Periodic Reporting for period 4 - PACT (Populism and Conspiracy Theory)
Periodo di rendicontazione: 2024-10-01 al 2025-09-30
The last two decades have seen the rise of populist movements all over the world. Populists are or were at some point governing, among others, in Hungary, Poland, Italy, Switzerland, Finland, and Norway, sometimes alone, sometimes as part of coalitions. Even where they are not (yet) officially in power, as in Germany, they have grown stronger and shape the political agenda, as the Brexit campaign or discussions about the refugee “crisis” in Germany and other countries show. Populism therefore constitutes a phenomenon we need to understand. When is it dangerous for democracy, and can it also have beneficial effects? Conspiracy theories have also significantly gained in visibility and impact over the past twenty years, especially during the coronavirus pandemic, and they have been playing a major role in the debates about populism. The two phenomena are obviously connected. Populist leaders – from Trump to Maduro, and from Orban to Bolsonaro – regularly employ conspiracist rhetoric, and as number of studies have shown, the followers of populist parties and movements tend to believe more in conspiracy theories than others.
However, the exact relationship between populism and conspiracy theory remains understudied. We know comparatively little about the significance of conspiracy theories for specific populist movements; we do not know yet if conspiracy theories are always part of the populist repertoire, and it remains to be seen if conspiracy theories are, as is sometimes claimed, more relevant to right-wing than to left-wing populism. The PACT project has provided a robust account of the relationship between populism and conspiracy theory. On the one hand, it has done detailed case studies of populist parties and movements in selected countries; on the other, it has bundled its findings in a general theorization of the relationship between populism and conspiracy theory. Across regions and countries, the safest indicator for how prominent conspiracy theories are within a specific populist movement is the status that conspiracism occupies in the given political culture. We usually tend to think of conspiracy theories as a form of counter knowledge and as stigmatized. This is still the case in Germany, Austria, Italy and parts of the public sphere in the United States and Brazil. However, in Poland and Hungary conspiracy theories apparently never underwent the process of stigmatization that turned them from official into subjugated knowledge after World War II in other parts of the world. Accordingly they are widely accepted and can be articulated openly, and therefore they are an integral part not only of populist discourse in these countries but also of political discourse more generally. Put generally, the more accepted conspiracy theories are in a given political culture, the more explicitly can they be articulated and the more important and the less divisive they are for populist parties and movements.
However, the exact relationship between populism and conspiracy theory remains understudied. We know comparatively little about the significance of conspiracy theories for specific populist movements; we do not know yet if conspiracy theories are always part of the populist repertoire, and it remains to be seen if conspiracy theories are, as is sometimes claimed, more relevant to right-wing than to left-wing populism. The PACT project has provided a robust account of the relationship between populism and conspiracy theory. On the one hand, it has done detailed case studies of populist parties and movements in selected countries; on the other, it has bundled its findings in a general theorization of the relationship between populism and conspiracy theory. Across regions and countries, the safest indicator for how prominent conspiracy theories are within a specific populist movement is the status that conspiracism occupies in the given political culture. We usually tend to think of conspiracy theories as a form of counter knowledge and as stigmatized. This is still the case in Germany, Austria, Italy and parts of the public sphere in the United States and Brazil. However, in Poland and Hungary conspiracy theories apparently never underwent the process of stigmatization that turned them from official into subjugated knowledge after World War II in other parts of the world. Accordingly they are widely accepted and can be articulated openly, and therefore they are an integral part not only of populist discourse in these countries but also of political discourse more generally. Put generally, the more accepted conspiracy theories are in a given political culture, the more explicitly can they be articulated and the more important and the less divisive they are for populist parties and movements.
The project began in April 2020, and while it was for some time impeded by the pandemic, it proceeded well and reached all its major goals by September 2025. The first phase of the project was dedicated to an analysis of the current and historical discourses of populist actors in the countries studied. In order to arrive at a holistic understanding of the relationship between populism and conspiracy theory, this critical discourse analysis was then supplemented by ethnographic fieldwork. The researchers spent between six months and a year in the countries they focused on, conducting interviews with party members and "ordinary" people who support the party or movement, and practicing participant observation at party rallies, demonstrations and other events. Once the researchers had returned from fieldwork, they intensified the process of data analysis and writing the monographs each will produce. These books will be published in the course of 2026. The same year, the PI will publish a short monograph in which he provides a theorization of the relationship between populism and conspiracy theory.
The project also reacted to the unforeseen challenges of the coronavirus pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Together with his colleague Peter Knight, the PI edited a volume on “Covid Conspiracy Theories in Global Perspectives,” to which nearly all PACT researchers contributed and which covers all continents. And the team later decided to devote its third and final international conference to the populist appropriation of conspiracy theories about the war in Ukraine. This event took place in Tallinn in September 2024 and was organized in collaboration with Dr. Mari-Liis Madisson from the University of Tartu.
The PACT project has greatly enhanced our standing of when, why, how, and to what effects conspiracy theories are voiced by populist leaders or by ordinary members within populist movements and parties. On the one hand, it has provided robust and very detailed accounts of the role that conspiracy theories play for the liberty party and its supporters in Austria, the five star movement and its supporters in Italy, the Fidesz party and its supporters in Hungary, the PiS party and its supporters in Poland, and the supporters of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. All of these case studies have been done through a combination of discourse analysis and ethnography. The researchers employed in the project have studied the articulations of conspiracy theories within populist discourse both top down (through discourse analysis) and bottom up (through participant observation and qualitative interviews). In addition, the PI has studied the articulations of conspiracism and populism in the United States and Germany. However, has already indicated in the application, he has not done ethnographic research. On the other hand, the PACT project has worked towards a comprehensive theorization of the general relationship between populism and conspiracy theory.
The project also took great efforts to communicate its results to stakeholders and the general public. It has produced three podcast series that are available on its website and all major streaming platforms as well as a short animated video that visualizes its general findings. In addition, the expertise of the team was frequently sought by media outlets and stakeholders.
The project also reacted to the unforeseen challenges of the coronavirus pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Together with his colleague Peter Knight, the PI edited a volume on “Covid Conspiracy Theories in Global Perspectives,” to which nearly all PACT researchers contributed and which covers all continents. And the team later decided to devote its third and final international conference to the populist appropriation of conspiracy theories about the war in Ukraine. This event took place in Tallinn in September 2024 and was organized in collaboration with Dr. Mari-Liis Madisson from the University of Tartu.
The PACT project has greatly enhanced our standing of when, why, how, and to what effects conspiracy theories are voiced by populist leaders or by ordinary members within populist movements and parties. On the one hand, it has provided robust and very detailed accounts of the role that conspiracy theories play for the liberty party and its supporters in Austria, the five star movement and its supporters in Italy, the Fidesz party and its supporters in Hungary, the PiS party and its supporters in Poland, and the supporters of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. All of these case studies have been done through a combination of discourse analysis and ethnography. The researchers employed in the project have studied the articulations of conspiracy theories within populist discourse both top down (through discourse analysis) and bottom up (through participant observation and qualitative interviews). In addition, the PI has studied the articulations of conspiracism and populism in the United States and Germany. However, has already indicated in the application, he has not done ethnographic research. On the other hand, the PACT project has worked towards a comprehensive theorization of the general relationship between populism and conspiracy theory.
The project also took great efforts to communicate its results to stakeholders and the general public. It has produced three podcast series that are available on its website and all major streaming platforms as well as a short animated video that visualizes its general findings. In addition, the expertise of the team was frequently sought by media outlets and stakeholders.
The project has greatly increased the scientific community’s understanding of the relationship between populism and conspiracy theory. In this regard, it has moved significantly beyond the state of the art. The general theorization that is sketched in a preliminary version in the introduction to the "Populism and Conspiracy Theory" conference volume and that the PI will extend on in a short monograph forthcoming in 2026 is by far the most detailed and thorough analysis of the connection between the two phenomena so far available. The project's results have been very well received by the academic community.
The - for obvious reasons - unplanned volume on "Covid Conspiracy Theories" has significantly shaped the scientific community’s understanding of the transnational flow and regional and local variations of conspiracism as part of populist discourse and beyond. Moreover, it is the first volume on conspiracy theories that is truly global in scope in that it contained contributions discussing countries on all continents. That had never been achieved before.
The - for obvious reasons - unplanned volume on "Covid Conspiracy Theories" has significantly shaped the scientific community’s understanding of the transnational flow and regional and local variations of conspiracism as part of populist discourse and beyond. Moreover, it is the first volume on conspiracy theories that is truly global in scope in that it contained contributions discussing countries on all continents. That had never been achieved before.