parallel institutional world. This world is dominated by a few big organisations, some medium sized initiatives, and by a huge amount of locally based projects. Many smaller organisations just perform their tasks as service providers for local or regional institutions, relying on their own resources.
Another dividing line within the Catholic FBOs runs between the more progressive initiatives which are close to the ideological left and which are strongly involved in issues and another set of organisations that are more conservative in values and tradition. Those are not as strongly committed to social action, but rather focus on prayer and proselytising. Regarding the degree of dependency vis-à-vis financing public authorities, being too dependent upon public money could reduce the FBOs capacity of advocacy on behalf of vulnerable groups in society. Some think that non-profit organisations just seek financing and that public authorities need their voluntary and professional labour force to cover the gaps in the social service network. Others fear that their economic dependency makes NGOs accept public sector targets and strategies and they are reduced to implement social policy. One step furthers goes the claim NGOs are increasingly becoming a legitimising channel of public policies and stabilising the social order in some of the most vulnerable sectors.
3.2 Poverty scenarios
Poverty scenarios have a lot in common since they are often the result of fairly similar processes. Globalisation is one of the main elements that connect dynamics in the European cities: immigration flows, the economic and financial impact of external processes, and changes in local productive logics. In each country, these common trends have produced different effects due to structural and policymaking variables.
The German welfare state provides material security, social and cultural welfare and education. Welfare provision is guided by the principle of subsidiarity. Private responsibility is regarded as more important than state responsibility. The state operates in those fields not covered by the third sector. In some cities, there is an increased polarisation and a deterioration of the situation in poverty areas. New forms of poverty have developed with new groups demanding for assistance, multi-problem situations and a decrease in social mobility.
Despite the strength of the Swedish welfare state and the high living standards of the population, there is poverty and social exclusion among some groups. This is regarded a local level problem rather than a national one. Poverty is overrepresented in certain city areas and affects residents of foreign origin. There are beneficiaries from social services living on public spaces in central areas or using them extensively. Some urban areas are increasingly experiencing segregation, social exclusion, poverty and violence.
There is a polarisation of poverty in Belgium along different lines: regional, urban-rural and within the cities. Several socioeconomic causes explain the concentration of poverty in specific neighbourhoods: industrial decay, neighbourhood stigmatisation, overrepresentation of low-income groups, social expenditure cuts. Social housing estates concentrate social exclusion in a vicious circle, which welfare and urban policy do not seem to be able to tackle successfully.
The context of poverty in the Netherlands seems to follow similar patterns for the three cities in this project. Even if there has been innovation and transition in the production system or the unemployment rates have been reduced, poverty is still higher in households of foreign origin people that tend to concentrate in specific areas of the city, generally out of the city centre. There are also vulnerable social groups with specific causes of exclusion living in more central areas.
Poverty in Spain has experienced socioeconomic dynamics that have redefined its maps: immigration, population ageing and fast economic growth followed by abyssal economic crises. Poor households concentrate in the city centres and post war peripheries of Madrid and Barcelona. Spanish city neighbourhoods are rather heterogeneous in social and ethnic composition due to the lack of big public housing estates that concentrate and reproduce problems they intend to solve.
Research describes the nature and dimensions of urban poverty in main Turkish cities as a result of poor planning, rural-urban immigration and low quality standards of housing and urban quality of life, among other structural reasons. Despite the importance of neighbourhoods with self-constructed houses without regular building permits, there are neighbourhoods of apartment buildings with high rates of poverty and social exclusion. Some inner city neighbourhoods share these conditions and the presence of highly stigmatised and marginalised groups. Urban social and demographic change have worsened the conditions of lower income residents due to the crisis of social and family institutions.
The UK probably best portrays the impact of welfare state retrenchment on poverty and social exclusion, and therefore the role of FBOs in combating them. Although poverty is not just an urban phenomenon, it tends to concentrate in urban agglomerations. Dramatic cuts in legal status of asylum seekers and new restrictive and discriminatory policy regulations have increased the importance of some poverty issues among this population. Although poverty has been reduced in absolute terms, it has increased in relative terms. Causes of poverty have been tackled with different degrees of success by public authorities. Poverty is regarded as an individual state and tends to blame the person as incapable or unwilling to integrate or move out of deprivation. Poverty affects families, single mother households and communities.
3.3 Policies and tools
Noteworthy is the role that ideology plays in poverty policies. Neo-liberal approaches have a big impact on the transformation of the Third Sector, both from an organisational point of view and the dimension of increased competition. Anti-poverty policies and the role of FBOs are influenced by the generosity of the regime when it comes to establish who is in and who is not.
The German research team provided two illustrations. One concerns public-private partnerships: the Cologne Sozialraumourientierung. This includes NGOs, FBOs, local administrations, private firms and citizens. The project targets vulnerable areas and allocates a budget to enhance community development and area activation, cooperation and participation. Other examples of anti-poverty policies are area-based policies.
The wide responsibilities of regional, provincial and local governments in Sweden have restricted FBOs to areas that the public sector does not reach. Despite public administration still funding the main body of social actions developed by FBOs, the scenario has changed with both the introduction of competition laws that have enhanced the public sector to intervene and with the literal privatisation of the public sector welfare agencies. There is a tradition of area-based policies with an integral approach, which is facing the challenge of worsening social conditions. The fact that local authorities have wide powers over social welfare policy implies that the definition of needs and strategies might rely on the views of the party in office.
Belgium has a centralised welfare service provision centred around Public Centres for Social Welfare present in every municipality. Information, eligibility and stigmatisation are barriers to benefit from social services. Belgium has not gone through the process of welfare service outsourcing, mainly because pillarised civil society organisations play a major role. The public welfare system relies on the third sector to cover the needs of those who are out of the system.
In the Netherlands, anti-poverty policies are designed and implemented at the municipal level, although districts reinforce the strategies with prevention and with enhancing the accessibility to programmes. Each city has its own policy style and different strategies to tackle poverty. Dutch welfare is comprehensive for those who are in, but marginalises those who are out. FBOs play a key role as welfare deliverers to these groups. The central level has initiated big city regeneration programmes that target vulnerable neighbourhoods with an integrated approach.
In Spain, policies combating social exclusion are designed and implemented at regional and local level in a framework of a Mediterranean version of the conservative corporatist welfare state. Macro programmes are implemented at national level and are generally universal. The Spanish welfare system is generous in terms of inclusion, but more limited in terms of social welfare. Welfare service provision increasingly has been outsourced to FBO and for-profit organisations.
The Turkish welfare state can be classified as belonging to the Mediterranean subtype of the conservative corporatist family. Despite the ongoing reform that seeks to provide universal health coverage, it has been launched in a context of the dominant neo-liberal policy design schemes. A number of social security institutions provide aid to specific groups in need. Family and kin networks are assumed to be part of welfare provision. FBOs play a substantial role in social action programmes tackling poverty and social exclusion in sectors that are out of the formal economy.
% LA wide range of national and local policy initiatives in the UK intend to fight poverty. The neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s radically redesigned and deregulated the protectionist presence of public welfare. There has been an attempt to redress dramatic imbalances, but the resources required are still lacking. The worsening situation of some social groups in terms of social exclusion is due to the impact of restrictive policies on asylum seekers. Anti-poverty measures generally emphasise the issues of 'workability' and 'activation' as a condition for entitlement to benefits. There has been a strong focus on poverty reduction in families, with some success. These programmes targeted the reproduction of poverty among younger members of the families. Youngsters are also targeted in security policies with punitive strategies towards so-called 'anti-social behaviour'. Welfare policies for the disabled have moved from reliance on the community to a new protective role of public authorities, but with severe restrictions of resources and accessibility to benefits. Poverty and social exclusion have been tackled through community regeneration programmes in area-based initiatives with a strong role of civil society in their implementation.
3.4 FBOs and social exclusion
Domains
There is a fairly wide range of domains in which FBOs develop their social actions. Most are shared at a national level, although this is not always the case. With the exception of Turkey, European FBOs devote their energy and resources to combat poverty with a wide array of means that range from direct intervention to advocacy, political activism and raising awareness in public opinion. Religion is relevant for the domains in which FBOs provide welfare. Catholic FBOs work with all sorts of beneficiaries regardless of their ethnic or religious background. In predominantly Protestant countries, Protestant NGOs deliver welfare on a universal basis, although the religious message is present and in some cases constitutes a critical part of the programme. Muslim and Muslim-based FBOs tend to focus more on their own communities, pursuing both integration and enhancement of their culture and traditions. In Turkey, the universal character of FBOs is quite self-evident, because the large majority of potential beneficiaries share the same religion.
The main Christian organisations in Germany provide services, solidarity, advocacy and policy guidelines for both mainstream population and excluded groups, regardless of ethnic or religious origin. These organisations are competing in the social service market. There are other Christian FBOs that provide support to the fringe groups. Non-Christian or immigrant FBOs mainly provide help to their own communities.
The space for social action in Sweden is narrower than in other countries. FBOs take care of people in the fringes of an opulent society and a broad welfare state. A major strategic role is to intervene as opinion builders, raise new social concerns and lobby the public institutions to keep their focus on fighting social exclusion efficiently.
FBOs work with the people in and beyond the fringes in Belgium. They develop three main kinds of activities: spreading the Gospel and disseminating their faith; providing material help to groups in need and enhancing the emancipation of people in need. They develop activities in fields such as health, education and culture. FBOs in the Netherlands differ in their relation with public administrations in the field of anti-poverty policies. Some big FBOs deliver services outsourced by the state in a regime of specialisation and quasi-monopoly. This generates tensions around principles and definitions of poverty and how to deal with it. Some Christian FBOs provide services for those who are not covered by the welfare state. Local churches or mosques provide help to members in need.
In Spain, both secular and faith-based NGOs have been delivering services for public administrations through contracts and grants. FBOs finance services from their own resources. Some of them are coordinated with public administrations, others act more independently. A minor, but active sector of Christian FBOs has an openly critical and challenging relation with public administrations around certain issues. In general, FBOs engage in a vast array of social action domains. Muslim and Jewish organisations are still at an early stage of development.
In some countries, FBOs play a leading role in anti-poverty activities. In Turkey, poverty is still understood as a 'natural' and unavoidable. The concept of social action is inspired by the Ottoman charity ethos. This is mixed with neo-liberal ideas that focus on personal responsibility and leaves aside structural causes of poverty. There is space for hegemonic FBOs that manage large budgets and distribute material aid to the neediest sectors of the population which are often outside the public welfare system and rely on informal economic strategies. Some FBOs provide training and incentives to develop small enterprises.
In the UK, the ideological framework is heavily indebted to the (in)famous saying that 'there is no such thing as society'. FBOs play a critical role in welfare provision in a wide range of welfare domains. The most vulnerable group consists of asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants, which face different forms of legal, material and social deprivation. Homelessness has been a traditional domain of FBOs in the UK. Another relevant domain is fighting household indebtedness by counselling and advice. Poverty is tackled through education and through the provision of specific services to the elderly and the disabled in aspects in which public assistance is insufficient.
Role of FBOs in combating poverty and social exclusion
There is a range of ways in which the role of FBOs is defined in the countries taking part in FACIT. The religious composition of the country is very relevant; the presence and potential of FBOs that represent mainstream cultural and religious values is sure. This translates into their roles in local governance networks, their capacity of action and their capacity of gathering public and private resources. Another relevant variable is the position between state and church. Strong links have eased in all countries, but they still play a significant role in the way FBOs regard state welfare and perceive their own role. The secularisation process has led to the transformation of some FBOs into quasi-FBOs. Organisations that were based on religious values and principles changed into secular NGOs to provide specialised services and to be able to compete with other NGOs.
In Germany, the importance of the main FBOs is related to the dominant religion in that part of the country. Although their legal position is weak, Muslim FBOs are relevant in Germany. Some mainly serve their own community. Anti- poverty action is not specifically addressed in a programme strategy, but rather through actions focused around the Mosque as a main centre of religious and social welfare. In the Jewish community, anti-poverty action is provided to individuals, both long-term residents and recent immigrants from third countries.
Swedish FBOs are different position than other FBOs regarding combating poverty and social exclusion. They mostly regard their function as complementary to the welfare state. The individual is given a predominant position in the processes of exclusion and its achieved independence from social ties will render him free from vulnerability. The long-standing welfare state culture has shaped the interpretation of social exclusion and poverty in Sweden around the citizen as an individual.
In Belgium, FBOs combat social exclusion from outside the system, although most of them are subsidised by government. Their activities include the provision of specific welfare services and helping less resourceful beneficiaries to gain or improve their access to public services. FBOs use a 'universalistic' logic.
FBOs in the Netherlands often operate in cooperation with public administrations. Big organisations always have been part of shared networks and platforms but currently, there is a trend to include smaller organisations. Other FBOs see themselves as outsiders; some because they challenge governmental policy strategies and others because they try to avoid the application of rules and regulations. Others are do-it-yourselves, because it is part of their philosophy to be independent and they have succeeded to get access to public resources.
The expansion of the third sector in Spain has given FBOs and NGOs a relevant role in its developed welfare state. The feeling exists that a substantial part of the most urgent social actions against poverty is taken up by FBOs. FBOs also act as policy advisers. Services are provided in three main ways: social welfare through grants or contracts funded by public institutions; programmes developed by FBOs, generally coming from a long tradition with different sources of funding; intangible social action by communities and congregations at a small local scale.
The role of FBOs in the UK is diverse. The traditional role of Christian organisations went through several stages related to the changes in welfare logics and ideologies. The current scenario is one of an increasing role in welfare provision by FBOs as a reaction to neo-liberal policies. Neo-communitarism has revamped FBOs' role in fighting social exclusion and poverty. In some domains, social action is provided as an outsourced service of the state. FBOs also complement public welfare where this is inefficient and provide services to groups that are out of the system. FBOs in the UK have a long-standing tradition of advocacy and political action through campaigning, protest and parliamentary lobby.
3.5 To whom
It can be assumed that groups in risk are rather similar in all countries. Vulnerability and poverty are a matter of social class, access to resources and capacity of developing what is considered desirable and acceptable for mainstream society. Often, this definition of social class is stained by the ethnic variable, but this conceptualisation cannot be taken for granted and other elements have to be considered. In general, the groups described as target groups can be included broadly into the categories from Marx, defined as: the unemployed, widows and orphans, the sick and the disabled, the technologically handicapped, the elderly and the marginal.
The main two FBOs in Germany provide social welfare in a broad range of domains and to a broad range of beneficiaries. The German welfare state and the third sector facilitate access for both integrated groups and those in a situation of vulnerability and social exclusion. Muslims, Jewish and Alevi communities tend to supply services to their own people. Swedish FBOs address beneficiaries through two main approaches: vulnerable and excluded people and non-excluded citizens. Social action might be highly institutionalised and outsourced by public authorities or can be focused on persons and behaviour labelled illegal or incompatible with the public order. Belgian FBOs provide services to marginalised groups and others in a situation of vulnerability or social exclusion that is not covered by the public system. Jewish and Muslim FBOs provide services to those from their communities in need. In the Dutch situation FBOs provide services to those who have an increased risk to or are in a clear situation of social exclusion. The main target groups for Spanish FBOs' are on the social exclusion map; they deliver services to those who are at the system's margins and to those who are outside. Their common feature is a lack of resources or sufficient access to existing resources. FBOs in the UK have a range of (potential) beneficiaries in their social action programmes which stretch from groups that have experienced downward social mobility to those who are in a situation of structural poverty with little or no chance of improvement. Minority FBOs mainly provide support to their own communities in domains related not only to cultural issues but also to discrimination and access to the labour market.
3.6 Functions of FBOs
It is relevant to consider the functions that FBOs have in relation to society. There are three broad groups: community-oriented functions, public opinion and participation and third sector and FBO-oriented functions. Most FBOs focus on community-oriented functions. The aim of this categorisation to stress the functions that are particularly relevant in each case. The categorisation of FBOs' functions in relation to the dimensions in which they take place: action or executive and spiritual dimensions account for the principles and primary aims of FBOs, while political, technical and organisational dimensions account for the ways in which those aims may be realised.
In Germany, the main Catholic and Protestant FBOs provide specific services to vulnerable groups that require them, but they regard poverty as a multidimensional process in which individuals require specific attention. They tackle poverty from an integral approach, seeking to identify and solve the causes. FBOs in Sweden usually tackle those issues that are not included and develop related aspects of the community-oriented functions. FBOs provide medical assistance and other services through volunteers as well as legal counselling and other supporting services. Muslim congregations focus on social inclusion through non-religious activities. Preventing social exclusion and marginalisation are among the main strategies of Belgian FBOs, together with providing assistance to the socially and legally excluded. The main functions can be summarised in three big sets; covering direct needs, detecting new needs and financial support. Dutch FBOs develop various roles: providing welfare services and charity to vulnerable and excluded groups. At community level, they provide informal care and mutual support, intangible services and they help to bridge the gap between demand and supply. FBOs in Spain cover a vast array of functions and anti-poverty strategies are implemented in different ways. The majority of FBOs belong to the sphere of the Catholic Church and they do not proselytise as the minority Protestant initiatives do. Mainstream FBOs in Turkey develop massive media campaigns to collect donations and funding. All have strong religious messages and are often used as propaganda tools. The solid third sector in the UK has developed a vast array of functions in its fight against poverty. The community-oriented functions of FBOs are dominant, but public opinion and participation functions are relevant as well.
3.7 Conclusion
A common pattern for FBOs is that they work with those 'beyond the fringes of society'. Sometimes they collaborate with public administration for those activities, sometimes activities are developed as a complement to public services, sometimes they even act in open confrontation. The FBO must be within the three main variables: the religious composition of the country, the relation of FBOs with the state and the process of secularisation.
4. The urban dimension
The spatial presence of FBOs in the city is highly variable, depending on the type of presence concerned, the development of specific fixed-space facilities, the operation of mobile or outreach services and the myriad contacts with socially excluded people. To a large extent, FBO activities reflect the marginal spaces of the city which are already inhabited by socially excluded people. FBO activity in the city also takes place beyond these marginal spaces. It has been widely recognised that FBOs represent the last remaining nexus of social capital in urban communities. FBOs are therefore a crucial site for bonding capital and bridging capital. One aspect is that the buildings used by religious congregations are typically used to provide support services, notably for the young and the elderly and physically or psychologically disadvantaged groups. Activities vary with geographical location, with buildings on the edge of marginal spaces in the city forming appropriate centres to reach out from or drop into, and other buildings offering centres for localised or specialised support; Peripatetic services that meet socially excluded people in their places of residence or performance.
Potential impact
The potential impact of the research can be measured by the participation of many organisations. The response to the survey was very high. The impact of the FACIT-project may be described in terms of increased visibility of the FBOs and their activities, higher political sensitivity for the position and the role of FBOs in combating poverty and social exclusion and better service provision towards beneficiaries through strengthening collaboration. Dissemination activities are diverse. A website was created and has been updated regularly (see http://www.facit.be online). Publications were distributed towards organisations interviewed and a larger public. Several publications are in preparation and two policy briefs were written. Two international conferences, an expert seminar and a workshop were organised.
1. Future trends
1.1. Elderly migrants
Due to the rising share of elderly migrants, demand for homes adapted to these people's customs is increasing. FBOs should take account of the specific needs of the elderly migrants and to invest in special elderly care initiatives and should establish mixed homes for the elderly, respecting the different religious customs. Such homes have the potential to become new arenas for integration.
1.2. The economic crisis
More people are in need as a result of the economic crisis, but less money is available. This gap is widening. Public authorities should support civil society actors. NGOs and FBOs are generally better placed when it comes to dealing with groups and situations in society's margins. Because less public funding is available, NGOs and FBOs will depend more on voluntary work.
1.3. Sustainability
The growing gap between increasing needs and limited public money puts pressure on public service provision and FBOs' activities and sustainability of FBOs becomes vital. Because more FBOs are needed to cater for the increasing problems public authorities should try to foster their sustainability. The creation of social enterprises should be encouraged: they create jobs for people outside the labour market, they provide low-priced quality goods and services and they contribute to reducing the ecological footprint. FBOs contribute to social cohesion, which may be seen as the social dimension of sustainability. Often FBOs play a positive role in cohesion through bringing people together and promoting mutual solidarity.
3. Country-specific policy
Governments should pay attention to the country context. In Belgium, new initiatives do not always successfully develop because civil society actors cannot live up to the existing administrative procedures. Migrant FBOs in Germany should be entitled to the legal status of welfare organisations. Then they would benefit from tax exemptions, have access to public money and be recognised as part of society. In order to maintain efficient service provision, there should be a collective bargaining deal for FBOs' and NGOs' hired professionals to grant adequate retributions and working conditions. The evaluation of services and programmes should be introduced. More active collaboration should be enhanced between public administrations and FBOs linked to minority religious groups that have a strong potential in social action. In stimulating interreligious cooperation in Sweden, local governments and FBOs should keep the gender dimension in mind and pay attention to the specific needs and demands of women.
FBOs should be open to cooperation with non-religious NGOs. Local governments should be sensitive to the needs and demands expressed by congregations of different religions when it comes to their physical presence in a city. Local governments and administration should be willing to enter into dialog with dedicated persons. They are important links between local government and civil society and should be met with respect. There is a need to raise awareness about the transnational dimension of the work of FBOs as part of a social justice agenda in European countries. It is crucial that training is made available to all religious groups, so that they have the same capacity to bid for contracts as secular organisations. Public authorities should pay more attention to good practices in which FBOs are providing innovative and successful practices of welfare, care and multi-faith activities.
Project website: http://www.facit.be
Jan Vranken (Prof. Dr Em.)
Danielle Dierckx (Prof. Dr)
University of Antwerp
Centre OASeS
Sint Jacobsstraat 2, 2000 Antwerp
Belgium
Tel: +32-326-55354
E-mail: jan.vranken@ua.ac.be
danielle.dierckx@ua.ac.be