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Populism and Conspiracy Theory

Periodic Reporting for period 2 - PACT (Populism and Conspiracy Theory)

Okres sprawozdawczy: 2021-10-01 do 2023-03-31

The last two decades have seen the rise of populist movements all over the world. In 2020, the four largest democracies – Brazil, Indonesia, the United States, and India – were governed by politicians usually described as populist by journalists and scholars. In Europe, too, populism is no longer restricted to the margins of politics and society. Populists are governing, among others, in Hungary, Poland, Italy, Switzerland, Finland, and Norway, sometimes alone, sometimes as part of coalitions. Even where they are not (yet) officially in power, they have grown stronger and shape the political agenda, as the Brexit campaign or discussions about the refugee “crisis” in Germany and other countries show. Populism therefore constitutes a phenomenon we need to understand. When is it dangerous for democracy, and can it also have beneficial effects?

Conspiracy theories have also significantly gained in visibility and impact over the past twenty years, especially during the Coronaviurus pandemic, and they have been playing a major role in the debates about populism. The two phenomena are obviously connected. Populist leaders – from Trump to Maduro, and from Orban to Bolsonaro – regularly employ conspiracist rhetoric, and as number of studies have shown, the followers of populist parties and movements tend to believe more in conspiracy theories than others.

However, the exact relationship between populism and conspiracy theory remains understudied. We know comparatively little about the significance of conspiracy theories for specific populist movements; we do not know yet if conspiracy theories are always part of the populist repertoire, and it remains to be seen if conspiracy theories are, as is sometimes claimed, more relevant to right-wing than to left-wing populism.

PACT will provide a robust account of the relationship between populism and conspiracy theory. On the one hand, it will provide detailed analysis of the countries it focuses on; on the other, it will undertake a general theorization of the relationship.
The project began in April 2020, and while it was for some time impeded by the pandemic, it is proceeding well and will reach all its major goals. The first phase of the project was dedicated to an analysis of the current and historical discourses of populist actors in the countries studied. In order to arrive at a holistic understanding of the relationship between populism and conspiracy theory, this critical discourse analysis is currently supplemented by ethnographic fieldwork. The researchers spend ca. six months in the countries they focus on, conducting interviews with party members and "ordinary" people who support the party or movement, and practicing participant observation at party rallies, demonstrations and other events. The fieldwork in Hungary has been completed; that in Italy, Austria and Poland is currently underway; that in Brazil will begin soon. Once the researchers have returned from fieldwork, they will intensify the process of data analysis and begin writing the monographs each will produce.

The research has already established that conspiracy theories occur in combination with left-wing populism but that they are usually less important for such parties and movements than for their right-wing counterparts. This insight is not unexpected because the hypothesis that conspiracy theories are more central to right-wing populism has existed for some time. But a conference organized by the project in March 2022 provided the empirical evidence thus far lacking.

The research of the PACT project has already established beyond a doubt that conspiracy theories are far more accepted in Central and Eastern Europe than in other parts of Europe and North America. They continue to constitute orthodox knowledge there, and not heterodox knowledge. They are often the official version of events and not counter-narratives. Accordingly, EU or even global initiatives to counter the harmful effects of populism, conspiracy theory, and disinformation more generally cannot adopt a “one-size fits all” approach, as they usually do at the moment. Instead, such campaigns need to be customized for specific regions and countries.

In reaction to the pandemic, the PI and his colleague Peter Knight (University of Manchester) have edited a volume on Covid conspiracy theories around the globe. It contains case studies on 25 countries, five of them by current or former project researchers. It will be published on March 9, 2023 as open access. This constitutes a major breakthrough. Many articles and some books have been written over the past two and a half years about Covid conspiracy theories and their connection to populist discourse. Much of this research is of poor quality and displays a tendency towards broad generalizations on the basis of limited case studies and data. The articles in the volume, by contrast, provide thick descriptions and in-depth analyses of many countries. Unlike in previous research, Asia and Africa are well represented in the volume. This already puts insights won from Western countries into perspective. Taken together, the chapters in the volume present by far the most comprehensive and nuanced analysis of populist conspiracism during the pandemic available.
The project is underway to provide the by far systematic accounts of the importance of conspiracy theories for populist movements in several European countries and two in the Americas. This will also include an evaluation of the differing status of conspiracy theory in different countries and regions. This will allow the PI to synthesize the results into a systematic theorization of the relationship between populism and conspiracy theory.