Most widely accepted ways of influencing others thoughts and behaviour, such as by offering incentives, presenting information or giving arguments, work by engaging a person's rationality--her capacity to respond appropriately to reasons for or against acting a certain way, or adopting a certain attitude. By contrast, many novel forms of influence operate at a subrational level, bypassing the targeted individual’s capacity to respond to reasons. Examples include bottomless newsfeeds, randomised rewards, and other ‘persuasive’ technologies employed by online platforms and computer game designers. They also include biological interventions, such as the use of drugs, nutritional supplements or non-invasive brain stimulation to facilitate criminal rehabilitation. The ethical acceptability of such arational influence depends crucially on whether we possess a moral right to mental integrity, and, if so, what kinds of mental interference this right protects us against. Unfortunately, these questions are yet to be addressed. Though the right to bodily integrity is well-established, the possibility of a right to mental integrity has attracted little philosophical scrutiny. This makes it unclear whether novel forms of arational influence are ethically acceptable, and how our societies should respond to them.
The purposes of this project are to (1) determine whether and how a moral right to mental integrity can be established; (2) develop an account of its scope and strength; and (3) determine what forms of arational influence infringe it, and whether and when these might nevertheless be justified. The analysis will be applied to controversial novel forms of arational influence including persuasive digital technologies, salience-based nudges, treatments for childhood behavioural disorders, and biological interventions in criminal rehabilitation.
