Cel
In recent years the assumption of perfect rationality of economic agents has been severely criticised: in particular, a big contribution came from the theory of evolutionary games.
I believe that market games provide an ideal framework for evolutionary modelling. However within the recent bounded rationality literature, this field has not yet been explored.
What I am planning to do is to extend results in evolutionary games and apply them to marke games. I will examine: the emergence of a particular market structure; the performance of ration behaviour and irrational rules; adaptive behaviour and mutation.
Expected results are: the failure of traditional competitive models to describe actual market behaviour and the formalisation of a new market model based on the evolutionary approach.
The topic is extremely relevant to European common industrial and commercial policies: my research can cast light on the drawbacks of the present international markets' structure.
Dziedzina nauki
Zaproszenie do składania wniosków
Data not availableSystem finansowania
RGI - Research grants (individual fellowships)Koordynator
CB3 9DD Cambridge
Zjednoczone Królestwo