Periodic Reporting for period 1 - ARM (The Long Arms of Authoritarian States)
Okres sprawozdawczy: 2024-01-01 do 2024-12-31
The ARM project explores authoritarian strategies for information control beyond borders. While foreign disinformation receives ample scrutiny, other forms of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) remain overlooked. ARM conceptualises, investigates and addresses information suppression as FIMI, used by authoritarian states targeting European diaspora communities and other key actors important for the foreign policy interest of the states. By conducting in-depth analyses of the information manipulation tactics by countries like Russia, China, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, we will be providing a nuanced understanding of their global information strategies. This will enable us to deliver actionable countermeasures and tools to protect against information suppression, enhancing freedom of information across borders.
ARM applies an innovative, interdisciplinary and participatory methodology. Our solid country expertise, built on long fieldwork experience in each of the four country cases and their diasporas, combined with research frontier competence within comparative politics, sociology, communication studies, digital ethnography and legal studies, will enable us to bring new dimensions of information manipulation to the fore. This will ultimately contribute to central policy goals in EU’s work on democracy and human rights.
ARM applies an innovative, interdisciplinary and participatory methodology. Our solid country expertise, built on long fieldwork experience in each of the four country cases and their diasporas, combined with research frontier competence within comparative politics, sociology, communication studies, digital ethnography and legal studies, will enable us to bring new dimensions of information manipulation to the fore. This will ultimately contribute to central policy goals in EU’s work on democracy and human rights.
The main goals of the first reporting period (01.01.2024-31.12.2024) of the ARM project were to formulate a working definition of information suppression as FIMI (WP1), as well as setting up the needed guiding documents for the project, such as the Communications and Dissemination Plan (WP7), the Data Management Plan, Ethic Guidelines, and supporting documents for the Ethics Check (WP8). The four country case Work packages – China, Russia, Rwanda and Ethiopia (WP2-5) – focused on their respective literature review and the preparation of the data collection – including securing ethics approval at the respective institutions. Data collection starts at the beginning of the second reporting period, once the project passes the Ethics check . Work Package 6 on identifying effects and developing a toolkit will start – as planned – in month 19 of the action. In addition, the ARM project recruited two highly qualified and motivated candidates for the new project positions: a doctoral researcher for the Ethiopia Work Package (WP5) at the University of Helsinki and a postdoctoral researcher for the China Work Package (WP2) at the Hertie School of Governance. Additionally, the ARM project set up its management structure and communications channels to provide a solid basis for effective collaboration and to regularly check in on the project’s progress. A main achievement of the first reporting period is reflected in the motivated, constructive and collaborative working atmosphere within the ARM consortium, where different disciplines and career stages are heard on equal terms to ensure ownership of the project and its activities amongst the entire ARM team.
In the first phase of the project, the team has done important groundwork in conceptualising information suppression. We define information suppression as a set of actions to silence information with the purpose of muting dissenting voices and narratives within and outside a country’s border, serving the interest of strengthening regime’s grip on power. We also specify some features of information suppression: It is intentional, serving the interest of the preserving power. However, this does not mean that information suppression is always coordinated or coerced from above. Furthermore, it is transnational, highlighting the link between domestic and global tactics of information suppression, with diaspora groups as both agents and targets. We place suppression strategies within the following spheres: information production, information dissemination, and information salience. All spheres reach across borders, underlining the link between domestic and foreign information suppression.
The fact that information suppression so far has not been explicitly defined either by academic literature or in policy documents makes our conceptualisation a contribution beyond the state of the art. By defining information suppression, we broaden the established approach to FIMI, which has traditionally only been focused on disinformation. By delineating the concept of information suppression within the strategic toolbox of authoritarian regimes, we contribute to the scholarly discussions of authoritarian politics and how autocracies manoeuvre to strengthen their power base.
The fact that information suppression so far has not been explicitly defined either by academic literature or in policy documents makes our conceptualisation a contribution beyond the state of the art. By defining information suppression, we broaden the established approach to FIMI, which has traditionally only been focused on disinformation. By delineating the concept of information suppression within the strategic toolbox of authoritarian regimes, we contribute to the scholarly discussions of authoritarian politics and how autocracies manoeuvre to strengthen their power base.