Final Report Summary - EU PEACEBUILDING (EU peacebuilding outside the neighbourhood: learning from the cases of Afghanistan, Darfur, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo)
This research had three aims: firstly, to assess whether the European Union (EU) had a long-term political strategy towards the resolution of the conflicts in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Darfur between 2001 and 2010, which relied a strategic use of its own internal capabilities. (These capabilities are the use of diplomatic, development, humanitarian, democratisation and security and defence policies.) The second aim was to assess the nature of the impact of the EU's engagements in these conflicts: did the EU efforts result in substantial resolution or in a worsening of the dynamics of the conflict? The third aim was to contribute to the development of a theoretical model for evaluating the EU behaviour in conflicts outside its neighbourhood by taking into account the assumptions present in two competing models: the liberal and the realist models as well as insights from the literature on Western engagements in peace-building and state-building.
Briefly put, the assumptions taken from the liberal paradigm are as follows: firstly, the EU has a tendency to behave as a 'normative power' and not as a classical Westphalian state; in its external behaviour the EU does not seek to pursue its own self-interest but rather to project liberal norms and values, which have an ideational impact on the external world. This tendency to act normatively is said to lie in the fact that the EU exists as being different from pre-existing political forms: the fact that the EU is the product of the reconciliation of national elites that had been to war with one another. Another reason is that the constitution of this new political entity has relied on treaty based, legal provisions. From this perspective, the EU has an internal inner ability to create a structure of incentives for mediation among conflicting parties and potentially to create benefits to deepen relationships among antagonistic players, and build peace from below. The extent to which the EU is able to project this normative power depends on the regional and local dynamics of the conflict. However, in general, the liberal perspective argues that the EU will prioritise the protection of human rights over safeguarding the territorial integrity of the state. This is understood as having a full or partial mitigating role on the dynamics of the conflict. From this perspective, the EU will also be predisposed to act as a 'peace-builder' prioritising the needs of individuals above those of the state.
In contrast, from the classical realist perspective, state or institutions that emphasise normative aspects often downplay the importance of having knowledge of existing circumstances and prefer immediate actions. It is argued that the reliance on normative power is the result of the fact that the EU is the institutional repository of second-order concerns for Member States, such as human rights and thus human rights are elevated when there are no vital economic or geostrategic interests at stake. From the realist perspective, in its engagement with conflicts outside of its neighbourhood, the EU will not be able to develop a high level of consensus with regards to its political objectives because its internal decision-making culture is based on a low-level common denominator and the prevalence of the interests of former colonial powers or of other major powers in such conflicts.
Scholars working in this tradition offer three separate assessments of the potential impact of the EU on conflicts outside its neighbourhood. Firstly, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, some scholars argue that the EU will simply reproduce the neo-colonial interests of former colonial powers and have no specific distinct input. Secondly, other scholars argue that the EU does not have an impact per se. Thirdly, other scholars argue that the EU inability to successfully combine its own geostrategic, economic interests and those of the peoples in the countries directly affected by war, has tragic consequences: the EU will tend to exacerbate rather than mitigate locally driven antagonisms or seek together with other external institutions or major Western powers to impose the building of state-institutions when there are no locally viable-driven peace processes.
To assess these competing assumptions, the research relied on a careful examination of the national and regional dynamics of the conflicts; a review of literatures on EU engagements in these regions and a review of some of the criteria for assessment of success and failures in international engagement in fragile states. The results were supplemented with qualitative in-depth interviews with EU and national officials, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and experts. A field trip to Chad was also undertaken.
From these analyses, can we identify patterns that point to the validity of some of the assumptions contained in the liberal or realist paradigms? Overall, between 2001 and 2006, the EU became engaged in the conflicts in Afghanistan, Darfur, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo without having a clearly agreed long-term political strategy. A change of perspectives emerged in the EU policies towards the conflicts in Darfur, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo from roughly 2006 to 2010 when the EU started to assume a more coherent normative stance. In these cases, the analysis provides evidence for some aspects of the realist perspective: former colonial powers pushed the issue of Chad, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo on the EU agenda and the EU acted militarily on the spur of the moment without having sufficient knowledge of the local and regional dynamics of the conflicts. However, the prioritisation of human rights concerns cannot fully be explained through the assumption of the prevalence of a 'low common denominator' in EU decision-making.
The analysis of these two case studies has revealed that cultural and epistemological issues internal to the EU and United Nations (UN) bureaucratic cultures played an important role in shaping the normative stance towards these two countries. Despite the emergence of the Common Foreign Security and Defence Policy, until recently EU engagements in countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been strongly dominated by individuals situated in the departments responsible for the delivery of humanitarian aid and long-term development aid. Within these departments, which work closely with UN agencies, a new culture of examining and evaluating conflicts in Africa did emerge since the mid-1990s. In these circles the root causes of these conflicts are understood as a 'governance failure' and there is the belief that it is the duty of international institutions to 'protect populations' from the interference of the state and other predatory actors. This perspective could thus be easily manipulated by those policy-makers based in the ministries of defence and foreign affairs of former colonial powers who were concerned that the EU was not doing enough to protect the territorial integrity of Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
With regards to impact, the results show that contrary to some realist perspectives, the EU does not simply reproduce the neo-colonial interests of former colonial powers: the EU has impact as well as it its own distinct input in decision-making. The adoption of key normative principles such as those embodied in the responsibility to protect doctrine; the strong reliance on holding elections and the emphasis on building or reforming of political state institutions are key features of the EU approach towards sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the realist perspectives fail to take into account the power that the EU exercises through the development, humanitarian aid and use of trade instruments.
However, substantial evidence has been found for the realist's argument that the internal inability of the EU to develop a strong internal consensus for its own political strategy, which takes into account of both its own geostrategic interests and the interests of the affected peoples' in these conflicts, has tragic consequences. With the exceptions of diplomatic interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the period of 2008 - 2009, the EU engagements in Darfur, Chad (2007 - 2009) partly contributed to exacerbating the conflict. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, in the period 2001 - 2002, the EU accepted the United States (US)-led strategy that elevated a military solution over diplomatic ones. Although it might have been unrealistic for EU officials to have sought to contain the drive toward war that was devised in Washington, by 2003, there was a moment of opportunity that was missed. The EU failed to use its diplomatic muscle to persuade the US to hold talks between the defeated Taliban forces and the new government of Karzai. Once the war restarted in the 2004 - 2009 period, despite strong concerns on the part of European Member States that had sent military forces to Afghanistan, EU institutions were never perceived as the forum for seeking to devise an alternative to the US led political-military strategy. The EU decision to develop an Afghanistan, Pakistan strategy in 2009 does not alter the situation: EU policies remain subordinate to decisions taken in Washington and lack a long-term vision for regional conflict management.
The study does not provide consist evidence for the liberal assumption that by acting normatively the EU will disregard concerns over the territorial integrity of a country at war or in a transition phase. Only in the case of Sudan can evidence for this assumption be found. In fact, the normative stance that the EU took over the handling of the conflict in Darfur and its interconnection with the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan (2005) was one contributing factor for the separation of the two entities into separate states. In the case of the conflicts in Chad, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EU adopted a normative stance but it remained highly concerned with the territorial integrity of the two countries. In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, despite some substantial diplomatic efforts and a moment of success in the 2008-2009 period, when it managed to persuade the United States and some other European countries to put pressure on the Rwanda's government to stop direct military involvement in Eastern Congo, the EU has been unable to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country. In the case of Chad, in 2007, the EU supported a military operation that had embarrassing consequences for its own standings: the Chadian President Déby sought and, in certain cases succeeded in using EU commitments to the region to strengthen his own dictatorial regime. The EU, perhaps involuntarily, safeguarded the territorial integrity of Chad at the expense of the establishment of fully-accountable democratic institutions.
The full results of this research are available at the following website: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/people/index.php/gb70.html(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie)
Briefly put, the assumptions taken from the liberal paradigm are as follows: firstly, the EU has a tendency to behave as a 'normative power' and not as a classical Westphalian state; in its external behaviour the EU does not seek to pursue its own self-interest but rather to project liberal norms and values, which have an ideational impact on the external world. This tendency to act normatively is said to lie in the fact that the EU exists as being different from pre-existing political forms: the fact that the EU is the product of the reconciliation of national elites that had been to war with one another. Another reason is that the constitution of this new political entity has relied on treaty based, legal provisions. From this perspective, the EU has an internal inner ability to create a structure of incentives for mediation among conflicting parties and potentially to create benefits to deepen relationships among antagonistic players, and build peace from below. The extent to which the EU is able to project this normative power depends on the regional and local dynamics of the conflict. However, in general, the liberal perspective argues that the EU will prioritise the protection of human rights over safeguarding the territorial integrity of the state. This is understood as having a full or partial mitigating role on the dynamics of the conflict. From this perspective, the EU will also be predisposed to act as a 'peace-builder' prioritising the needs of individuals above those of the state.
In contrast, from the classical realist perspective, state or institutions that emphasise normative aspects often downplay the importance of having knowledge of existing circumstances and prefer immediate actions. It is argued that the reliance on normative power is the result of the fact that the EU is the institutional repository of second-order concerns for Member States, such as human rights and thus human rights are elevated when there are no vital economic or geostrategic interests at stake. From the realist perspective, in its engagement with conflicts outside of its neighbourhood, the EU will not be able to develop a high level of consensus with regards to its political objectives because its internal decision-making culture is based on a low-level common denominator and the prevalence of the interests of former colonial powers or of other major powers in such conflicts.
Scholars working in this tradition offer three separate assessments of the potential impact of the EU on conflicts outside its neighbourhood. Firstly, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, some scholars argue that the EU will simply reproduce the neo-colonial interests of former colonial powers and have no specific distinct input. Secondly, other scholars argue that the EU does not have an impact per se. Thirdly, other scholars argue that the EU inability to successfully combine its own geostrategic, economic interests and those of the peoples in the countries directly affected by war, has tragic consequences: the EU will tend to exacerbate rather than mitigate locally driven antagonisms or seek together with other external institutions or major Western powers to impose the building of state-institutions when there are no locally viable-driven peace processes.
To assess these competing assumptions, the research relied on a careful examination of the national and regional dynamics of the conflicts; a review of literatures on EU engagements in these regions and a review of some of the criteria for assessment of success and failures in international engagement in fragile states. The results were supplemented with qualitative in-depth interviews with EU and national officials, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and experts. A field trip to Chad was also undertaken.
From these analyses, can we identify patterns that point to the validity of some of the assumptions contained in the liberal or realist paradigms? Overall, between 2001 and 2006, the EU became engaged in the conflicts in Afghanistan, Darfur, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo without having a clearly agreed long-term political strategy. A change of perspectives emerged in the EU policies towards the conflicts in Darfur, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo from roughly 2006 to 2010 when the EU started to assume a more coherent normative stance. In these cases, the analysis provides evidence for some aspects of the realist perspective: former colonial powers pushed the issue of Chad, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo on the EU agenda and the EU acted militarily on the spur of the moment without having sufficient knowledge of the local and regional dynamics of the conflicts. However, the prioritisation of human rights concerns cannot fully be explained through the assumption of the prevalence of a 'low common denominator' in EU decision-making.
The analysis of these two case studies has revealed that cultural and epistemological issues internal to the EU and United Nations (UN) bureaucratic cultures played an important role in shaping the normative stance towards these two countries. Despite the emergence of the Common Foreign Security and Defence Policy, until recently EU engagements in countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been strongly dominated by individuals situated in the departments responsible for the delivery of humanitarian aid and long-term development aid. Within these departments, which work closely with UN agencies, a new culture of examining and evaluating conflicts in Africa did emerge since the mid-1990s. In these circles the root causes of these conflicts are understood as a 'governance failure' and there is the belief that it is the duty of international institutions to 'protect populations' from the interference of the state and other predatory actors. This perspective could thus be easily manipulated by those policy-makers based in the ministries of defence and foreign affairs of former colonial powers who were concerned that the EU was not doing enough to protect the territorial integrity of Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
With regards to impact, the results show that contrary to some realist perspectives, the EU does not simply reproduce the neo-colonial interests of former colonial powers: the EU has impact as well as it its own distinct input in decision-making. The adoption of key normative principles such as those embodied in the responsibility to protect doctrine; the strong reliance on holding elections and the emphasis on building or reforming of political state institutions are key features of the EU approach towards sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the realist perspectives fail to take into account the power that the EU exercises through the development, humanitarian aid and use of trade instruments.
However, substantial evidence has been found for the realist's argument that the internal inability of the EU to develop a strong internal consensus for its own political strategy, which takes into account of both its own geostrategic interests and the interests of the affected peoples' in these conflicts, has tragic consequences. With the exceptions of diplomatic interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the period of 2008 - 2009, the EU engagements in Darfur, Chad (2007 - 2009) partly contributed to exacerbating the conflict. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, in the period 2001 - 2002, the EU accepted the United States (US)-led strategy that elevated a military solution over diplomatic ones. Although it might have been unrealistic for EU officials to have sought to contain the drive toward war that was devised in Washington, by 2003, there was a moment of opportunity that was missed. The EU failed to use its diplomatic muscle to persuade the US to hold talks between the defeated Taliban forces and the new government of Karzai. Once the war restarted in the 2004 - 2009 period, despite strong concerns on the part of European Member States that had sent military forces to Afghanistan, EU institutions were never perceived as the forum for seeking to devise an alternative to the US led political-military strategy. The EU decision to develop an Afghanistan, Pakistan strategy in 2009 does not alter the situation: EU policies remain subordinate to decisions taken in Washington and lack a long-term vision for regional conflict management.
The study does not provide consist evidence for the liberal assumption that by acting normatively the EU will disregard concerns over the territorial integrity of a country at war or in a transition phase. Only in the case of Sudan can evidence for this assumption be found. In fact, the normative stance that the EU took over the handling of the conflict in Darfur and its interconnection with the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan (2005) was one contributing factor for the separation of the two entities into separate states. In the case of the conflicts in Chad, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EU adopted a normative stance but it remained highly concerned with the territorial integrity of the two countries. In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, despite some substantial diplomatic efforts and a moment of success in the 2008-2009 period, when it managed to persuade the United States and some other European countries to put pressure on the Rwanda's government to stop direct military involvement in Eastern Congo, the EU has been unable to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country. In the case of Chad, in 2007, the EU supported a military operation that had embarrassing consequences for its own standings: the Chadian President Déby sought and, in certain cases succeeded in using EU commitments to the region to strengthen his own dictatorial regime. The EU, perhaps involuntarily, safeguarded the territorial integrity of Chad at the expense of the establishment of fully-accountable democratic institutions.
The full results of this research are available at the following website: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/people/index.php/gb70.html(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie)