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The IAEA and the two Koreas: History of the ROK and the DRPK in their challenges and contribution to the international nuclear safeguards and verification regime

Descrizione del progetto

Relazione storica tra Corea del Sud, Corea del Nord e AIEA

Le salvaguardie nucleari internazionali e la verifica da parte dell’Agenzia internazionale per l’energia atomica (AIEA) sono fondamentali per prevenire l’uso improprio di materiali e tecnologie nucleari per scopi militari. Sostenuto dal programma di azioni Marie Skłodowska-Curie, il progetto IAEA2KOREAS analizza le relazioni storiche tra l’AIEA e la Corea del Sud e la Corea del Nord in materia di proliferazione nucleare. Negli anni ’70 la Corea del Sud aveva un programma segreto di armi nucleari e i sospetti sulle sue ambizioni nucleari sono riemersi nel 2004. La Corea del Nord si è ritirata dall’AIEA nel 1994 e ha infine espulso gli ispettori dell’agenzia nel 2009. Il progetto fa luce sulla storia delle sfide e del contributo delle due Coree all’AIEA, esaminando le lezioni apprese da quest’ultima.

Obiettivo

International verification through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards forms the cornerstone of global nuclear nonproliferation efforts to prevent the misuse of nuclear material and technology for military purposes. This research examines several critical junctures in the historical development of the relationship between the IAEA and the two Koreas – South Korea (ROK) and North Korea (DPRK) – to address how this international organization has evolved in its handling of nuclear proliferators. Historical paths of the IAEA with the two Koreas – the North which succeeded in developing its own bombs vs. the South which abandoned its weapons program – have been more complicated and less one-sided than what is commonly believed. South Korea became an IAEA member state in 1957 and ratified the NPT in 1975, but it maintained a clandestine nuclear weapons program throughout the 1970s. Furthermore, although South Korea’s military nuclear pursuits were halted when its president was assassinated in 1979, suspicions about its nuclear ambitions were revived when the ROK government disclosed its past nuclear activities as it signed the Additional Protocol with the IAEA in 2004. It revealed that ROK scientists separated a small amount of plutonium from irradiated uranium in 1982 and conducted some “laboratory-scale experiments” in 2000 to enrich uranium up to a higher level than what was allowed by the IAEA. The case of the DPRK with the IAEA was more dramatic, as widely known, with its withdrawal from IAEA membership in 1994 and its expulsion of IAEA inspectors. Thus, based on extensive research in the ROK, US, and IAEA archives, analysis of open-source data, and interviews with key stakeholders, this project intends to shed new light on the understudied history of the two Koreas’ challenges and contribution to the IAEA and further examine any lessons that the IAEA learned through its turbulent relationship with one successful and one failed proliferator.

Campo scientifico (EuroSciVoc)

Parole chiave

Programma(i)

Argomento(i)

Meccanismo di finanziamento

HORIZON-TMA-MSCA-PF-EF - HORIZON TMA MSCA Postdoctoral Fellowships - European Fellowships

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(si apre in una nuova finestra) HORIZON-MSCA-2023-PF-01

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Coordinatore

UNIVERSITAT WIEN
Contributo netto dell'UE
€ 249 301,20
Indirizzo
UNIVERSITATSRING 1
1010 Wien
Austria
Regione
Ostösterreich Wien Wien
Tipo di attività
Higher or Secondary Education Establishments
Collegamenti
Costo totale
Nessun dato

Partner (1)