Periodic Reporting for period 4 - Corruption Roots (At the roots of corruption: a behavioral ethics approach)
Okres sprawozdawczy: 2020-03-01 do 2020-08-31
First, we found evidence for the collaborative roots of corruption (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015, PNAS). Specifically, cooperation is essential for completing tasks that individuals cannot accomplish alone. Whereas the benefits of cooperation are clear, little is known about its possible negative aspects. Introducing a novel sequential dyadic die-rolling paradigm, we show that collaborative settings provide fertile ground for the emergence of corruption. In the main experimental treatment the outcomes of the two players are perfectly aligned. Player A privately rolls a die, reports the result to player B, who then privately rolls and reports the result as well. Both players are paid the value of the reports if, and only if, they are identical (e.g. if both report 6, each earns €6). Because rolls are truly private, players can inflate their profit by misreporting the actual outcomes. Indeed, the proportion of reported doubles was 489% higher than the expected proportion assuming honesty, 48% higher than when individuals rolled and reported alone, and 96% higher than when lies only benefited the other player. Breaking the alignment in payoffs between player A and player B reduced the extent of brazen lying.
Our group continued to use the novel methodology to study how such corrupt collaboration emerges and spreads when people can choose their partners (Gross, Leib, Offerman, & Shalvi, 2018; Psychological Science). Participants were assigned a partner and could increase their payoff by coordinated lying. After several interactions, they were either free to choose whether to stay or switch partners, or forced to stay with (or switch) their partner. Results reveal both dishonest and honest people exploit the freedom to choose a partner. Dishonest people seek and find a partner that will also lie—a “partner in crime.” Honest people, by contrast, engage in ethical free-riding: they refrain from lying but also from leaving dishonest partners, taking advantage of their partners’ lies.
Second, in Köbis, Verschuere, Bereby-Meyer, Rand, and Shalvi (2019; Perspectives on Psychological Science) we tackled the question is self-serving lying intuitive? Or does honesty come naturally? Many experiments have manipulated reliance on intuition in behavioral-dishonesty tasks, with mixed results. We present two meta-analyses (with evidential value) testing whether an intuitive mind-set affects the proportion of liars (k = 73; n = 12,711) and the magnitude of lying (k = 50; n = 6,473). The results indicate that when dishonesty harms abstract others, promoting intuition causes more people to lie and people to lie more. However, when dishonesty inflicts harm on concrete others, promoting intuition has no significant effect on dishonesty (p > .63). We propose one potential explanation: The intuitive appeal of prosociality may cancel out the intuitive selfish appeal of dishonesty, suggesting that the social consequences of lying could be a promising key to the riddle of intuition’s role in honesty.
Finally, in Haran & Shalvi (2019; Journal of Experimental Psychology: General) we studied how receiving advice influences one’s honesty. Recipients of advice expect it to be both highly informed and honest. Suspecting either one of these attributes reduces the use of the advice. Five experiments tested the effect of the type of suspicion on advice taking. We find that recipients of advice discount it more severely when they suspect intentional bias than when they suspect unintentional error. We find the effect of suspicion on advice use stems from the different attributions of uncertainty associated with each type of suspicion. The results suggest people place an implicit premium on advisors’ honesty, and demonstrate the importance of establishing reputation for advisors’ success.