Periodic Reporting for period 1 - SEAKNOT (SEVERE ACCIDENT RESEARCH AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FOR LWRS (SEAKNOT))
Okres sprawozdawczy: 2022-10-01 do 2024-03-31
At present, there are a number of factors that might drastically affect the existing capabilities of investigating, and eventually, managing these events, above all the knowledge and know-how acquired for decades are at risk of being lost as many specialists have already retired or are in the process. Furthermore, many of the old archives and experimental data about SA are at risk of being lost forever if not proper measures are initiated, as human and technological means to do experimental and modelling research on the matter are being reduced. At the same time, new approaches for the SA assessment are being explored (Uncertainties and Sensitivity Analysis UaSA, as in the H-2020 MUSA project, or the application of Artificial Intelligence in the H-EUROPE ASSAS project) and the thorough comprehension of results demands involvement of senior experts more than ever, together with the progressive involvement of new younger experts.
The specific objectives of SEAKNOT are:
• To carry out a sound and critical analysis of the current knowledge on Sas. Based on it, recommendations will be given on the way forward to significantly reduce risks associated with existing (Gen II and Gen III) and forthcoming nuclear technologies (SMLWRs & ATFs).
• To identify the future experimental research needs required to support and further optimize SA mitigation measures, and even the “practical elimination” of the consequences associated with an extended core melt or a spent fuel damage. All the water-cooled nuclear reactors in operation in EU with current and/or advanced technologies (ATFs and SMLWRs) will be considered. An assessment of the EU SA experimental facilities regarding the current and future research needs will be also included, along with the proposal of an experimental infrastructure platform.
• To strengthen the background and skills of young generations in the field, by a range of dissemination and communication activities in which a mobility programme will be the backbone of an efficient Knowledge and Know-how Transfer (K2T) from senior scientists and engineers, together with the organization of short Courses about Severe Accident Phenomenology (SAP).`
Therefore, two major outputs will come out from SEAKNOT:
• A Roadmap for SA research in the next decade to efficiently reduce safety uncertainties soundly base on a Phenomenology Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT), a SA Database Directory and a network of SA infrastructures (SAINET).
• Reinforcement of K2T to the nuclear technology forthcoming workforce.
The specific objectives of SEAKNOT are:
• To carry out a sound and critical analysis of the current knowledge on Sas. Based on it, recommendations will be given on the way forward to significantly reduce risks associated with existing (Gen II and Gen III) and forthcoming nuclear technologies (SMLWRs & ATFs).
• To identify the future experimental research needs required to support and further optimize SA mitigation measures, and even the “practical elimination” of the consequences associated with an extended core melt or a spent fuel damage. All the water-cooled nuclear reactors in operation in EU with current and/or advanced technologies (ATFs and SMLWRs) will be considered. An assessment of the EU SA experimental facilities regarding the current and future research needs will be also included, along with the proposal of an experimental infrastructure platform.
• To strengthen the background and skills of young generations in the field, by a range of dissemination and communication activities in which a mobility programme will be the backbone of an efficient Knowledge and Know-how Transfer (K2T) from senior scientists and engineers, together with the organization of short Courses about Severe Accident Phenomenology (SAP).`
Therefore, two major outputs will come out from SEAKNOT:
• A Roadmap for SA research in the next decade to efficiently reduce safety uncertainties soundly base on a Phenomenology Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT), a SA Database Directory and a network of SA infrastructures (SAINET).
• Reinforcement of K2T to the nuclear technology forthcoming workforce.
First reporting period in progress
SEAKNOT is being proposed within the topic “Safety of operating nuclear power plants and research reactors” (HORIZON-EURATOM-2021-NRT-01-01). Particularly, the following expected impacts from EC call will be aimed to be fulfilled by the SEAKNOT project:
• Development of know-how and tools for the improvement of safety in relation to the design and safe operation of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs).
• Better understanding of some predominant phenomena with the fundamental support of experimentation.
• Update of the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) and experimental research on SA prevention and mitigation mechanisms (e.g. passive systems phenomenology) and aiming at “practical” elimination of risks associated with an extended core melt or a spent fuel damage for all reactors currently in operation in EU and for reactors to be licensed for design-life extensions, i.e. long-term operation.
• Preparation of recommendations, tools and guidelines for knowledge management to maintain know-how and for implementation of actions dedicated to maximize safety related return from experience.
• Effective promotion of a safety culture, integration of human factor in safety assessment, inclusion of research needs of Member States’ nuclear safety regulators, supporting implementation of training requirements of the Nuclear Safety Directive.
• Development of know-how and tools for the improvement of safety in relation to the design and safe operation of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs).
• Better understanding of some predominant phenomena with the fundamental support of experimentation.
• Update of the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) and experimental research on SA prevention and mitigation mechanisms (e.g. passive systems phenomenology) and aiming at “practical” elimination of risks associated with an extended core melt or a spent fuel damage for all reactors currently in operation in EU and for reactors to be licensed for design-life extensions, i.e. long-term operation.
• Preparation of recommendations, tools and guidelines for knowledge management to maintain know-how and for implementation of actions dedicated to maximize safety related return from experience.
• Effective promotion of a safety culture, integration of human factor in safety assessment, inclusion of research needs of Member States’ nuclear safety regulators, supporting implementation of training requirements of the Nuclear Safety Directive.