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Safe control of non cooperative vehicles through electromagnetic means

Final Report Summary - SAVELEC (Safe control of non cooperative vehicles through electromagnetic means)

Executive Summary:
SAVELEC aims to provide a solution for the external, safe control of a non-cooperative vehicle without any consequences on the persons inside the vehicle or other persons and objects nearby. The proposed solution is based on the use of electromagnetic means, electromagnetic pulses (EMP) and/or high power microwaves (HPM), in order to disrupt the proper behaviour of the electronic components inside the vehicle, which will lead it to slow down and stop. The SAVELEC approach is based on the premise of obtaining an optimized solution in terms of field strength. In this sense, electromagnetic compatibility experiments on key components of cars were performed in order to evaluate the effect of different types of signals. The consequences of human exposure to the signals chosen were evaluated in the context of European legislation in order to ensure safety of persons inside the vehicle and in the environment as well as of the user of the technology. The effect in explosive atmospheres regarding exposure to this kind of signal was also within the scope of SAVELEC. A simulated environment was used for assessing the human driver reactions in different scenarios and driving conditions once the car enters the abnormal behaviour mode as a consequence of the influence of the electromagnetic signal. Legal studies on the use of this technology by the European Security Forces were carried out and a regulatory framework was proposed and promoted. Special attention was paid to the measures needed for assuring a controlled and secure use of this kind of device.
The purpose of the project was achieved: to design, build and test a breadboard level prototype for the evaluation of the technology. A real demonstration with a real car in a controlled track was performed to assess the technology in a real-life scenario.

The SAVELEC consortium is formed by 9 partners distributed in 6 European countries: Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, Greece and Slovakia. This consortium includes three well-defined profiles of partners essential for carrying out the project successfully: Electromagnetic profile, automotive profile and Industrial partner in the field of defence and security. SAVELEC consortium is constituted by following partners:
• IMST (project coordinator): German SME with very strong expertise regarding antenna and radiating elements design and fabrication and analysis of human exposure to electromagnetic fields.
• BCB: Spanish SME with expertise in the preparation of electrical/electronic automotive test benches.
• VTI: Sweden research centre with specific car simulators and testing facilities.
• TEI of PIRAEUS: Greek University providing expertise in EMP/HPM technology.
• DLR: German key partner regarding vehicular electronic architectures and configurations.
• UNIVERSITY OF MAGDEBURG: German university providing expertise in vehicular communications and sensors.
• ACADEMY of ARMED FORCES: Slovakian army academy with very important expertise in EMC susceptibility analysis.
• HELLENIC AEROSPACE INDUSTRY: Greek industrial defence and security partner.
• MBDA FRANCE: French industrial defence and security partner.
Moreover, MBDA UK was included in the project as a third party, which brings a strong background on EMP/HPM technologies.

In addition to the aforementioned partners, several end-users were added as associated partners acting as key advisory expert regarding the analysis of missions, use-cases and scenarios. The involvement of security forces as end-users in the project was a key success factor, taking into account the necessity of having realistic information about the use-cases, scenarios and operational parametres. The end-user panel was constituted by different European Law Enforcement Agencies and associated organizations:
• Intervention, Information, Mobile Material and Telecommunication Units - Guardia Civil – Spain
• GIGN, Gendarmerie Nationale – France
• LKA/SEK Sachsen-Anhalt – Germany
• KEMEA, Ministry of Public Order – Greece
• Grupo Especial de Operaciones - Cuerpo Nacional de Policía – Spain
• Special Counter-Terrorism Unit – Hellenic Police – Greece
• State Security Division – Hellenic Coast Guard HQs – Greece
• R.A.I.D Police Nationale – France
• Academy of the Police Forces – Slovakia
• Home Office Centre for Applied Science and Technology - United Kingdom

Project Context and Objectives:

Since the environment affects onboard electronics of vehicles, the regulatory authorities and manufacturers of every economic region have been doing a lot of research resulting in several standards and directives focusing on enforcing the behavior of vehicles faced with several environments. On the other hand, the increasing development of electronics applied to any automotive and ship sector makes these vehicles more sensitive to electromagnetic effects.

As defined previously, the aim of the current standards and directives is to cover requirements about immunity and susceptibility to radiated and conducted disturbances. These standards consider the electromagnetic environment in which these devices normally operate, defining immunity levels according to this environment.

In this context, Commission Directive 2004/104/EC of 14 October 2004 was defined to be applied to the electromagnetic compatibility of vehicles, covering requirements regarding immunity to radiated and conducted disturbances for functions related to direct control of the vehicle. This Directive refers to ISO standards for determining the immunity requirements:
• ISO 7637 series evaluates the compatibility with conducted electrical transients of equipment due to sudden interruption of current, switching processes or voltage reduction caused by energizing the starter-motor.
• ISO 11451 and ISO 11452 series (vehicle test methods and component test methods respectively) evaluate the electrical disturbances by narrow band radiated electromagnetic energy.

On the other hand, manufacturers define their own standards, most of them based on the ones previously defined (e.g. TL 821 66 by Volkswagen, GS 95002 by BMW or GMW3097 by General Motors), but also taking into account different environments defined in other standards (e.g. ES-XW7T-1A278-AC by Ford, which adds references to ISO 10605 for electrical disturbances from electrostatic discharge, B21 7110 by Peugeot-Citroën, which adds a reference to the MIL-STD 461E magnetic field immunity test or Renault 36-00-808/G by Renault which adds a reference to the MIL-STD 461E audio frequency magnetic immunity test).

These types of standards not only apply to land vehicles, in the same way that some IEC standards have been defined to cover requirements of immunity focused on boats and electronic installations on ships. This is the case of:
• IEC 60533, which evaluates special EMC risks such as lightning strikes, transients from the operation of circuit breakers and electromagnetic radiation from radio transmitters meeting the requirements of IMO (International Maritime Organization) resolution A.813.
• IEC 60945 based on IMO Resolution A.694 specifies the requirements and type testing which can be applied to shipborne radio equipment forming part of the global maritime distress and safety system and electronic navigational aids.

Other kinds of environments related to defense and the army have been also standardized. Some immunity tests described in these standards (e.g. MIL-STD-461E from USA) use EMP/HPM signals in radiated and conducted immunity tests. These kinds of signals are tested since it was observed that high-altitude nuclear detonations produce EMP pulses that can potentially disrupt or damage electronic and electrical systems.

It is clear that no malfunctions occur when devices are used in the electromagnetic environment they were designed for, but when the environment changes in terms of electromagnetic disturbances the devices could be affected. This interference phenomenon in EMC can be used sometimes as a desirable phenomenon for some applications. This is why some patents that use EMP/HPM signals have appeared in recent years for different applications. These patents (only American patents were found) could be included as state-of-the-art inputs; these various ideas (most cases are generalities and not developed ideas) aim to develop a system with the capacity to disable vehicles with or without contact:
1. US7475624 “Electromagnetic Pulse Generator”: it proposes a system to disable a vehicle with an EMP (Electromagnetic pulse) induced to the electronics of a target vehicle with a mechanical coupling.
2. US5293527 “Remote vehicle disabling System”: this patent describes a block diagram of a system to disrupt the electronics of a target vehicle, generating an electromagnetic pulse.
3. US5952600 “Engine disabling weapon”: this patent extrapolates the concept of a non-lethal weapon for temporarily immobilizing a target subject to disabling electronic circuits that control an engine with a induced voltage via two channels of electrically-conductive air.

It is true that this line of research may be the way to stop non-cooperative vehicles, which is one of the main problems of security forces nowadays, reducing the risk of injuries as is shown in many studies and real cases:
According to the ESRIF Final Report – December of 2009 (European Security Research & Innovation Forum) and its commitment to “...develop a strategic plan for security research and innovation over the next 20 years in Europe” and its cluster for “securing identity, access and movement of people and goods,” industrial implementation of technologies should be promoted for automated border control in order to “...ensure efficient border management...”. In the same way, several working groups of the ESRIP focused on ensuring the safety of citizens and critical infrastructures.

SAVELEC aimed at going beyond the state of the art through:
1. The scarcity of scientific studies and patents in Europe on such phenomena focussing on stopping non cooperative vehicles makes it necessary to make a detailed study of the sensitive parts of vehicles as well as the effects that such pulses have on them.
The knowledge of levels, types of disturbances and coupling mechanisms could be used to evaluate the susceptibilities for this kind of device in order to develop devices to stop non cooperative vehicles.
2. Commercial systems based on military standards which simulate EMP pulses are available in the market; however, commercial systems are too large to achieve the objective proposed in this project. Likewise, the field level and waveforms generated by such systems are the ones defined in these standards and this may not be an efficient solution.
System elements (antennas, generators, amplifiers and so forth) will be designed or integrated in order to create a system that stops non cooperative vehicles. The fundamental feature of this system will be its portability to be integrated into security forces’ vehicles. The optimization of the necessary field level will be also optimized to ensure the safety of citizens, the environment (including the vehicle in which the system is on board) and users of this technology.
3. The existing standards regarding the evaluation of human exposure to electromagnetic fields (e.[*]g[/*]. EN 50357, EN 50364 and EN 50366) focus on establishing the requirements for equipment with regard to the protection of the health and safety of the user and any other person. But these requirements are based on the effect of continuous electromagnetic fields on people.
The project aims to evaluate the effects of the pulses from the car-stopping prototype device on people. These effects will be studied from two points of view:
The effects in the near field on the final user (security forces) and on the people in the immediate environment.
The effects in a far field on the occupants of the non-collaborative vehicle.
4. Human behaviour is a complex factor to assess but is decisive for the resolution of situations in the scenarios where this device is expected to be used. This is why besides the human exposure evaluation, human factors cannot be forgotten. Thus, some studies about the reactions of drivers in the event of car failures as a consequence of EMP/HPM signals will be carried out considering multiple variables.
5. The absence of EMP/HPM generators for industrial applications means there is a lack of a regulatory framework in the European Union related to the use of this technology and the evaluation of human exposure to this kind of electromagnetic field.
The project will lay the groundwork to regulate the conditions of use of this technology and the requirements to ensure safety and security for persons and objects in the immediate environment restricting its use to authorized personnel to ensure proper handling


High Level Objectives

SAVELEC aimed to provide a solution for a well-defined problem in the scope of police/security/border guards and forces (the safe control and stopping at distance of non-cooperative vehicles) using an approach based on electromagnetic means, basically EMP and HPM. The basic idea was to evaluate which type of signal in terms of waveform, frequency and duration is the most suitable for interfering with the electronic components and systems in a car and which could lead to slowing it down and stopping it. This technology could be applied in a wide type of missions that were evaluated and assessed in the very beginning of the project with the close participation of a group of end-users involved as advisory experts. Although the project is orientated at evaluating the feasibility of the technology in the field of cars, the results could be easily extrapolated to other kinds of vehicles like fast vessels, trucks or motorbikes.

SAVELEC provided new of technology solutions for security forces, which could assist them in their daily operations, providing important added value in terms of safety and security. The preparation of a regulatory framework for the use of this new concept means considering all the ethics and legal aspects concerned, which was also one of the important objectives of the project.

The proposed solution was also studied in terms of field strength for minimizing the impact on persons and infrastructures nearby the operation scenario. The safety and security of the technology user and the suspicious persons inside the vehicle are at the heart of the SAVELEC project

Scientific and Technical Objectives
• To perform an in-depth analysis of the different missions and use-cases where the technology is expected to be used. This includes land and maritime missions.
• To define a set of high-level requirements for the different missions and use cases identified in terms of distance of operation, speed of the target, distance to nearby persons and objects and environmental aspects.
• To perform a technology review of the technology available on the market for the generation of EMP/HPM, carrying out an economic assessment of the different options.
• To review the current electromagnetic compatibility requirements applied to the electronic and electrical automotive systems and components in the worldwide context.
• To identify what systems and components of a car are the more suitable to be interfered with and which could lead to slowing down and stopping the car safely.
• To prepare a test bench in a laboratory environment for evaluating the impact of different EMP/HPM signals on the identified items to be interfered with. To prepare an EMP/HPM generation bench providing high versatility in terms of the type of signal, frequency, duration and field strength.
• To select and define the most suitable and optimized type of signal to be used for achieving the proposed objective: stopping and controlling a car at distance.
• To assess the impact of the EMP/HPM selected signal regarding human exposure. The solution aims to be completely compatible with European guidelines regarding human exposure to electromagnetic fields.
• To perform studies on ATEX exposure to electromagnetic fields to ensure that the EMP/HPM signal will not cause any problems in this sense.
• To make an assessment of the human factors, by means of a simulated car environment, and inducing the expected failures on the car as a consequence of the EMP/HPM signal, the impact on the driver once the normal behaviour of the car is affected. Different situations and environments will be evaluated (i.e. high speed car, high traffic density situations, narrow roads...)
• To design and develop an EMP/HPM car-stopping device prototype at a breadboard level achieving all the above requirements including the safe and controlled use of the device.
• To evaluate and demonstrate the performance of the new device in a realistic scenario (controlled track) on real cars.
• To promote a regulatory framework regarding the use of high power electromagnetic means of interference by security forces.
The final outcome of the project will be the car-stopping EMP/HPM device prototype at a breadboard level that will demonstrate the viability of the technology for the proposed purpose, achieving all the operational, technical and legal requirements.

Project Results:
The key technical activities and work packages, and the project workflow are presented in Figure 1. From each of the work packages, the foregrounds and exploitable results have been identified.

Work Package 1: Missions and Uses Cases

WP1 identified the missions and use cases compliant with the Project technology and the End-Users’ needs. The results of WP1 can be used as preliminary background work in future similar Projects of the SAVELEC Consortium Members.
The objectives of this WP were:
• Evaluating the different concepts for operation regarding the detention and control of non-cooperative vehicles in land and maritime environments.
• Providing a set of high level operational requirements for the vehicle stopping device.
In order to reach those objectives, a close cooperation with an end-users panel (end users) was set up.
The first step wass performing an analysis of the missions and use cases. This task aimed at identifying and analyzing the different missions where the security forces would need to have a device available that could stop and control different kinds of non-cooperative vehicles at a distance. This would include not only land missions regarding the detention of cars, motorbikes or fast vessels but also maritime missions where the main use case will be looking into the control and detention of a fast speed vessel by seaborne or airborne platforms.
The aim was to bring out major information from interviews to the End Users. In order to provide information in this domain, end-users have defined use-cases for which they would need to stop cars or boats. They characterized the situation, context, environment, and desired outcome of any of these use-cases. The end-users constraints and requirements in terms of legal aspect, casualties, efficiency, usable platform, operators, etc. have also been broached. Then, the operational analysis led tried to:
• Assess and identify the possible EMP/HPM solutions;
• Define the associated operational requirements for the SAVELEC device;
• Express trials recommendations.

More than thirty collected use-cases have been merged into nine different scenarios (See Table 1). Land and maritime scenarios were divided into protection, control and pursuit missions.

The analysis led to the following conclusions:
• Land scenarios are of most interest for the end users.
• There is a real need of a new solution in the field of pursuit missions (both for land and maritime scenarios); the end-users are particularly interested in discrete land pursuit missions.
• Spontaneous checkpoints and security checkpoints also present a challenge for police forces in the car stopping domain.
• When it comes to land missions, the end users are particularly interested in finding a solution for stopping high power cars.

The results of the missions and use cases analysis care were taken into account for developing the different concepts of operation (CONOPS) of the SAVELEC device. Those lead to the definition and specification of a set of operational requirements that provided the boundary conditions regarding the development of the device: distance to target, environmental conditions, target speed and dimensions, etc.
In a first place, end-user requirements and constraints have been studied. In this sense, the first SAVELEC workshop allowed the consortium to question the end users about the requested effects from the SAVELEC device on the different actors on the field: police operator, police vehicle, device platform, illuminated vehicle, driver of the illuminated car, civilians in the field of operation, civilian cars and infrastructures. These were considered to define the different characteristic of the device in terms of power, size, etc. The legal aspect and needed authorization, as well as the additional requirements given during end-users interviews (regarding maximum size and weight, deployability, etc.) were also taken into account. Then, in order to get an idea of the sizing of a SAVELEC device, and to assess how such equipment would be used on the field, end-user platforms were characterized.
Taking into account the end-user requirements and constraints, an operational analysis was performed, leading to the following conclusions:

Land scenarios:
Many different uses of SAVELEC device allow coping with the discrete pursuit situation. This scenario, dealing with stopping fast cars at low speed, presents one of the greater interests to the end users. Miniaturized fixed systems seem to offer a good solution to this kind of scenario.
The highly visible pursuit situation is greatly subject to technological constraints and suspect vehicle behavior after illumination. The already available technology is still at a too low level of maturity for being sure to apprehend the suspects in good conditions: driver’s reaction and collateral damages are at too much risk. This scenario viability then strongly depends on results regarding the device’s effect on car vital elements and driver’s behavior. Illumination by the front of the police vehicle require much more complex system than by the side or the rear
SAVELEC use for high value protection situations is at higher interest to the end users. The hidden device just after to gate could be used for specific operations.
Security checkpoints can only be dealt with if the suspect vehicle is slowed down or with an automatic system deactivated by the operator for minimizing his reaction time. The use of a very short range system would then allow to minimize collateral damages risks. Really close to the previous scenario in terms of proposed solutions, this one gained less interest to end users.
As far as opportunity checkpoints are concerned, reaction time is the key for distance of arrest. Security reasons make it at less interest to end users.

Maritime scenarios
To cope with this type of scenario, SAVELEC system needs to have a bigger range, and then, to identify earlier the potential threat.
The operational interest lies on the non-lethal aspect of the device. It mainly allows the arrest of a suspect at a level of reaction, between request to stop and shooting into the engine.

Platforms consideration:
In the initial stages, fixed systems seem to offer the most useful solution. They fit with slow motion cars stopping, which may be the more obvious scenario at this time. If the device is small enough, the proposed solution of using the road furniture to hide it suits end-users needs quite well.
The next step would be to integrate the device into a mobile system, in order to provide police forces with more flexibility. Once again, depending on the size of the device, motorbikes and roof-trunk both cars offer a solution which seems to be flexible and well adapted to collateral damages minimization.
In a more distant future, when the technology reaches a certain level of maturity, front illumination from cars and/or helicopters will provide another option for almost any cases presented here, as soon as collateral damages can be easily avoided. It has to be kept in mind that this kind of platform would nevertheless be strongly dependant to weather conditions, and selected area (few infrastructure and traffic for low helicopter flight).
For maritime platforms, the parallel can be drawn: devices used into fixed boat in the first time would fit with several scenarios (mainly protection and control missions). In a second time, moving boat integrating a SAVELEC device could be used. At last, the best platform to be used would be helicopters once again.

Size, operability, range, target, environmental conditions requirements and trial recommendations were defined in order to be used as an input for the device development.

Work Package 2: EMP/HPM Technology Review

WP2 conducted a literature and technology review and these results can be used as preliminary background work in future similar Projects of the SAVELEC Consortium Members. In this WP2, the work was focussed on reviewing the different possible technologies for implementing the EMP/HMP. Not only was the state-of-the art analysed, but possibilities of implementation for the system to be developed and a design framework were also suggested.
The work in this WP gave a clear overview of the system to be designed, with its main building blocks (see Figure 2):
• The Prime power subsystem generates relatively low power electrical input in a long-pulse or continuous mode
• The Pulsed power subsystem stores it, and then switches it out in high power electrical pulses of much shorter duration
• The Microwave source transforms them into electromagnetic waves
• The Mode converter optimizes transmission and coupling to an antenna
• The Antenna directs the microwave electromagnetic output into a higher intensity beam

It was made clear that power will be one of the main issues in the design. For the sources it was suggested to use what is commercially available, to reduce risk and costs. It was determined that wery high power will not be needed. The options available are the use of a magnetron or a TWT (travelling wave tube). The TWT is not broadband, but its bandwidth would be enough. The choice in principle will be using a magnetron.
The state of the art regarding antennas for EMP/HPM was also analysed, and different antenna solutions were presented. All of them display enough bandwidth for the application, yet some of them do not have a stable phase centre. The gain and beamwidth of the preferred solutions was further analysed. A compromise between size and performance will be necessary.

Moreover, the existing literature concerning the effect of EMP/HPM signals on cars was analysed. It was determined that the most prominent effects of EMP/HMP occur at lower frequencies (1-2GHz), and that around 500V/m are needed to stop a car. The shielding efficiency of the vehicle depends on the frequency and the angle of arrival of the interfering signal.
For HPM signals, the larger effects were found for the L and S Bands. Electromagnetic fields from 500V/m to 25KV/m @ 15m needed, depending of the complexity of the EUT (Equipment Under Test). For EMP signals, malfunction is obtained from 5 KV/m up to 50KV/m.
For both kinds of signals, depending on complexity of EUT, pulse repetition can create some disturbances, normally related to an operation cycle of a critical electronic function. For both types of signals the shape of pulse is a very important issue
For both types of signals permanent damage were achieved, in the case of HPM signals even the EUT is off.
Finally, two different scenarios were identified. The choice of the best solution will be made later in the project, taking into account the outputs of the other WPs.

• Single Source-Fixed Frequency
o variety of commercial products.
o power feeding specifications according to source requirements
o additional RF pulse compression configuration may be implemented
o minimization of the number of components
• Low Power Source with Amplifier Stages-Sweeping Frequency
o all individual HPM subsystems are commercially availabletechnical cost is restricted to the integration and the compatibility issues

Work Package 3: Automotive EMI/EMC Analysis

WP3 provided the background of automotive EMI/EMC analysis. The gained knowledge was essential for meeting the demands of the missions and use cases identified in WP1. The vulnerabilities of automotive components and systems are now better known to the SAVELEC Consortium and can be used in the future for further extending the SAVELEC technology. On the other hand, WP3 results can also be used by the automotive community to develop novel technologies and providing more EMI robust cars in the future.

A collection of the most project relevant automotive EMC legislations and regulations was carried out, to perform a weakness analysis. The focus was on automotive EMI/EMC legislations, on industrial regulations (e.g. specification sheets) and additionally on testing methods as a possible information source of EMI/EMC influences, i.e. weakness values for a vehicle. Also, the feasibility of accessing vulnerable components by EMP/HPM and their potential impact on the vehicles’ operation was analysed. The performed study focused on the body constructions, localisation of sensors, ECUs and wires and the characterisation regarding automotive-IT. The outcome was a list of project relevant sensors/actuators, their technology description, disturbance and impact on the vehicle operation. Other important issue are cables, their structure, length and shielding. Finaly, relevant information on the feasibility of interfering in the vehicle operation causing its’ safe stopping was provided. The output was a description of the identified strategies for stopping the vehicle and a list of highly vulnerable and vital components.

Thus, a list of critical vehicle components regarding EMI vulnerability and relevance in the operation of the engine was established. This list takes very into account the components that are common to all vehicles in the market independently of manufacturer, model and engine type.
The selected components are thus common to diesel and gasoline engines and results are very likely to be comparable. The components are classified in three types, control units (ECUs), sensors and actuators. One ECU in car systems have been identified as very critical which is the engine control unit (PCM). Other ECUs in vehicles are expected not to provide any significant effect on the engine behaviour when affected by EMI. Regarding sensors, four engine-critical have been identified: crankshaft position sensor (CPS), camshaft position sensor, petro pressure sensor and accelerator pedal sensor. The first two sensors indicate the position of the pistons and valves in the engine. In case a signal from these sensors in affected by external signals, the engine will be unaware of the current status and function of the engine and will likely enter a safe mode known as limp home mode. This mode produces a reduced output power or even a stop of the vehicle which are the aims of the project. The petrol pressure sensor signal indicates the engine the current pressure in the fuel delivery system which is critical for all vehicles based on injection which are common in the EU market (both diesel and gasoline injection). The last sensor, the acceleration pedal sensor indicates the engine the current position of the accelerator pedal. A disturbance in this signal may confuse the PCM, forcing it to enter the limp home mode aforementioned. For the third type, the actuators, two critical components have been identified: the injector and the fuel pump relay. If injectors in a vehicle are disturbed the engine may stall or lead the car to stop. Injectors are responsible for delivering fuel to the cylinder before combustion and if no or few fuel is delivered the engine performance will be compromised. Finally the fuel pump relay is a component which delivers current to the fuel pump in the fuel delivery system. The relay is directly connected to the PCM and the fuel pump so a disturbance on it will cause a direct effect on the delivery of the fuel as well as in the pressure of the fuel delivery system. Apart from the fuel delivery, the fuel pressure is very critical for injection based engines as aforementioned.

Work Package 4: EMP/HPM experiments

The testbench that was developed within WP4 to meet the SAVELEC Project requirements, and may accept extended future investment with an anticipated high return in terms of both research results and tangible products. The testbench is versatile and may be used in multiple EMI/EMC analysis research activities involving not only car components and systems but also maritime or avionic components as well as communications and electronics equipment.

WP4 was focussed on preparing different automotive set-ups for studying the effect of EMP/HPM on automotive components that were identified as potentially vulnerable in WP3. These setups included the configuration of the equipment under test (EUT), the development and configuration of the monitoring system, and the configuration of signal parameters to generate the EMP/HPM interfering signals. It also comprised the experiments in an anechoic chamber and the evaluation of results for the design and definition of the SAVELEC prototype.
The first task focused on developping a test plan which identifies the tests to be performed in the laboratory, which covered the use of two methods of signal generation to cause effects in the vehicle. Both systems use radiating methods to produce effects in the EUTs:

• HPM system: uses a high power generator in the 1-2.5GHz frequency band. The field strength provided by the generator is up to 2000V/m. The complete generation system is configured with this generator plus an amplifier and an antenna.
• EMP system: uses an electromagnetic pulse generator to provide an ultra-wide band signal (UWB) generated by nanosecond pulses. The complete system also includes an antenna to radiate the signal.

The test plan also describes in detail the EUTs, their wiring and connections as well as their location in the semianechoic chamber. Auxiliary devices for a normal function of the EUT are also identified and presented in the test plan.
• Different automotive component setups were proposed for studying the effects of EMP/HPM signals. Each setup was described with the EUT (component) plus the auxiliary equipment required for testing. A detailed description of locations and configurations was also described.
• A test bench architecture to monitor the behaviour of the EUT and the CAN bus communications was designed.
• A procedure was defined for proceeding with the test setups in a top-down approach based on critical nature of components in the car system, starting from the PCM, which is the engine computer, followed by sensors and actuators critical for the normal operation of the engine.
• A procedure for changing signal generation parameters in order to find potential vulnerabilities was established.

This WP also included the development of the Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) to monitor the tests and specifically will try to measure the effects of the RF interfering signal on the sensors, electronics, wires and communications in the vehicle. The ATE analyses digital and analogue signals; especially “low-frequency” signals related with engine operation, and communicates with the signal generation equipment to register the waveform parameters.

Then, EMP/HPM experiments with a real car and the signal generation equipment were performed in the testing facilities. The selected car is a VW Golf mk5 with Diesel engine. The Diesel engine was selected since it is expected to be a more reliable electronic engine control system. All components aforementioned are very similar in both engines, as stated above, so their behaviour under EMI is expected to be very similar. On the other hand, from an EMI point of view, Diesel engines have the advantage of not requiring spark plus, thus ignition to produce the combustion. This means that the combustion relies exclusively in the correct injection of fuel in the cylinder, which fully depends on the correct knowledge of the crankshaft and camshaft position. Ignition in gasoline engines also relies on those signals but by affecting the spark plug we cannot extrapolate any result to the Diesel engine.

The car was monitored with the ATE system developed and different setups where tested according to the description of the test plan. The experiments were carried out partly in a semianechoic chamber and partly in an “open field” area, as shown in figure 3.

The experiments at component level gave a deep understanding of the behaviour of the vehicle under interference. CAN communications have proven to be difficult to interfere, as it was predicted in the theoretical analysis. Actuators also present a robust operation. On the other hand, critical sensors and their wires plus the inputs to the ECUs have been identified as the weakest points for interferences. Tests with the full vehicle showed that the interference to these critical sensors and/or their communications wires leads to a full stop of the engine. During the tests, several frequency sweeps where carried out to identify successful frequency spots in the HPM. For each successful frequency spot, the rest of parameters in the signal generator where tested, such as pulse width, pulse repetition, antenna orientation, polarization and power. In case of the UWB – EMP generator, the parameters tested were orientation, output power and pulse width.

The work allowed to draw general conclusions of the tests, focused on the analysis of the car behaviour during the interference; the signal generation parameters such as frequency band and power, for the demonstrator characterization; ATEX components exposure, in this case the airbag control unit and the Diesel tank; and effects on safety and driveability, focused on checking effects on ABS, ESP or similar systems installed in the vehicle.

The airbag control unit was exposed to EMP/HPM signals, but it was not affected and it did not show any error/data trouble code. Regarding driveability, ABS system was not affected during the tests and only the steering angle sensor located in the steering wheel showed data trouble codes in a specific frequency band. This sensor is used by the ESP system, but it will enter into disabled mode during the illumination, recovering the control of the sensor once illumination is stopped.

The main results of this work were: achievements in this document are as follows:
• Full description of input/output signals for each EUT (PCM, sensors and actuators)
• Full description of pins, wiring for each EUT (PCM, sensors and actuators)
• A load box design for testing the components in the chamber
• Full description of the interconnection of auxiliary components for a correct operation (or emulation) of PCM input/output signals. That applies to the gateway the dashboard cluster and the load box
• Identification of car operation modes
• Classification of possible failures during the test
• Definition for monitoring measuring blocks and DTCs
• Description of specified test setups for each EUT
• Designs for the auxiliary hardware to be used in the test setups
• ATE Test Bench Sofware development
• Integration of ATE test bench hardware
• Software development to facilitate remote control of the microwave signal generation equipment as well as logging of monitored data.
• EMP and HPM experiments with a real car and components.
• Practical knowledge and understanding of the car behaviour under EM interference.
• Parameterization of optimal signal values and parameters that lead to car electronics interference and identification of signal parameters that led to engine stop.
• Optimization of signal parameters to stop the engine with a focus on the characterization of the demonstrator.
• Car setups design and installation for the tests.

Work Package 5: EMP/HPM Device Prototype

The HPM Device Prototype is the main result of the SAVELEC Project. It is a device able of stopping a car at a distance and has been tested in open-field real world scenarios to stop a static or a moving car. The technology that was developed may also be extended to different frequency bands and include a combination of antenna beam steering, multiple repetition pulse cavities, varying pulse power and width, and so forth. These results may be used as a basis in the future to develop a device that will be able to more efficiently stop a car by optimizing its functional and operating characteristics

First, the requirements that should be met by the design and the manufacture of the SAVELEC device prototype system elements were specified, taking into account the know-how acquired within the project regarding missions and use cases”, the EMP/HPM testbench experiments and the existing regulatory framework.These requirements included:

• Antenna requirements with respect to frequency range, input peak power, input impedance and matching, gain and radiation pattern, polarization back-lobe radiation.
• Signal generation subsystem with respect to the frequency range, the characteristics of the pulsed waveform (peak amplitude, pulse duration and pulse repetition frequency) and the power feed.

Since the signal generation subsystem demonstrates a more complicated structure including various units, the signal generation requirements were specified also on a unit level. Thus, for each single unit planned to be part of the signal generation subsystem individual requirements were specified. Based on this specification there was discrimination between COTS units and the ones that should be developed as novel parts of the device prototype.

Based on these requirements, the design alternatives for the novel parts of the SAVELEC device prototype have been simulated using commercial electromagnetic software simulators as well as simulation models developed in the framework of the SAVELEC project. The results from these simulations determined the fabrication details of the novel units as well as the specific types and the setup parameters of the COTS elements that will be used as part of the device prototype.

The SAVELEC device prototype consists of COTS instrumentation integrated with the following novel subsystems:
i) Signal Generator Subsystem: the Microwave Pulse Compression (MPC) stage of the Signal Generator subsystem is available in different variants. All different parts needed for the operation of the MPC stage at different frequencies producing pulses with different durations were fabricated and integrated.
ii) Antenna Subsystem: all parts needed to construct the ellipsoidal antenna that is going to receive and radiate the MPC output signal was fabricated and the antenna as a single piece has been constructed.

Once the different parts were designed and manufactured, they had to be integrated into the device prototype, and tested to assess and verify the system parameters and to validate the whole system. In this context, the following subtasks were accomplished.
a) the different MPC variants as well as the antenna constructed were tested and finely tuned in the lab according to the requirements specifications
b) the different MPC variants were tested in an anechoic chamber in order to acquire a fine tuning EMC perspective
c) the SAVELEC device prototype, i.e. the MPC, the antenna and all satellite COTS elements were integrated, measured, finely tuned and validated against the requirements specification
d) conclusions regarding the optimum setup parameters of the SAVELEC device prototype were drawn and guidelines for open field trials were provided.

Also based on the requirements specification a test plan for both lab and open field trials tests was established, an outline of the open field trials test plan with emphasis on the potential technical restrictions and risk points (for example, the maximum speed of the test car, which depends on the length of the car test track, the accuracy of the car remote control technique etc.) Also, the impact of the illumination on the car remote control system (steering robot) and the automotive parts installed inside the car had to be considered. For each of the above issues, a dedicated investigation and preliminary tests and measurements were carried out.

The open field trials were accomplished according to the plan in different rounds. The results and achievements are:
• the test car with the integration of a steering robot that allows to conduct moving car tests were completed successfully
• the microwave and the automotive test bench were installed
• the integration of the various subsystems of the SAVELEC device prototype was accomplished and the SAVELEC device operates as predicted.
• several tests with the car either static or moving were performed and car stop events were achieved

Work Package 6: Regulatory Framework

WP6 covered the project related safety, legal and ethical aspects. It aimed at evaluating and defining the safety and its requirements for the research within the project and the usage of such a device afterwards.

The assessment of selected human factors in simulated environment was an important part of the work, to ansswer important questions such as how would drivers react on limited or no control of the vehicle. As foreseen in the work plan two driving simulator pre studies were carried out, to collect experiences for further driving simulator studies within the project. For that, the reactions of drivers (54 subjects) were tested in different scenarios (e.g. city, highway) when substantial vehicle systems fail. In particular these were: Steering, Brakes and Engine. The results show that a loss of steering and brakes leads to an accident, but the loss of the engine – as it is intended within the SAVELEC project – does not lead to any accident or even dangerous traffic situation. All test drivers stopped their car safely. Within these studies it was shown that some subjects conjecture failures as misbehaviours of the simulator. Further, the instruction is one of the central tasks as it determines the actions and reactions of the subjects. A third important aspect is the definition of the scenarios and the way they are put in practice.

With the knowledge gained in the pre-studies, further test-runs were performed in a driving simulator (see figure 5) with the following specifications (abbreviated):

1. Each test person was shown the driving simulator, and got some general information.
2. A general description of the study was given.
3. Informed consent paper was signed to continue.
4. The test person answered the pre-questionnaire.
5. The test person first drove for 5 minutes normal driving, to get familiar with the simulator.
6. The test person got the specific driving instructions.
7. The test person performed the trial.
8. The test person answered the post-questionnaire.

6 scenarios were considered:
• Motorway: high speed (150-200). Medium traffic (as high density as possible without reducing the speed).
• Motorway speed (100-150). High traffic.
• City – high traffic. 0-50. (queue situation)
• City – low traffic. 50-100. Stop the engine before an intersection when it turn to green.
• Tool booth 0-50 km/h.
• Rural road (100-150). Use the device before a sharp curve

The following data were collected at each test run:
• Vehicle dynamic parameters (vehicle position, speed, acceleration)
• Time to complete vehicle stop after the engine stop
• Near-crash incidents and crashes (distance to other objects. Time to collision with other objects)
• Stress level of the test person
• Notes taken by the simulator operator about the reactions of the test person during the driving and after the engine stop
• Questionnaires: pre-test and post-test questionnaires

The Vehicle Failures that were tested are:
• Engine stops completely
• Brake booster off (harder brake pressure needs to be applied to the brake pedal after a few brakings)
• ABS off
• Power steering off will be included in the driving simulator model

The analyzed results show, that in nearly all cases the drivers react in a way that can be summarized as safe. It took them a time to realize the loss of engine power and afterwards they moved safely to the right lane or hard shoulder. Especially at high speeds (above 150 km/h) they used the brakes to slow down vehicle. This may lead to unsafe situations, if the road is slippery and the ABS/ESP is affected by the EM from SAVELEC device.

The work also included a research of the existing regulations regarding human exposure to EMP/HPM signals, and how to evaluate it. Three different scenarios were identified: the car driver/passenger, a bystander and the operator. Then, a detailed exposure assessment using one of them was performed for three different scenarios (driver, bystanders and operator), different frequencies, different angles of incidence, and different human models, both male and female. In total, over 1,000 simulation cases were considered and analysed, as shown in figure 6.

The results of the simulations were compared to the recommended limits defined by ICNIRP. This allowed providing further recommendations regarding how to evaluate the effect of the signal to be used in SAVELEC, and the precautions to be taken for the operation of the device.

The analysis of all the simulation cases and the comparison with the established maximum recommended limits yielded results which are highly interesting for the project. The main conclusions are:
• The maximum field limit that should be used will be determined by the pedestrian case and for smaller bodies (children). The SAR limits for frequencies above 1 GHz may even be more restrictive than the field limits recommended by ICNIRP.
• The preferred polarization for the wave should be the horizontal polarization, as it allows increasing the electrical field values while staying within the recommended limits.
• Based on the reference levels, longer pulses (i.e. lower equivalent frequencies) will allow increasing the field strength while respecting the recommended limits.
• Based on the physics, shorter pulses transmits less energy into the human body and should allow as well higher field strength while respecting the recommended restrictions.
• Once the duration of the pulse and its spectral characteristics have been determined, the maximum field amplitude can be calculated by adding the SAR values of each frequency component, so that the total sum is kept within the limits. Conversely, it should be possible to shape the pulse to remain within the limits.
• To analyse scenario 3 (operator) it is necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the characteristics of the RF front-end.
• The final system parameters (frequency range, power and pulse shape) were used to perform simulations that base more precisely on the configuration of the final prototype.

In this task, potential threats to life and limb in the motor vehicle by explosive atmospheres were demonstrated and the role of electromagnetic interference as well as the catalytic role of car electronics was discussed. A preliminary study on the use of explosive materials in vehicles was performed. The following materials were identified as relevant: Airbag, Fuel/petrol, Air-condition fluid, Batteries (starter battery). No experiments to demonstrate this fact were proposed in this task. Indeed, as the aim of the project is optimize the energy of the pulse, we don’t expect the pulse to cause ignition. Therefore, the task was limited to theoretical studies, to find the most relevant indicators for safety-critical aspects (in the literature survey).

First, the lead-acid battery and the lithium-ion battery were analyzed and an endangering by EM means – to be researched in SAVELEC as far as the literature studies and expert interviews shown – excluded. The airbag system was considered and shown that there are no expectable ignitions should occur in the described limits of field strengths. Furthermore, it was shown that the coolant of air conditioners currently implicate no risks if they are remaining in the closed circle and not overheated. As a final explosive substance the fuels and oils were analyzed and it was found that they initially have no explosion potential. Nevertheless, they can include a risk to the occupants of a motor vehicle when they leak and ignite for example in the hot engine compartment. The flammability of gasoline (petrol 98 Octane) is 260-450 °C and Diesel 220 °C. Any heating above these values should be avoided.

A definition of electromagnetic compatibility was given and compared to the guidelines of the European Commission. Subsequently, it was examined how to ensure EMC in the car and to what extent this is possible in reality or actually finds application by the car manufacturers. It was shown that control devices could be influenced by magnetic fields, however, the car manufacturer try to ensure through several means and tests that no serious errors are caused. It was analyzed whether and to what extent EM fields affect the explosives in the car. The result is that the effect of EM fields is little or not assignable to those substances. The greatest impact can happen in theory in the area of the airbag system, because the airbags are activated electronically.

The results show, that the intended use of EMP / HPM are unlikely a source of danger. Airbag, Fuel/petrol, Air-condition fluid, Batteries (starter and lithium ion battery) were investigated by performing a literature study. Therefore all sources of information were taken into consideration, such as test protocols from EMC chambers, manufacturer specification sheets, internal documents from vehicle suppliers and interviews with experts (e.g. test chamber stuff). On a first research it can be summarized that none of these materials will lead to an explosion, by usage of the intended EMP/HPM means. This is caused by an extra protection of vehicle manufacturers, who safeguard these materials in vehicles on an extra level to avoid endangering situations in high EM fields, e.g. nearby a radio transmitter station.

The work of WP6 also included the analysis of the legal aspects of the use of such a device. This was performed in coordination with the Independent Ethics Advisory Board. The board members were selected heterogeneous, carefully by expertise and fitting to the project activities and outcomes. Regularly meetings/phone conferences are introduced and a matrix of support by expertise was agreed – to easy identify the relevant contact person. The IEAB board was regularly informed about the project activities, in particular regarding the tests and trials. Also, IEAB workshops contributed to advance in the Ontology modeling approach for the legal framework was discussed and details regarding human exposure (medical devices) and influences on electronically- especially RF devices were discussed against the background of legal questions.

Also, concepts for securing the technology (prototype and later devices) were researched and investigated. A three-level approach was designed which describes security means at the following stages: Use of the device, transportation and storing of device and tracking of usage and remote control. The different approaches at these levels are under expert review and a concept for the definition of the optimal approach and the combination was defined.

An analysis of the existing regulatory framework was carried out throughout the lifetime of the project. Assuming the safety results obtained within the project, the legal situation shows no significant barriers in usage of the technology by law enforcing agencies. As a main criterium the principle of reasonableness of means was identified. Due to the non lethal and non harming character the SAVELEC technology is more appropriate than existing alternatives and additionally opens a wider range of situations where it could be used. . Six scenarios were analyzed and factors were collected that lead to or against the use of the SAVELEC technology. Three different approaches of decision making helping tools were created and applied to the scenarios. Those are: sensitivity analysis, neuronal network and fuzzy system. Each of them has its strengths and weaknesses. It is intended to create two different approaches: One for the training purposes for law enforcing agencies and a second one for decisions in the use case. All relevant factors that were identified as possible influencing the safety were collected and modelled in ontology. Based on this ontology, numerical simulations are possible to calculate the reasonableness of SAVELEC use by security forces. The scenarios were discussed in a legal/ethical workshop in Magdeburg together with legal experts.

Beside this a first investigation on certification processes was performed, including the conformity to European law on disturbances of radio-based and controlled devices. This first investigation was based upon a separation approach, since there is a huge list of factors and parameters with a complex interplay with environment (e.g. direct and indirect effects or structural impacts) an investigation, collection and structuring of potential relevant parameters in a generalized list was started.

An online questionnaire was set up and published to gather the opinion of citizen in Germany, concerning the use of this new SAVELEC technology, in particular the fears and the implications on the traffic safety. The results were used as design factors for the device specification and political recommendation for the legal framework conceptualization.

Potential Impact:
As defined in the Description of Work, SAVELEC aims a three expected impact items:
• Impact Item 1: “to raise the awareness of policy-makers and help developing the proper legal framework.”: This aspect was covered through the activities in WP6 ‘Regulatory framework’ where specific legal studies were be carried out and a regulatory framework was be proposed and promoted.
• Impact Item 2: “to demonstrate to the law enforcement agencies the added value of the new technology in specific areas in relation with their daily operations”: this was achieved with the involvement of the end-users of SAVELEC. An important part of the dissemination activities was aimed at these end-users to let them know the benefits of this new technology. A real field demonstration was as central part of the third SAVELEC workshop, with the participation of industry and end-users.
• Impact Item 3: “to demonstrate to the citizens that the use of new technologies by security forces in their daily mission could increase their security without endangering their safety”: this was achieved through a proper dissemination of the results obtained in the project. Specific activities were undertaken for ensuring that the new technology is secure and safe in terms of human exposure to EMP/HPM, human driver factors and ATEX exposure to EMP/HPM. Specific measures for a controlled and secure use of this new device are central to the EMP/HPM prototype design and development and were defined and assessed taking into account the feedback from the Independent Ethics Advisory Board and the end-users.

List of Websites:

Project coordinator:
Dr. Marta Martínez Vázquez
Department of Antennas & EM Modelling
Carl-Friedrich-Gauß Str. 2-4
47475 Kamp-Lintfort
Tel. +49 2842 981 316

Dissemination manager
Prof. Stelios Savaidis
250, Thivon & P. Rali
Tel. +30 2105381526