Descrizione del progetto
Uno sguardo più approfondito ai mercati online
I mercati online mettono in contatto i venditori con i consumatori e sono molto popolari. In effetti, circa la metà di tutte le vendite del commercio elettronico vengono oggi effettuate mediante questo tipo di mercati. Alcune delle piattaforme di maggiori dimensioni, tuttavia, sono state criticate di abusare del proprio potere di monopolio nei confronti dei propri utenti, ovvero consumatori, venditori e pubblicitari, e di adottare pratiche anticoncorrenziali. Il progetto FAPoD, finanziato dal CER, esplorerà il duplice ruolo svolto dai mercati online (in termini di piattaforma di mercato e strumento di vendita). Inoltre, approfondirà il modo in cui le piattaforme indirizzano i consumatori ai venditori. Si studierà per di più la natura degli algoritmi di raccomandazione, e in particolare l’interazione tra la ricerca del consumatore e l’efficacia dell’algoritmo. I risultati faranno luce sulle misure antimonopolistiche adatte ai mercati digitali.
Obiettivo
Internet markets tend to concentrate in the hands of a very few large platforms. These platforms have been accused of abusing their monopoly power vis-a-vis their users (consumers, sellers, advertisers) and maintaining the latter through hostile behavior towards potential competitors. They are said to harm users by ‘self-preferencing’, data harvesting, creating 'monopoly positions' and extracting resulting rents with high fees, all the while avoiding competition by acquiring, copying and otherwise disadvantaging potential competitors. This proposal addresses these concerns in four parts. Part 1 focuses on the dual role of online marketplaces, whereby the platform both runs the marketplace and acts as a seller on it. I aim to understand how such hybrid marketplaces conduct themselves toward consumers and third party sellers. The model will be used to evaluate recent policy proposals and suggest ways to avoid significant unintended consequences. Part 2 studies how platforms steer consumers to sellers. As most platforms let sellers set prices and collect fees on revenues, a platform’s own algorithm and her choice to augment/replace it with a position auction may be consequently driven by revenue maximization. I plan to show that steering systems may drastically alter pricing, leading to ‘mediated’ competition. Part 3 explores the nature of recommendation algorithms, particularly the interplay between consumer search and algorithm effectiveness. I demonstrate that algorithms may be self-fulfilling and self-defeating, which determines their effectiveness and significantly alters the resulting allocations and their efficiency. Part 4 explains the circumstances in which an incumbent platform may acquire an upstart platform. These depend on, the overlap of existing user bases, increasing returns to data and monopoly power over advertisers. Acquisitions may be used in situations of both no and substantial overlap in user bases, with mixed welfare consequences.
Campo scientifico
Programma(i)
- HORIZON.1.1 - European Research Council (ERC) Main Programme
Argomento(i)
Meccanismo di finanziamento
HORIZON-AG - HORIZON Action Grant Budget-BasedIstituzione ospitante
08002 Barcelona
Spagna