Descripción del proyecto
Conflicto y cooperación entre los órganos jurisdiccionales nacionales y de la Unión Europea
El sistema jurídico de la Unión Europea (UE) está descentralizado, lo que limita la capacidad de aplicación de la UE y a menudo provoca la resistencia de los jueces nacionales hacia la autoridad del Derecho de la Unión. Se desconocen los incentivos y las dinámicas que configuran las complejas pautas de conflicto y cooperación entre los órganos jurisdiccionales nacionales y supranacionales dentro del sistema jurídico de la UE. El equipo del proyecto EUTHORITY, financiado por el Consejo Europeo de Investigación, utilizará modelos teóricos de juegos para analizar las interacciones estratégicas entre el Tribunal de Justicia, los órganos jurisdiccionales nacionales y los responsables políticos. Se utilizarán datos de sesenta y ocho órganos jurisdiccionales superiores nacionales de toda la UE para demostrar la hipótesis de que la política nacional y las actitudes judiciales hacia la integración desempeñan un papel importante a la hora de determinar la autoridad del Derecho de la Unión en el ámbito local.
Objetivo
Supranational legal regimes are increasingly enforced by multi-level, non-hierarchical court systems, in which judges at the upper, supranational echelon do not have the power to reverse domestic court decisions. Yet the incentives and dynamics that shape the complex patterns of conflict and cooperation observed in the most important of all such court structures, the EU legal system, are still poorly understood. To what extent are domestic courts able to negotiate the terms of their cooperation with the Court of Justice? How do national courts differ in that respect? Are the non-compliance threats issued by domestic courts all equally credible? Do the rare cases where these threats have been put to execution pose a systemic risk to the authority of EU law? How are the domestic courts’ incentives to cooperate with EU judges affected by the sort of political backsliding witnessed in Hungary and Romania in recent years? Our interdisciplinary research project addresses these puzzles of legal integration with the avowed aim of helping judges and policy-makers make more informed choices when faced with compliance problems in the judicial realm. Grounded in a general theory of judicial behaviour, our generic hypothesis is that the authority of EU law at domestic level is determined by domestic politics as well as by judicial attitudes towards integration. EUTHORITY seeks to refine this hypothesis using game theoretic modelling to analyse strategic interactions among the Court of Justice and domestic courts and politicians. Theory-building combines with a large-scale data-collection effort. We undertake to compile longitudinal data on the institutional characteristics and doctrinal responses to legal integration of 68 domestic apex courts across the EU 28 Member States. With a view to construct an annual, court-specific index of legal integration, we also conduct an expert survey asking academic lawyers and practitioners to assess their courts' attitudes towards EU law.
Ámbito científico
Programa(s)
Régimen de financiación
ERC-STG - Starting GrantInstitución de acogida
3000 Leuven
Bélgica