The first question of GLONEXACO was how the dynamics of the global trade in natural resources influence the microdynamics of armed conflicts. For this analysis the project looked at three levels, the global level (including multilateral organizations), the European level and the local level in the targeted countries.
On the global level, a so-called foreign accountability norm for natural resources has emerged, which can be defined as “the fact or condition of companies being legally required to disclosure information that allows holding them accountable for socially and/or environmentally harmful practices regarding natural extraction in their supply chain abroad”. The EU and the United States have adopted policies to comply with this norm. This norm is, however, not without criticism. While often hailed by western NGOs and states as an answer to the “Global Governance Gap”, many non-western states perceive the foreign accountability norm as a possible infringement of their natural resource sovereignty. Furthermore, there exists the fear that such policies will give states with more “market power” additional dominance over resource-export driven economies through the establishment of unilateral standards.
The European Union (EU) has embraced this norm and supports supply chain due diligence measures to trace the origin of some natural resources. These policies are also a response to enforcement problems of most existing multilateral and unilateral sanction regimes because of state weakness in the targeted regions. This approach results from the broader idea from the EU that transparency can improve resource governance and, therefore, safeguard both its political and economic interests in conflict zones, such as the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, when the issue becomes specific—as in the 2017 EU Conflict Minerals Regulation—translating this idea into concrete policies became more contentious as the different EU Institutions set different priorities for the final policy design. Economic interests of business groups and member states can influence the practical implementation of this norm.
These policies against so-called conflict resources are part of conflict management policies. Analyzing their local impact, however, some unexpected and undesired effects can sometimes be observed. Instead of decreasing violence between armed groups and against civilians, these policies can increase it. The reason is that they may be effective in cutting the funding of these violent groups, but the consequence is that they look for alternative sources of income. This can lead to violent confrontations for other pieces of territory that has become more valuable. At the same time, some armed groups turn to quick money and start to plunder from the civilian population.
The second main research question was to what extent the microdynamics of armed conflicts influence the global trade in natural resources. Most studies indicate that this effect is only limited. Whereas they may be an important source of income for armed groups, these resources are usually only a very small part of the global trade. A simple reason is that it is usually difficult to establish/maintain industrial extractive facilities under these conditions. As a result, the production capacity declines soon and buyers turn quickly to more stable production sites.
The third, and overarching, question of GLONEXACO was how the EU can influence these two dynamics to curtail the trade in natural resources that finance armed conflicts, without harming its competitive position. I will discuss the answer in the next section as it has also broader socio-economic implications.
