Instances of nonlinear pricing in vertical industries typically involves discount schemes where higher volume purchases or those that involve a larger selection of the supplier’s products lead to lower prices. Some of these discount schemes can generate incentive effects that are often associated with exclusive dealing. In absence of efficiency rationale these are often seen as potential mechanisms to exclude competitors and therefore carry a negative connotation in competition law. Disentangling the underlying motivations for loyalty discount schemes is essential for the capability of competition policy enforcement to separate anticompetitive instances from benign ones. This project aims to generate output that serves this end. Its benefits are likely to diffuse into competition law and policymaking. The applicant has received her PhD at Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, and holds an assistant professorship at the University of Alicante. She conducts research on industrial economics, and is a dynamic researcher with numerous achievements. To accomplish the project the applicant would spend two academic years in the Economics Department at University College London, a research department in economics. UCL has vast scientific expertise and facilities required for conducting top quality academic research. In addition, its active involvement in interdisciplinary collaborations is valuable for this project. The proposal would contribute to applicant’s academic career. It would help improve her analytical skills and research training, diversify her knowledge, deepen her project management skills, create opportunities for long-lasting collaborations and get in touch with timely antitrust issues. Through the accomplishment of this project, the applicant aims to build a sound publication record, to make relevant research contributions, to advance knowledge, and to achieve professional independence.
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