Final Report Summary - EURTG (Building Efficient Models of Governance: the EU Regional Tier and improving Compliance with Global Rules)
The EURTG project explores the role of the EU regional tier as an efficient model of governance to improve compliance with global rules. It builds and tests an innovative theoretical model of regional coordination and builds policy relevant tools to improve good governance and enforcement of the rule of law. More specifically through quantitative and qualitative research it unfolds the causal relationship between a regional tier model of governance and compliance with international agreements in the area of economic policies and development policies in the EU and abroad. It also builds an international compliance index to monitor and assist state compliance with global rules.
States have increasingly engaged in international legislative agreement in a vast array of policy sectors ranging from trade to environmental policies and human rights (Simmons, 1998). The European Union for example has emerged as a regulatory state (Majone, 1996) establishing a supranational model of policy-making and governance based on a detailed legislative framework and enforcing institutional devices (ECJ/ Commission). Other international regimes facilitate and constrain state relations at the supra-national level in salient policy areas such as the WTO trade agreement or Climate Change regime and new regional initiatives are emerging in Asia and Latin America (Hix, 2010, Kahler, 2010). International regulatory agreements between states and regional coordination have thus become a central mode of governance and policy-making in supra-national political systems. However, while the cost of bargaining and the design of effective and detailed regulatory agreements are high, states at times fail to comply. Infringement with collective agreements can be particularly damaging for rational member states pursuing their national interests through settings of supranational governance and undermines the efficiency and credibility of international political systems (Moravcsik, 1998). The current context of economic and political instability calls for coordinated economic and development policies; which are efficiently implemented at the domestic level.
Drawing from the field of political science, international political economy and international law, the research develops the concept of a regional tier model of governance as established in the EU and test its efficiency as a model of governance to improve compliance with global rules across policy sector at the EU and international level. The regional tier model of governance is based on the three following mechanisms (Figure 1):
1. Delegation of enforcement power to supranational institutions
2. Access for private actors to enforcement mechanisms
3. Application of international laws that are embedded in the rules of the regional organization.
Scholars are divided in determining what shapes compliance and the institutional mechanisms to adopt to solve non-compliance problems international regimes may suffer from. Enforcement theorists understand non-compliance as a deliberate choice by a rational state to violate treaties after weighing the costs and benefits of alternative behaviours (MBaye, 2002; Fearon, 1998; Garrett, 1995; Keohane et al 2000; Mattli and Slaughter 1998, Pollack, 1997; Simmons, 1998; Weingast, 1989), while management theorists interprets infringement as a result of national government capacity limitation and thus privilege tools such as capacity building and monitoring rather than coercive measures to ensure compliance (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Huber and McCarty, 2004; Marks et al, 1996; Tallberg, 2002). Constructivist theories have also analysed the importance of shared norms and identities in creating cooperative behaviours (Checkel, 2001; Falkner et al, 2005; Heritier, 1996; Knill, 2001; Risse et al., 1999). This research project thus seeks to bridge the gap between the enforcement, management and enforcement schools and build a coherent theoretical model of regional compliance and compliance with global rules that can be applied across policy sector.
The methodology applied is two-fold. The large-N analysis competitively tests the variables shaping compliance in the EU in the area of economic and development policies from 1980 to 2009 and builds a preliminary assessment of functional institutional mechanisms required to improve compliance. The qualitative analysis unfolds the causal relationship between the regional tier model of governance and compliance in the areas of competition and environmental policies through process tracing of infringement proceedings in France, the UK and Switzerland. Concerns over endogenous compliance are addressed by testing the compliance performance of cooperative-minded states with similar levels of resources and administrative capacities; the intervening variable being the inclusion of a regional tier of governance. It concludes with a preliminary assessment of determinants of cooperation in Asia and the effect of the regional tier of governance on compliance beyond the EU’s borders. In addition this projects builds an innovative compliance scoreboard of EU member states and non-member states with international agreements across policy sectors.
The main findings show the regional tier of governance locks states into compliance with legislative agreements from which they cannot easily opt-out, whereas stand-alone states display more flexible patterns of compliance. Also, the regional tier of governance improves compliance with global rules beyond the initial intent of member states as a side product of efficient and credible commitment at the regional level and potentially outside the EU borders through bilateral agreements and soft power capacities.
Indeed delegation and pooling of policy-making competencies at an additional level through a regional tier can improve compliance rates with international law. Once the regional tier is adopted, it can solve the prisoner dilemma and coordination problems inherent to collective action (Fearon, 1998, Mattli, 1999). Through credible institutions and delegation to supranational agents the regional layer provides a supplementary set of enforcement and management mechanisms to improve compliance with global rules. It opens the gate at multiple levels to non-state actors enabling "fire-alarm" and "police-patrol" agents to supervise compliance at the domestic, regional and international level (McCubbins et al, 1984). The regional tier can also help legitimize the agreed international regulatory framework (Brown et al., 1998; Tallberg, 2002). Through the process of bargaining and allowing non-state actors into the policy-making process, shared norms, identities and institutionalized actions can emerge (Simmons, 1998; Haggard and Simmons, 1987).
If the regional tier of governance succeeds in producing a legitimate regulatory output, then compliance rates will increase. In turn, this outcome pulls states into levels of compliance that are higher than what would have been achieved in the absence of a regional tier. States that have established institutional coordination models at the regional level are thus expected to comply better than other countries that have not delegated authority through a regional tier of governance.
In the light of the current financial and its direct impact at the domestic level across the world, changes in preferences outside the EU borders call for more efficient models of global governance, supplemented by credible delegation to supranational institutions, to ensure efficient state coordination and compliance with economic policies and banking regulations. The rising revolutionary calls for democratisation from Ukraine to the Middle East also require the existence of practical level tools and policy relevant research to ensure states abide by their commitments and the requirements of international human rights standards, transparency and international law. Finally at the EU level, the Lisbon Treaty and the recent establishment of the European External Action Service have led to an increase in the foreign policy role of the EU. Functional institutional mechanisms are thus crucial to ensure the EU commitment to good governance and enforcement of the rule of law are facilitated at the international level. The economic crisis and challenges faced by European member states also call for increased efficiency in cooperation and credible commitment to assist and limit the risk of player defaulting. This research project thus provides crucial findings to address the economic, political and environmental challenges of our time as well as build policy relevant tools for researchers, policy-makers, civil society and private actors to improve models of global governance and cooperation.
States have increasingly engaged in international legislative agreement in a vast array of policy sectors ranging from trade to environmental policies and human rights (Simmons, 1998). The European Union for example has emerged as a regulatory state (Majone, 1996) establishing a supranational model of policy-making and governance based on a detailed legislative framework and enforcing institutional devices (ECJ/ Commission). Other international regimes facilitate and constrain state relations at the supra-national level in salient policy areas such as the WTO trade agreement or Climate Change regime and new regional initiatives are emerging in Asia and Latin America (Hix, 2010, Kahler, 2010). International regulatory agreements between states and regional coordination have thus become a central mode of governance and policy-making in supra-national political systems. However, while the cost of bargaining and the design of effective and detailed regulatory agreements are high, states at times fail to comply. Infringement with collective agreements can be particularly damaging for rational member states pursuing their national interests through settings of supranational governance and undermines the efficiency and credibility of international political systems (Moravcsik, 1998). The current context of economic and political instability calls for coordinated economic and development policies; which are efficiently implemented at the domestic level.
Drawing from the field of political science, international political economy and international law, the research develops the concept of a regional tier model of governance as established in the EU and test its efficiency as a model of governance to improve compliance with global rules across policy sector at the EU and international level. The regional tier model of governance is based on the three following mechanisms (Figure 1):
1. Delegation of enforcement power to supranational institutions
2. Access for private actors to enforcement mechanisms
3. Application of international laws that are embedded in the rules of the regional organization.
Scholars are divided in determining what shapes compliance and the institutional mechanisms to adopt to solve non-compliance problems international regimes may suffer from. Enforcement theorists understand non-compliance as a deliberate choice by a rational state to violate treaties after weighing the costs and benefits of alternative behaviours (MBaye, 2002; Fearon, 1998; Garrett, 1995; Keohane et al 2000; Mattli and Slaughter 1998, Pollack, 1997; Simmons, 1998; Weingast, 1989), while management theorists interprets infringement as a result of national government capacity limitation and thus privilege tools such as capacity building and monitoring rather than coercive measures to ensure compliance (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Huber and McCarty, 2004; Marks et al, 1996; Tallberg, 2002). Constructivist theories have also analysed the importance of shared norms and identities in creating cooperative behaviours (Checkel, 2001; Falkner et al, 2005; Heritier, 1996; Knill, 2001; Risse et al., 1999). This research project thus seeks to bridge the gap between the enforcement, management and enforcement schools and build a coherent theoretical model of regional compliance and compliance with global rules that can be applied across policy sector.
The methodology applied is two-fold. The large-N analysis competitively tests the variables shaping compliance in the EU in the area of economic and development policies from 1980 to 2009 and builds a preliminary assessment of functional institutional mechanisms required to improve compliance. The qualitative analysis unfolds the causal relationship between the regional tier model of governance and compliance in the areas of competition and environmental policies through process tracing of infringement proceedings in France, the UK and Switzerland. Concerns over endogenous compliance are addressed by testing the compliance performance of cooperative-minded states with similar levels of resources and administrative capacities; the intervening variable being the inclusion of a regional tier of governance. It concludes with a preliminary assessment of determinants of cooperation in Asia and the effect of the regional tier of governance on compliance beyond the EU’s borders. In addition this projects builds an innovative compliance scoreboard of EU member states and non-member states with international agreements across policy sectors.
The main findings show the regional tier of governance locks states into compliance with legislative agreements from which they cannot easily opt-out, whereas stand-alone states display more flexible patterns of compliance. Also, the regional tier of governance improves compliance with global rules beyond the initial intent of member states as a side product of efficient and credible commitment at the regional level and potentially outside the EU borders through bilateral agreements and soft power capacities.
Indeed delegation and pooling of policy-making competencies at an additional level through a regional tier can improve compliance rates with international law. Once the regional tier is adopted, it can solve the prisoner dilemma and coordination problems inherent to collective action (Fearon, 1998, Mattli, 1999). Through credible institutions and delegation to supranational agents the regional layer provides a supplementary set of enforcement and management mechanisms to improve compliance with global rules. It opens the gate at multiple levels to non-state actors enabling "fire-alarm" and "police-patrol" agents to supervise compliance at the domestic, regional and international level (McCubbins et al, 1984). The regional tier can also help legitimize the agreed international regulatory framework (Brown et al., 1998; Tallberg, 2002). Through the process of bargaining and allowing non-state actors into the policy-making process, shared norms, identities and institutionalized actions can emerge (Simmons, 1998; Haggard and Simmons, 1987).
If the regional tier of governance succeeds in producing a legitimate regulatory output, then compliance rates will increase. In turn, this outcome pulls states into levels of compliance that are higher than what would have been achieved in the absence of a regional tier. States that have established institutional coordination models at the regional level are thus expected to comply better than other countries that have not delegated authority through a regional tier of governance.
In the light of the current financial and its direct impact at the domestic level across the world, changes in preferences outside the EU borders call for more efficient models of global governance, supplemented by credible delegation to supranational institutions, to ensure efficient state coordination and compliance with economic policies and banking regulations. The rising revolutionary calls for democratisation from Ukraine to the Middle East also require the existence of practical level tools and policy relevant research to ensure states abide by their commitments and the requirements of international human rights standards, transparency and international law. Finally at the EU level, the Lisbon Treaty and the recent establishment of the European External Action Service have led to an increase in the foreign policy role of the EU. Functional institutional mechanisms are thus crucial to ensure the EU commitment to good governance and enforcement of the rule of law are facilitated at the international level. The economic crisis and challenges faced by European member states also call for increased efficiency in cooperation and credible commitment to assist and limit the risk of player defaulting. This research project thus provides crucial findings to address the economic, political and environmental challenges of our time as well as build policy relevant tools for researchers, policy-makers, civil society and private actors to improve models of global governance and cooperation.