Periodic Reporting for period 1 - DevEthAC (Developing Ethical Abstention Contextualism)
Okres sprawozdawczy: 2023-04-01 do 2025-03-31
Electoral abstention is on the rise. In new and established democracies alike, there has in recent decades been an increase in the share of enfranchised citizens who voluntarily refrain from voting in legislative, presidential, and other political elections.
In response to this development normative political theory has produced an innovative body of work focusing on electoral participation. Examining non-voting from a principled, moral perspective, this literature notably explores to what extent a democratic state can justifiably render voting a legal obligation, and to what extent voting in elections might be a moral obligation.
But despite its advances, the philosophy of electoral participation still has important lacunas and shortcomings. One, although several philosophers of electoral participation indicate that non-voting might sometimes be morally permissible, the scope and the moral grounds of permissible non-voting remain ill-defined. Two, insofar as democratic states have policies of optional voting, they must have a procedure for handling or absorbing the non-votes that likely occur in elections. Yet, the philosophy of electoral participation offers no account of how democratic electoral systems can best absorb non-votes. And three, the philosophy of electoral participation does not yet shed light on the moral consequences that non-voting might engender for the individual non-voter: no account exists yet of how not voting might affect a citizen’s moral entitlements and responsibilities.
Remedying these three lacunas has been the overall scientific objective of DevEthAc. It has sought to morally assess non-voting and give an clear account of the extent to which it is morally permissible and impermissible respectively. The project has further sought to give an account of how a democratic electoral system can best absorb non-votes. And it has aimed to give an account of the moral consequences that non-voting may have for individual non-voters.
In response to this development normative political theory has produced an innovative body of work focusing on electoral participation. Examining non-voting from a principled, moral perspective, this literature notably explores to what extent a democratic state can justifiably render voting a legal obligation, and to what extent voting in elections might be a moral obligation.
But despite its advances, the philosophy of electoral participation still has important lacunas and shortcomings. One, although several philosophers of electoral participation indicate that non-voting might sometimes be morally permissible, the scope and the moral grounds of permissible non-voting remain ill-defined. Two, insofar as democratic states have policies of optional voting, they must have a procedure for handling or absorbing the non-votes that likely occur in elections. Yet, the philosophy of electoral participation offers no account of how democratic electoral systems can best absorb non-votes. And three, the philosophy of electoral participation does not yet shed light on the moral consequences that non-voting might engender for the individual non-voter: no account exists yet of how not voting might affect a citizen’s moral entitlements and responsibilities.
Remedying these three lacunas has been the overall scientific objective of DevEthAc. It has sought to morally assess non-voting and give an clear account of the extent to which it is morally permissible and impermissible respectively. The project has further sought to give an account of how a democratic electoral system can best absorb non-votes. And it has aimed to give an account of the moral consequences that non-voting may have for individual non-voters.
By deductively analysing what basic liberal and democratic moral principles and values entail for the project’s three puzzles, DevEthAc has developed three philosophical theories that correspond to the project objectives. It has developed a theory of morally permissible non-voting which argues that democratic citizens’ moral entitlement to personal autonomy entails a permission for citizens not to vote in elections so long as that does not foreseeably impose risks of major harm on others. The project has further developed an institutional proposal labelled Proportional Non-Voter Sortition which suggests that non-voting in legislative elections should trigger a random selection procedure in which non-voters are selected by lot to serve as legislators, in a number that is proportional to the overall rate of non-voting. And the project has developed an account of why non-voters do not, contrary to common belief, lose their moral right to express political criticism.
The project’s results are described in a series of academic articles and working papers. The idea of Proportional Non-Voter Sortition is described and justified in an article published in the top political science journal Perspectives on Politics. The theory of permissible voting and the theory about the moral consequences of non-voting are described and justified in two further working papers that will be submitted for peer review within 6 months of the project end. Additionally, the project’s three theories have been presented at 11 scientific conferences and research seminars in Austria, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US. Jointly, the project results can help to consolidate the philosophy of electoral participation as a field of inquiry in its own right and open new frontiers of inquiry within it, all while enhancing our understanding of the moral and political significance of electoral abstention.