Enhancing European Coordination for National Research Programmes in the Area of Security at Major Events

Final Report Summary - THE HOUSE (Enhancing European Coordination for National Research Programmes in the Area of Security at Major Events)

Executive Summary:
Enhancing European Coordination for National Research Programmes in the Area of Security at Major Events – THE HOUSE is aimed at strengthening the European Research Area (ERA) on Major Events security by applying the research coordination tools/methodologies developed during seven years of activity within the projects EU-SEC and EU-SEC II. THE HOUSE builds on the assumption that Major Events are “windows of opportunity” to increase inter-agency/intra-agency coordination at national and regional level and they are suitable to have a long-lasting legacy on the national security planning of the hosting countries.
The 27 month project (Starting date: 1st March 2012; End date: 31st May 2014) received 100% funding from the DG Enterprise and Industry, with a total grant of € 2,774,300. Capitalising on the existing EU-SEC II network of cooperation, THE HOUSE gathered a wide Consortium of 24 national public end-users from 24 different EU Member States plus UNICRI. The main goal of the Project was to achieve a harmonised European approach to the implementation of the research conducted in the field of Major Events security, identifying the best option(s) available for the establishment of an European House of Major Events Security (the House). Such objective was achieved trough a coordinated research based on the outcomes and finding observed and analysed in the application of the House standards (Coordination Tools and Methodologies-CTM) to eight selected Major Events organized in Europe. The House also benefited from the Consortium partners providing them a common framework for Major Events Security, including common taxonomy, planning and evaluation standards elaborated to respond to the specific needs of the security end-users groups.
The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) is THE HOUSE project Coordinator organization. Ms. Barbara Rohmann, Head of UNICRI Major Events Security Programme, is THE HOUSE project Coordinator and contact person (rohmann@unicri.it). In compliance with the role of Project Coordinator, UNICRI guaranteed the smooth implementation of the Project and monitored its development; ensured the coordination among the Partners by disseminating a set of jointly elaborated criteria and working language while facilitating and promoting trust and good team spirit among the partners
The Project was composed of a broad collation of 25 partners representing 24 different EU Member States Governmental Agencies, ranging from Ministries of the Interior to Ministries of Justice, to Police Academies and UNICRI, as Coordinator. Furthermore, this number is added to by EUROPOL and CEPOL as Member of the Project Advisory Board.
Project Context and Objectives:
The House Project was a follow-up project to EU-SEC (2004 – 2008) and EU-SEC II (2008 – 2001). EU-SEC II identified seven coordination tools/methodologies (CTMs) as the main coordination gaps which needed to be addresses in order to foster the coordination of security research in the field of Major Events in Europe and identified the European House of Major Events (THE HOUSE) as the way in which to deliver these CTMs to Member States. During the implementation of the Project a series of field tests were carried out with a view to assess the potential of these CTMs as the services that will be offered by the European House of Major Events Security (The House, a structure that potentially will be shaped and developed based on the findings/results of the Project). Once established, The House will be at the disposal of the EU national authorities in charge of security planning for Major Events.
Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom were represented in the project by through their Ministries of Interior, Ministries of Justice, or Police Academies.
The following are the CTMs adopted by THE HOUSE. In the implementation of the Project, CTMs 1-4 have been tested by security planners of requesting EU Member States while CTMs 5-7 have been developed:
CTM 1 – IPO Security Planning Model (Denmark);
CTM 2 – Guidelines for Public Private Partnerships for Major Events (United Kingdom);
CTM 3 – Media Management Guidelines (Italy);
CTM 4 – Common Standards for Security Products (Austria);
CTM 5 – Special Technical Equipment Pool (STEP) (Estonia);
CTM 6 – European Major Event Register (EMER) (Portugal);
CTM 7 – Networking and Training (France).
One Member State was delegated to be in charge of each CTM, these partners are called CTM Owners. The CTM Owner was responsible for presenting the CTM at the associated events of THE HOUSE and also in the development of the content of the CTM.
In compliance with European Commission rules the work load for THE HOUSE project was divided into 5 Work Packages (WPs) which are set out below:
Work Package 1 (WP1) – Management Activities
Work Package 2 (WP2) – Joint Activities
Work Package 3 (WP4) – Transnational Activities
Work Package 4 (WP4) – User Guidelines
Work Package 5 (WP5) – Dissemination
Each Work Package (WP) was further subdivided into various tasks. In this reporting period, all work packages were active (WPs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
Work Package 1 – Management Activities
This Work Package (WP) ensured that the project was implemented in a smooth and effective manner. This WP was not divided into specific tasks since its activities were distributed along the entire development of the project and it concerned the structure of the Consortium. The Consortium was divided into three distinct parts:
• Network Steering Committee (NSC) – composed of one representative for each of the 24 partner institutions of the Consortium and chaired by UNICRI.
• Secretariat – composed of Project Coordinator, Project Officer and Project Assistant. The Secretariat is the administrative and managerial body of the Consortium.
• Advisory Board – composed of representatives from CEPOL and Europol
Work Package 2 – Joint Activities
Work Package 2 assessed THE HOUSE coordination tools/methodologies (CTMs) as common European standards in relation to four thematic areas of real Major Events security planning and these form the four tasks of WP 2 which were as follows:
2.1 Common research and technology taxonomy
Task 2.1 developed operating versions of the databases Special Technical Equipment Pool (STEP) and European Major Event Register (EMER) (CTMs 5 and 6 respectively).
2.2 Common planning standards
Task 2.2 assessed the impact CTMs 1-4 (IPO Model, PPP, Media Management, Security Products) have, as common planning standards, on the coordination of Major Events security planning in Europe.

2.3 Common evaluation standards
Task 2.3 assessed the impact CTMs 1-4 (IPO Model, PPP, Media Management, Security Products) have, as common evaluation standards, on the coordination of Major Events security planning in Europe.

2.4 Networking and training
Task 2.4 worked in collaboration with CEPOL to plan and implement training modules and a training curriculum on Major Event Security standards that raised awareness and promotes use of The House services.

The 8 test events where Work Package 2 tested the services of The House were the following:
• Euro Athletic Championships, Helsinki, Finland June -July 2012
• UEFA Euro Cup, Poland, July 2012
• Bulgaria-Italy (FIFA WC Qualification) September 2012
• EU Presidency Ireland, January - June 2013
• Rainbow March, Bratislava, Slovakia June2013
• EU Presidency, Lithuania, July – December 2013
• CEV Euro Volley, September 2013
• Nuclear Safety Summit, March 2014
Work Package 3 – Transnational Activities
Work Package 3 assessed the impact of the coordination tools/methodologies (CTMs) provided by THE HOUSE on the advancement of a common policing approach in line with the priorities of European security policy-makers such as the Stockholm Programme and the EU Internal Security Strategy. It also developed policy suggestions to ensure the effectiveness and long-term sustainability of this advancement.
To achieve its objectives, WP 3 was split into one macro-task (grouping tasks 3.1 3.2 and 3.3) and one micro task (3.4).
Task 3.1 – Common research and technology taxonomy, Task leader: Romania
Task 3.2 – Common standards, Task leader: Austria
Task 3.3 - Common evaluation standards, Task leader: Spain
Task 3.4 – Feasibility Study, Task leader: UNICRI
Tasks 3.1 3.2 and 3.3 were designed to run in parallel with Tasks 2.1 2.2 and 2.3 and intended to systematically analyse the impact that the coordination tools/methodologies of THE HOUSE can have on the adoption of common policing approach by implementing relevant provisions of the Stockholm Programme and the EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS). The output from these three tasks will provide a direct benefit to the EU and national Institutions in terms of offering a practical input for the concrete application of certain aspects of the Stockholm Programme and other relevant EU policies in view of the advancement towards the adoption of a common policing approach across Europe.
Task 3.4 the Feasibility Study sought to identify the most appropriate legal and governance framework to the future activities of the House. The resulting feasibility study has been particularly important to set the basis for the long-term sustainability of the House and for the future provision of coordination assistance to European security policy-makers.
Work Package 4 – User Guidelines. The aim of this work package was to produce guidelines for security end-users about the practical use and application of the research coordination tools/methodologies (CTMs) offered by House to the security planning of Major Events taking place in Europe.
Work Package 5 – Dissemination. The aim of this work package was two-fold:
• To raise awareness among the community of practitioners and the general public about THE HOUSE and its coordination assistance services;
• To foster the adoption and application of THE HOUSE CTMs among the community of security policy-makers and practitioners
Project Results:
The House Project has addressed the coordination gaps in major event security research identified during EU-SEC-II; it has tested the solutions elaborated during EU-SEC-II (the Coordination Tools and Methodologies – CTMs) in response to these gaps. The main goal of the House was to reinforce the European Research Area (ERA) through the coordination of Major Event security planning in Europe. To this end, the House assisted the EU countries hosting a Major Event in the application of the research coordination methodologies identified, developed and tested by the Consortium of end-users within EU-SEC II. The following section deals with the individual research results of the main partner led deliverable reports of the project (D2.1 D2.2 D2.3 D2.4 D3.1)and also the other main deliverable reports which were led by the coordinator (D3.2 D4.2).

Deliverable 2.1
The aim of Task 2.1 was to make operating versions of two integrated data-bases: Specialist Technical Equipment Pool (STEP) and European Major Events Register (EMER), using the common research and technology taxonomy elaborated by the EU-SEC II Consortium. The visions of the databases laid out in these predecessor projects, have been further developed both in terms of technical and substantive content through an effective consultation process with the Consortium. Though the Task Team has stuck to the initial task of developing operating versions of STEP and EMER, close cooperation with the other Task groups (most notably those involved in the CTM Provision meetings – Task 2.2 Task 2.3 and Work Package 3) revealed that the most effective way for the databases to assist in the daily activities of major event security planners would be if they were integrated into an all encompassing electronic planning tool which would provide access to all of the services of The House. In keeping with the vision of the EU-SEC II Manual, EMER will provide the access to the consolidated planning tool but once a registered user is logged in, they will be able to access all of the services of The House through one portal. The electronic tool will be based on the overall structure of CTM 1 (the IPO Security Planning Model) but will also incorporate CTM 2 (Public Private Partnerships), CTM 3 (Media Management), CTM 4 Ethical Standards for Security Products) and CTM 7 (Training and Networking). Not only will this provide greater coordination of in ensuring common planning and evaluation standards but also ensure the use of a common taxonomy throughout the planning and evaluation processes and in respect of major events security training. Consultation with the entire Consortium on this possibility, during NSC # 3 in Porto and further during NSC # 4 in Cyprus, gained consensus and as such it must be concluded that this is the path for the future of STEP and EMER and for further investment in their development as part of a comprehensive tool.
Potential Impact on Common Planning and Evaluation Standards
The operating versions of STEP and EMER have been designed to provide relevant information for major events security planners. This information is mainly related to the event, House services and equipment. The identification of key information elements was a crucial part of this process and contributed to the success of the databases, as so far developed.
From October to December 2012 a benchmark exercise was conducted across other operational European databases. Due to data protection policies, these databases are not identified here but they are ones used by a substantial set of police forces. The Task Team identified the aims, management, range, structure, protocols, security, relevant information, infrastructure, and amount of information required to be entered by each operator for these European police databases. It was found that the information quality is a relevant issue that the House Consortium needs to take into consideration for further development and revision of the STEP and EMER databases. Another key issue is the will to share relevant data amongst the partners.
Currently, partner countries can use CTM 5 and CTM 6 on a voluntary basis. However, the Task Team learnt from their feedback, that the type and amount of information they want to share must always be a decision made by the end-users themselves. This is in keeping with the idea of the data contributor retaining control over their respective content on the databases, as envisaged in the EU-SEC II Manual’s description of STEP and EMER. To encourage this understanding, of course, The House Consortium should promote the advantages of sharing such information within the restricted and secure environment of The House.
As envisaged for EMER and STEP within the EU-SEC II Manual, Major Event planning could be improved if planners could have access to relevant information from previous major events. For example: identified problems (Threat Assessments), measures and solutions (Security Plans), tools used (Security Products/Specialist Equipment), good practices and points of attention (Evaluation Reports covering best practices and lessons learned).
Importantly, from its consultations, the Task 2.1 Team considered that trust among Partners is the most relevant challenge for The House Consortium.
Considering the potential of EMER as a dynamic tool, the Task Team designed it as a database model that would allow for the incorporation of feedback from House Partners as end-users. To this end, the questionnaire already prepared by Task 2.1 can be used as an assessment tool within EMER.
The Task Team’s main recommendation for Project management consideration and the future development in this regard is to work towards an incorporation of STEP, EMER and all other services of The House into a consolidated electronic tool. This would allow the end-user to use all services simultaneously.
The Potential Impact of STEP and EMER at a European Level (WP3)
Running parallel with Task 2.1 was Work Package 3’s Task 3.1 the aim of which was to consider the potential contribution of STEP and EMER to the implementation of the EU’s Stockholm Programme and other relevant EU Policies. Based on systematic consultation with all end users and providers of House services in relation to the live major events participated in by THE HOUSE Project (including Europol and CEPOL), the findings of the Task 3.1 study were reported on to the Consortium at NSC# in April 2013.
With regard to the simple STILT taxonomy (see Annex B), there was strong support for it. As a basic classification system for ‘security products’ and use in conjunction with STEP (and CTM 4), it was found to be highly acceptable among practitioners for potential EU policy adoption. With practical operational reach (now further given to it by STEP) it was seen as capable of being developed on the basis of field experiences and knowledge gained and shared through House services.
Making practical sense to all parties, the STILT taxonomy was reported by Task 3.1 to have a ready policy and operational impact to the strategic advantage of the EU as a common standard that would be very easy to implement. Its ready incorporation into the STEP database within Task 2.1 has gone some way to support that finding.
With regard to STEP itself, Task 3.1 reported that where the EU’s 2007 Handbook on Major Events recommended the development of ‘a database on all available resources and corresponding contact points’ as a very useful tool for organising Member States, no such database currently existed (to the knowledge of those interested parties consulted) but that if it did it would be welcomed. The continued development of STEP, Task 3.1 found, would therefore make a significant contribution to the implementation of this relevant EU policy concerning security planning for Major Events.
As a point for Task 2.1 consideration, it was reported by Task 3.1 that in the future development of both STEP and EMER they be made accessible via the Europol Platform of Experts (EPE) in due course. This raises a question as to the longer-term ownership of both STEP and EMER. That is, whether ownership responsibility for their integrity and maintenance should remain national (i.e. with current Owners) or be made transnational (i.e. with Europol). This is a matter for the Project management to consider. Europol, however, would need to subject both STEP and EMER to further evaluation before considering them as information sharing databases for major events.
Finally, with regard to EMER, some Partners were hesitant over the idea of extending the voluntary registration of an event as ‘major’ to that of a formal declaration process with common standard compliance implications regulated at a transnational EU level beyond that of the participant’s national/state framework. Others saw it as neither necessary nor likely to be acceptable. In this light, Task 3.1 reported that the potential of EMER remains only to facilitate the exchange of experiences, best practices and evaluated lessons learned between Participating Members States, as originally envisaged.
To be acceptable, any potential EU level policy suggestions concerning EMER and the idea of registering or declaring an event as ‘major’ should be put in terms of enabling Member States to do something voluntarily rather than requiring them to do so.
Further Considerations for Use of STEP & EMER at European Level
The Task 2.1 Team feel the use of databases in general is crucial to feed the decision making processes of Major Event security planners. The organization of Major Events required huge amounts of information to be processed, which obviously requires the use of databases. Considering the security planning phase, planners need to have different kinds of information from different kinds of databases. The challenge here is not the use of databases, but the interconnection of them.
If The House and its CTM services could be transformed into an ICT (Information and Communications Technology) platform that allows in an easy and simple way to several databases at the same time, it would be a key tool for European planners. As explained in the EU-SEC II Manual and THE HOUSE Project proposal, an integrated system of databases for House services would help contribute toward common planning and evaluation standards for Major Events in Europe.
The adoption of common standards for Major Events security planning at a European level can, in the opinion of the Task 2.1 Team, be better ensured by The House by promoting the following:
• Incorporation of all of the services of The House within one tool;
• The identification of planning departments (see Annex A of the EU-SECII Manual);
• Organization of further awareness raising actions to promote the services of The House;
• Organization of training activities on The House services in conjunction with CEPOL
• Organization of activities involving representatives of national planning departments to try to penetrate a wider audience;
• Exploration of possibilities for simulation programmes (as envisaged in Task 2.4’s development of CTM 7).

With regard to the development of similar databases to STEP and EMER at the European level, none were identified during the implementation of Task 2.1. However, the Task Team recommends that The House uses the same assumptions used by databases (e.g. Schengen Information System (SIS)) in terms of data protection policy, user’s profiles, data implementation models, portal hosting, maintenance, management and governance.
Recommendations
With the above work of Task 2.1 in mind, and in order to take full advantage of it, the Task Team recommends the following actions:
• Develop a comprehensive electronic planning tool encompassing EMER, STEP and all of the services of The House
• Set up a submission protocol
• Set up the management of the databases after the Project concludes.
• Ensure portal security.

Deliverable 2.2
The objective of Task 2.2 was to provide assistance on the use of The House CTMs to the host countries of Major Events over the course of the project. This assistance involves consultation with national security planners/end users at the CTM provisions in order to:
• Assess the CTMs as common planning standards (can they be called common standards, are there gaps and overlaps between the CTM and the existing national practice?)
• Assess the method of provision of assistance (presentation of standards, discussion workshops, consultation with end users)
• Improve the CTM and its provision to host countries based on understanding of any gaps that exist between them and the national planning practices, on the basis of the above assessment.

Based on the research conducted by the Task Team during the CTM Provision process at the associated events of the project, the following are the consolidated findings on the applicability of the standards of THE HOUSE as common planning standards for major events security in Europe and where applicable, recommendations for their improvement.
CTM 1 - IPO Planning Model
The evidence taken from the five CTM 1 provisions indicates that the currently used planning processes within EU member states, whilst not directly following the IPO Planning Model, cover the same issues. It has been recognized that while there is synergy between the model and current practice, the practice is not supported by written national policy. This may present a problem for the preservation of such synergy and collective experience.
Evidence of the adoption or use of the IPO Model has been seen since the predecessor project to THE HOUSE (EU-SEC II), where Denmark (the owner of CTM 1) used the model to conduct the post event evaluation of the security for the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit 2009 (COP2009). During THE HOUSE Project, the IPO Security Planning Model was directly referred to by the national security planners in their presentations of the associated event security or the discussion afterwards (Poland, Lithuania, the Netherlands).
From the research of the thematically linked Task 3.2 it emerged that "Its application as a general planning guide for all types of major events, including football, was echoed in responses from Lithuania, Greece, Malta, and at least four of the seven Romanian end-users." Furthermore, as mentioned in section 3.1.2 subsequent to the CTM Provision, the Irish Police have considered the use of the IPO Model in the Irish context as a benchmark for the establishment of a national strategic framework for major events.
As such, it can be concluded that the model reflects a common planning approach in Europe in its current form and the structure of the model and the individual elements it contains are widely accepted by all Consortium partners.
Having said that, there is also a feeling that the model, published in 2007, would benefit from an update taking into account further best practices which have been identified, developments in security planning practice and technological developments. In the process of updating the model, it is considered important to take into account current versions of other relevant publications, models, handbooks and EU Policy documents already adopted.
In this respect, such an update has been discussed at some of the later CTM provisions and at the third and fourth Network Steering Committee meetings and was met with universal approval by the Consortium. In this respect, the first action will be the publication of an updated 2014 edition of the planning model. This would include new chapters dealing with Media and PPP (thus incorporating existing CTMs of The House) and Post Event Evaluation (in order to ensure that the evaluation is included in the planning phase and thereby avoids results based evaluation), and additional security elements and sub-elements.
In addition to the updated paper version of the model, it has been deemed essential to develop, in the medium to long term, an electronic version of the planning model which encompasses the current elements of the model, additional elements to be decided after further consultation, a range of databases including CTM 5, the Special Technical Equipment Pool (STEP), CTM 6 The European Major Events Register (EMER), as well as an expert contact database and database of national contact points, etc.
From all of the Task Team’s consultation with national security planners, a clear thread can be seen in the desire to use the planning model in varying degrees, to be determined on a national basis and depending on the national context. If the model is not considered as a prescriptive planning tool, it can be seen that the potential range of application is very wide. It can provide a supporting role when used in conjunction with other national models, manuals or guidelines (as in the case of the Netherlands), it has the potential to provide the basis for the entire planning policy framework, or can even be used as checklist for use during the planning and/or evaluation phases. Presented in this way, allowing for national flexibility in the scope of application, the model is likely to be seen as widely acceptable within all member states, and if accepted, this would engender a degree of ‘commonality’ whilst allowing member states to preserve their independent approach to major event planning.

CTM 2 - Public Private Partnerships
CTM 2 has been delivered to two member states during the CTM Provision process, Finland and Slovakia. The feedback from end users would tend to indicate that, whilst the area of Public Private Partnerships is reasonably mature where relationships are ‘contractual’ and therefore viewed as longer term, e.g. in areas such as waste management on behalf of municipal authorities, the concept of Public Private Partnerships and their use for major event security planning varies considerably throughout the European Union, being a regular practice in some countries and representing new territory in others.
From discussions with ‘The House’ Consortium partners it is clear that the trend for the contracting out of services, historically delivered by police and other state authorities, to private contractors, is widely accepted throughout the EU, and in view of the current global financial situation it is felt that such trend is only likely to continue.
There would appear to be many examples of private partners providing services to major events across the EU, however there is still discussion whether the services provided are related to ‘security’ or ‘safety’.
The taxonomy of ‘security’ and ‘safety’ are sometimes differentiated within EU member states and this appears to cause some confusion, at least amongst some end users, regarding the value and credibility of the private sector if a proposal for common planning standards for the security of EU major events includes the private sector.
A number of member states highlighted issues that were seen as inhibitors to the creation of common planning standards in the area of Public Private Partnerships and these included a lack of coordinated training and licensing of the private sector, a lack of EU definition around roles and responsibilities and National legislation in some member states which precludes responsibility for public safety and security being given to private companies. Furthermore, the national legislation governing the private security industry within the EU differed widely across member states and this was cited as a problem for the use of common standards.
Whilst such obstacles may appear to make the concept of common EU planning standards in this area difficult for some to accept and/or adopt, from its research Task Team 2.2 still believes that the elements and concepts within CTM 2 add value to the major event planning process and that, as such, they are of worth and should continue to be considered in the context of Common Planning Standards for major events.
Taking into account the absence of EU wide legislation governing all issues surrounding PPP and the desire communicated by security planners for something to fill this gap, there is a need to consider and potentially address the legislative questions raised. For this reason, the model for PPP as outlined within the project has not been found to be one which is universally applicable to all EU Member States. On the other hand, it clearly emerged from the research that issues in relation to PPP are recurring themes in the member states consulted. The degree of use and benefit to be derived depend on the legislative and cultural context, but in all instances there are benefits including cost effectiveness and the legacy in stakeholder relationships: for instance, cultivation of private sector relationships and advancement of technologies in place.
On the basis of this, the preference for a set of guidelines for the establishment of Public Private Partnerships is that it be sufficiently generic to be applicable to the various legislative and cultural contexts throughout the EU. Done in this manner, there would be a great value in the integration of generic PPP guidelines into the overall methodology for security planning, and as such there is a clear identified need to integrate PPP into the IPO Planning Model in its future update.

CTM 3 - Media Management
CTM 3, offering Media Management Guidelines, was delivered to three end user groups and the evidence would tend to indicate that media management, in relation to major events, is handled in very similar ways across the EU.
Appropriately managed pro-active and continuous media management can only serve as a positive force in managing public expectations and the thirst for information during the planning phase, and throughout the operational phase, of a major event (and after).
The above concept would appear to be widely accepted within end users and Consortium partners and therefore there appears to be, broadly, little divergence among EU member states in their approach to handling the media.
One element of media management which consistently featured as an area for discussion was the proliferation of, and potential difficulties created by, the use of social media such as Twitter, Facebook, etc. Such mediums were seen as being enablers for disruptive elements of society during fast moving situations, creating potential difficulties for the authorities responsible for maintaining law and order.
Whilst being accepted as a medium which can be used for negative purposes by elements of the public, the social media concept was also seen as an enabler for EU authorities in that it provides a ‘fast time’ platform for the dissemination of relevant information and for confirming or dispelling social media ‘rumours’.
The end user forum in Slovakia considered that CTM 3 provided potential benefit when dealing with major events with an EU wide dimension but held concern that the blanket imposition of the CTM across the EU may frustrate the attempts, by EU member states, to deal with domestic media during developing situations solely within their borders. Of note, though, was the mention, in Dublin, that Ireland, in their planning for their Presidency of the EU were utilizing EU media policy.
In common with other CTMs, Task Team 2.2 considers that the practical processes of media management within EU Member States, within the security planning for EU major events are broadly similar with the individual elements within the CTM being considered. It is therefore difficult to see any reason to suggest why EU wide adoption of the CTM, for EU wide major events, would cause member states significant difficulty.
Due to the globalization of the media landscape, media is an area where the police and security planners need to be aware of all aspects of evolving media forms and the impact that they may have on the perception of the event by the population as well as the image of the event and therefore the country which is projected around the world. In the case of media management, it is recognized that general guidelines for all security planners are desirable as the transcendence of borders facilitated by internet and mobile networks has meant that the same issues are faced by security planners all around Europe and the entire world in respect of media.
The research conducted demonstrates that Media Management is recognized as one of the main pillars of the security planning process and therefore it shall occupy a dedicated chapter in the proposed update of the IPO Planning Model (for 2014) as well as becoming a central element in the electronic version of the planning model. In addition, a specific interest in training in respect of the management of new forms of global media has been expressed by the security planners and this should be considered in respect of the training element of The House services (CTM 7).

CTM 4 - Ethical and Operational Standards for New Security Products
CTM 4 was formally delivered in two member states within the project plan, both in the very early stages of the project. However, the subject has been informally discussed on a number of occasions during other meetings and CTM provisions.
The areas of focus within CTM 4 relate to the quality assurance standards of new ‘security products’ and the ethical compliance practices applied during major event planning. In this context ‘security products’ are taken to include both physical assets which assist in the provision of security, e.g. hostile vehicle barriers, fencing, CCTV etc. and documentation which supports the major event planning process.
As the testing and certification of new security products (physical assets) are governed by national and EU legislation, the focus of the CTM within the project has been towards the quality assurance of major event planning documentation. From the discussions held with end users and Consortium members it is reasonable to suggest that the planning documentation created during the planning for major events would differ in format between EU member states, but that the content would be found to be broadly similar.
There is no evidence of anything approaching an EU quality assurance standard for planning documentation, and the evidence would indicate that ‘peer review’ is widely used as the main quality assurance methodology. Whilst this may deliver sound quality assurance, this will always be dependent on the quality and experience of the ‘reviewer’. In terms of both assisting and validating any quality assurance and review process, an aspect which may be an area for further development may be the potential for the standardization of major event planning documentation across the EU.
There is clear evidence that ethical compliance is a routine consideration amongst EU member states and this can be evidenced by reference to the use, and application, of the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Code of Police Ethics. As such, any guidelines in respect of this topic should be based on such policy documents.
However, what cannot be shown so readily is the mechanism by which these issues are formally considered within the planning process. Examples of this include the reference of the Polish authorities to the inclusion of representatives from independent rights organizations in the planning process and the Metropolitan Police Service (UK) who now routinely appoint a legal representative to the planning team for major events in London, specifically to comment on and to give legal advice and guidance to police commanders on legal and ethical considerations.
The research of Task Team 2.2 concluded that, whilst further work may assist aspects of CTM 4, there is no reason to suggest that EU member states would have any difficulty in adopting the CTM, particularly in light of the use of existing legislation as mentioned above. As such, the CTM should be integrated into the future versions of the planning model.
Final Recommendations
On the basis of all of these conclusions, Task 2.2 makes the following recommendations:
• The publication of an updated paper version of the IPO Security Planning Model
• The development of an electronic version of the model
• The adoption of the model in all its forms across the EU
• Redrafting of the PPP guidelines in a more generic manner
• Integration of this new version of the PPP guidelines into the future versions of the IPO Security Planning Model
• Update of the chapter of Media management and integrate into the future versions of the IPO Security Planning Model
• The development of a training module on media management for major event security, including consideration concerning its delivery methodology as either local or central and, possible integration into CTM 7
• That CTM 4, as currently defined, be omitted from future project development as the research data clearly indicates that the principles espoused within the CTM are adequately dealt with under current legislative and regulatory framework across the EU

Deliverable 2.3
The objective of Task 2.3 was to provide assistance on the use of The House CTMs to the host countries of Major Events over the course of the project. This assistance involves consultation with national security planners/end users at the CTM provisions in order to:
• Assess the CTMs as common evaluation standards (can they be called common standards, are there gaps and overlaps between the CTM and the existing national practice?)
• Assess the method of provision of assistance (presentation of standards, discussion workshops, consultation with end users)
• Improve the CTM and its provision to host countries based on understanding of any gaps that exist between them and the national evaluation practices, on the basis of the above assessment.

Based on the research conducted by the Task Team during the CTM Provision process at the associated events of the project, the following are the consolidated findings on the applicability of the standards of THE HOUSE as common evaluation standards for major events security in Europe and where applicable, recommendations for their improvement.
Based on the Task Team’s observations during the provision and application of CTMs 1-4 to actual major events and their security planning processes, this section assesses their use and potential/actual impact as common evaluation standards for end users. The overall findings for each CTM are taken in turn here, followed by findings concerning common evaluation standards in general and The House project’s overall aim of developing a common policing approach in Europe.
Overall findings on CTM 1 – The IPO Security Planning Model
CTM 1 is a particularly important component of The House project. It is a very useful tool for officers responsible for drafting operational security plans for major events in that it can be used as a checklist and/or as an evaluation tool. The model is an accepted tool that is already in use by a number of EU Member States participating in The House in relation to the planning of major events. Although it is a standard model, it can easily be adopted to national needs. Users of this tool can easily recognise and confirm that CTM 1 is a very valuable tool. This not only assists them in the drawing up of their plans but also in the delivery of directives and instructions prior to the events to officers involved in the security activities emanating from them and also during the later debriefing and evaluation of the event. In fact, many end users clearly described CTM 1 as an effective tool for the early preparation for planning of security at major events.
As a result of the provisions, it is obvious that elements of CTM 1 have always been used by security planners when drafting plans for major events. They are not new elements since they are referred to in the organisation of any major event, even prior to the existence of CTM 1. Some elements already established in CTM 1 and used by end users are, for example, border control, cooperation between neighbouring border officers, the use of CBRN experts at venues, the involvement of media management, the use of national and international liaison officers, the identification of team security liaison officers among others.
End users confirm that their current evaluation practices are similar or identical to the ones presented in CTM 1. Obviously, there exist differences relating to working concepts, separations of phases, classification and vocabulary. The evaluation of security planning is generally prepared, during which national and international standards are taken into consideration. The planning organisation generally prepares guidelines for evaluation and these are distributed to all relevant end users. Many declare that evaluation reports are prepared, although many also confirm that they do not refer to any evaluation model. In fact, some end users draw up conclusions following the event. From the assessments and the lessons learned, they try and improve future planning. End users are aware of the importance of lessons learned pursuant to personal experiences but such experiences are not formally documented. Therefore, in the absence of documentation, it is obvious that newly deployed security planners will learn only through their own experience or in the best case scenario profit from the experience of close colleagues. CTM 1 provides solutions for having systematic evaluations. CTM 1 can assist host national authorities in that whilst being a tool to standardise a secure and uniform approach for the security planning of major events (internationally), it can at the same time be used to fit the national requirements.
The House service provided as CTM 1 is very often recognized as being the standard format. It is recommended as a “template” to provide a framework aimed at uniting national approaches to the security planning of major events without being rigid but rather used as a reference document. The model is a good means of cross checking during the preparation phase of a major event to see if elements contained therein have been taken into consideration, if considered necessary.
Using the CTM 1 service assists planners and end users as a guidance and adjustment tool for when preparing their plans, thus avoiding leaving gaps at an early stage. The standards contained in CTM 1 can be used by them for evaluation purposes similar to the way they use it in the planning stage. They can combine it not only with their existing evaluation process/data base, but also as an added inspirational plan since this was produced by their own “in-house” research centres.
Quite often, end users tend to suggest that specific elements should be added to the CTM 1. An example is the suggestion that information and intelligence should be extended both at national and international level. Another example is the suggestion that the relation between the costs and budget and the planning itself should be more detailed. In the end, there was a consensus that the CTM 1 should be more generic and uniform and that the details for each plan should be the task of the planners at national level.
A few end users may not be interested to follow the contents of the CTM 1, because they were not of the opinion that a post event evaluation model was necessary. It is however understood that the contents of CTM 1 would be a very helpful tool with which to carry out post event evaluations. There was a general feeling that existing national practices did suffice for their purposes and that the CTM 1 presented was very close to their planning procedures.
End users are prepared to implement sub-elements for planning and evaluating major events security which are associated with the main elements of CTM 1. For example, “New attitude towards fans: Care, Tolerance and Suppression”, dialogue, Anti-Conflict Teams, cooperation with international spotters, national contact points, and others.

Overall findings on CTM 2 Public Private Partnerships
CTM 2 is a common guide aimed at establishing best practices in the area of PPPs. It basically serves as a checklist and contains seven modules. As such CTM 2 aims at creating and maintaining a common understanding of the methods of relationships and inter-dependencies, between public and private partners, when planning security at major events.
The separation between public and private security provisions must always be monitored and coordinated; the ongoing and steady change of areas of responsibilities and uninhibited growth and expansion of new policing priorities and private security sector within EU must always be considered as a factor that can affect the operation and the relationship between these entities. The European Member States which have been visited, all have their own legislative and planning systems in place and they also secure and evaluate their major events.
There are some Member States which do not embark on PPPs arrangements and consequently, a gap between the standard and national rules and practices exist. Pursuant to activities which were held, the relevance of the PPP was understood better by participants but there is still the need to recognise “how one can make use of PPP in daily activities”. It is imperative that The House standards are somehow linked to the daily practice in different Member States. Former major events can be used as examples to explore how the system works and one can also compare and explore which elements are common with national legislation. Through such activity one would be able to learn why and whether it is more beneficial for end users to use The House standard for PPP rather than the national methodology.
In the course of the discussions of the provisions, there are occasions when difficulties were encountered to interpret certain vocabulary and terminology. However, pursuant to discussions and verifications between CTM providers and end users, participants agreed on references and essentially all those present during the discussions acknowledged the concepts of the recommendations related to PPP.
Some end users indicate that CTM 2 is different compared with their own systems. However, a number of end users indicate that the CTM reflects their national evaluation procedures. The majority of the end users state that CTM 2 is similar to existing national guidelines which are also used as recommendations to serve as a checklist for evaluation purposes.
Intra-organizational challenges are also encountered by partners. An example would be the procedures for the delivery of training to private guards. This issue certainly needs revisiting and to be improved upon in order to ensure that trainees get the proper instruction with which they can deliver a positive service when embarking on PPP activities.

Overall findings on CTM3 – Media Management Guidelines
The end users acknowledge that CTM3, as a European standard for the evaluation of security planning for major events, does not only serve as a best practice template on the effective management of the media itself but also serves as a communication tool of policing, for the benefit of the public and the end users. CTM 3 helps to assess the cooperative relationship and efficiency between the police and the media.
End users state that new ways of communication means, emerging from new technologies and new types of “citizen journalism” especially the social media, which include Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube and others, must be incorporated in the overall set up.
End users have a common understanding that in security planning and evaluation of major events, Media Management has not been considered as a priority so far. Handbooks, manuals or written protocols do generally not exist and there are no formal platforms to build and manage cooperation with the Media. Media Management is merely based on experiences for former major events, inclusive of both positive and negative successes.
Whilst debating CTM 3, it is apparent that for some end users the Media Management Guidelines were complete and valuable. On the other hand other end users consider the provisions of the same CTM as being futile, since they do not regard them as a priority. These end users consider that whilst elements describing operational issues such as the establishing of checkpoints, parking provisions, transport means and other related information are important for image building for private event organisers, this cannot necessarily be said in respect to the Media; the Media is not regarded as beneficial for the enhancement of security even in post incident situations.
Others indicated that discussions of the Media Management Guidelines as standards is important, considering that a strategic use of the media to create an ‘atmosphere of security and positive image for the police’ is not the same as using it to create a ‘welcoming atmosphere and positive image of the event’ . In the first situation, the police, instead of the event, become the focus of media attention, when the purposes of the guidelines are aimed at facilitating the second. Hence such differences require additional research and development in the interest of all stakeholders. It is important that event organisers, together with the police and other security providers, continuously explore security issues. Their task is to work towards the implementation of the recommendations/guidelines and to try and create an international standard, in so far as media relations are concerned, thus improving evaluation standards.
These differences in perception, call for continuous and dynamic future explorations of the subjects before implementation of relevant EU recommendations/policies as well as international consistency in media relations. This is one of the important purposes of evaluation. Consequently, the likeliness of using the guidelines as a standard is unclear to one group of end users who feel that there is still a need for more research to be carried out. Once the research is concluded, the findings may then facilitate the possibility for the guidelines to be accepted by the senior policy planners and therefore implemented within their organisation.
Some end users concentrate on the difficulties of their own internal system, such as the quality of their spokespersons network, rather than on the aim and contents of the given provision. They are rather proactive but drift beyond the realistic services of The House. They acknowledge the role of The House and the provision but disregard the generic view and request individual solutions to their own problems. Often end users already have in place their own national evaluation standards and are therefore they are reluctant or unprepared to divert from them, obviously since they considered them suitable. On the other hand it was clear, that during the debate on CTM 3, some end users recognised gaps and other inconsistencies in their evaluation processes and therefore confirmed that The House may contribute and enhance their standing plans and procedures.
Other partners have a different opinion. They state that during the last years they have experienced substantial improvement in this area. They further aim to improve this issue and to continue development of future activities and enhance media management. They will embark on initiatives to convince their executive and mid-level staff to acknowledge the success that has already been experienced and to recognize the importance of media management when embarking on security planning. Concurrently, the need for the acknowledgement of the media management to desist from aggressive media activity is also important since Media could be considered not only as a security tool, but also as security threat.
It is important that partners also acknowledge that for securing the best results, it is imperative that officers deployed in major events security receive appropriate media management training, which should also include a public relations component.
Overall Findings on CTM 4 – Ethical Standards for New Security Products
End users state that ethical standards for new security products are relevant when planning and evaluating the security at major events. CTM 4 might act as a benchmark. Since human rights are crosscutting in nature, they must be included in the ethical standards.
Some end users mention that CTM 4 is a useful and relevant standard. Ethical issues are commonly applied throughout the EU Member States and reflect the evaluation practices. End users agree that ethical standards are important and are appropriate when police work has to be evaluated.
On the other hand, some end users state that ethics are not an issue since they are applied naturally within the country and are therefore not subject at all of any evaluation.
Because of the fact that when dealing with the public and interfering with civil rights, one must ensure that careful attention is taken and many social and organizational factors must be taken into consideration, it is crucial that there are Ethical Standards.
Reflections on the CTMs as “common evaluation standards”
Many end users see common evaluation standards as realistic and relevant, because in their opinion major events, no matter where they are held, require constant quality improvement. Evaluation standards can assist all to assure a certain quality control. They help create a new police culture, assist in synchronising some parts of police laws and improve the coordination between countries which have different cultural heritages as well as different political environments and procedures. These evaluation standards will assist in addressing problems which then could be addressed appropriately. They will facilitate and enhance the preparation for future events. Moreover, most of the elements contained in the CTMs are already being taken into consideration during the planning and evaluation of major events by the proper law enforcement authorities. This tends to prove that the CTMs are reflecting existing national standards.
Additionally, such standards may be beneficial to assessments of procedures before, during and after events, vertically between layers of decision within an organization as well as horizontally between organizations. Finally, such standards may facilitate the establishment of new approaches and practices when designing security planning within a country. Evaluation standards may sustain the sharing of experiences between colleagues from different countries and assist everyone to identify and adopt best practices. Within the framework of the standards established by The House, countries will have the opportunity to adjust, change and adopt better awareness and approaches, thus improving security planning at major events and implementing new methods.
Creating common European evaluation standards is difficult in view of the differences in procedures, priorities, administrative directives and legislation which exist in the different EU Member States. Some countries have provisions to allow and administer planning and evaluation activities while other countries are in the process of developing those. Therefore, the entire concept and context of related evaluations and standards may differ between EU Member States. Current differences of national legislations amongst countries present a challenge to common European evaluation standards. However, universal checklists are considered good to pursue and the development of such common standards is desirable and must be pursued in future as expressed by many end users during CTM provisions.
Language skills are considered as a big challenge, therefore the possible proper use of the standards, i.e. guidelines and manuals, which are commonly produced in English, is not assured. The end users underlined that it is imperative that all the documentation related to standards is translated into the end users’ national language.
With the help of the evaluation process and the incorporation of lessons learned the quality of security at major events can be enhanced, taking also into account societal changes. New avenues, such as internet and social media, constantly force changes upon social environments. Consequently, there is a constant need for awareness of new knowledge, technologies and tactical approaches for improved security assurance at major events.
From the provisions, all of the four CTMs are found to be important and directly related to common evaluation standards for planning of major events. They reflect standards in the area of policing aimed at ensuring security at major events. As common evaluation standards they may serve as functional checklists. The CTMs provide common references for police officers as national end users.
Reflections on the contribution to a “common policing approach”
Enhancing the standardization within the EU of security planning/evaluation for major events requires international cooperation. Issues as common understanding and common evaluation standards are key elements for an integrated approach. Having said that, any advancement on the standardization of an area (field) of policing, such as the planning and evaluation of major events security, is by definition at the same time as step towards the achievement of a greater level of a common policing.
Since major events are regarded as windows of opportunities because they create a space for not only focusing on the event itself but at the same time can enable the creation of a long-term security strategy and therefore constitute also a crucial move towards a common policing approach throughout the EU.

Deliverable 2.4
Task 2.4 was focused on activities for the development potential of a European Training Curriculum on major events security in collaboration with the European Police College (CEPOL). The training is envisaged to serve to raise awareness and promote the use of House services among relevant national policy makers and practitioners. Task 2.4 was aimed at developing the networking and training potential for European policy-makers and senior police practitioners with regard to Major Events security planning and the common security standards of The House as services to them in relation to it.
As a consolidated conclusion and regarding to the applicability and use of the training curriculum on the development of common planning and evaluation standards for major event security in Europe, it appears obvious that each country has its own approach of major event security planning while at the same time, there exists a strong interest for operational guidelines.
In line with the overall aim of THE HOUSE Project, the training curriculum should be seen as a contribution to the adoption of a common policing approach and common standards in Europe concerning security during major events.
In terms of all the work done on Work Package 2’s Task 2.4 participants in the workshops held during the project unanimously agreed that it was clear that in terms of the Task’s objective to develop A common training model on Major Event Security. The IPO Security Planning Model publication delivers an extremely robust training model that has been comprehensively tested throughout the period of the Project and is completely accepted as such by Partners.
It is widely acknowledged, throughout Europe and beyond, that the IPO Security Planning Model provides, in training and development terms, significant opportunities for conceptualising the subject of Major Events security planning at a strategic level and understanding how the different components of the Model work together to produce an inclusive and all-risks response.
Furthermore, at tactical and operational levels, the different elements and sub-elements of major event security planning published within the Model such as venue security, contingency planning, intelligence and traffic management, for instance, individually present themselves as important thematic, topic based, training subjects.
Clearly, the ongoing development of an electronic version of the IPO Security Planning Model and its capacity to explore a much wider range of subject related matters, together with STEP (an integral element thereof now designed to support the identification of training needs via Task 2.4 collaborative activity with Task 2.1) will greatly assist in training needs analysis activities.
Planning and delivering major event security is a complex and very dynamic exercise in which strong leadership and effective management are required for optimal effectiveness. The process of planning and implementing security has an evolutionary and cyclical nature, characterised constantly by the ongoing gathering of intelligence, the formulation of detailed plans, the delivery of pragmatic operational response solutions, vetting and accreditation, the monitoring of day-to-day operations and ongoing review. The capacity to provide training on major event security planning, or any elements thereof at strategic, tactical and operational levels, is therefore critical for obvious reasons.
In addition, in security governance terms, the provision of such training would also, in terms of House priorities, facilitate international cooperation and the exchange of information, promote the identification of best practice and enhance security governance through better interaction with stakeholders. In many respects, this would also support and facilitate the intentions of relevant EU Policies (e.g. the EU’s 2007 Handbook on Major Events) and aspirations of the Stockholm Programme.
The House would therefore, Task Team representatives agreed, have a really unique offering in terms of being in a position to provide a flexible, comprehensive and complementary range of safety and security training products designed to save lives, protect infrastructure and property and strategically derive economic and other legacy benefits from enhanced capacity and effectiveness in local, national and international counter terrorism, community safety and security governance affairs.
It was also noted that there are currently significant shortcomings in the provision of major event security training and development opportunities that effectively encompasses the multi-dimensional local, national and international matrix of major event safety and security risks, threats and vulnerabilities. To this end one could propose, for future project activity, the exploration of security planning for Major Events as a multi-agency activity involving more than just the police and national authority for security and being in need of a more central coordination and direction at the domestic level but done so to a common set of standards at the European level, as per those already being developed by The House.
In terms of Task 2.4’s original aims and objectives, the practical outcomes achieved during the current Project’s initial 18 month implementation phase can be listed as follows:
• A Training Needs Assessment feature now incorporated into the STEP Prototype for future use
• A set of significant documents uploaded onto the CEPOL Website for use with The House (Annex C)
• Formal cooperation with CEPOL
• A first CEPOL/House course planned for late (4th quarter) 2014
• A draft of the European Training Curriculum for the CEPOL/House course and future
• Awareness of The House and its CTMs raised and promoted with and through CEPOL.

In terms of an overall conclusion, all participants in the workshops during the Project agreed that The IPO Security Planning Model provides a very robust training model which can be further developed into an electronic tool which provides all of the services of The House including Training. If this vision for the future of The House is realised, there would be a demand for a training module to guide security planners in the use of such a tool. Continuing to work in collaboration with CEPOL and other European Institutions when appropriate, within the framework of an all encompassing electronic tool for the planning of security for major events, The House can deliver an integrated, cross sector training approach that provides a comprehensive yet flexible response, tailored to overcome identified shortcomings and satisfy a wide range of specific training needs.

Deliverable 3.1
The purpose of Deliverable 3.1 was to analyse how The House CTMs and the resulting coordinated research can contribute to the application of the Stockholm Programme and other relevant EU policies. The D 3.1 Report is composed of the results of the following three individual task report studies:
Task 3.1 (Romania): On the potential contribution of CTM5 (STEP) and CTM6 (EMER) to the implementation of the Stockholm Programme and other relevant EU policies as a common research and technology taxonomy.
Task 3.2 (Austria): On the potential contribution of CTM’s 1 to 4 (IPO Planning Model, Public Private Partnerships, Media Management, Security Products) to the implementation of the Stockholm Programme and other relevant EU policies as common planning standards.
Task 3.3 (Spain): On the potential contribution of CTM’s 1 to 4 (IPO Planning Model, Public Private Partnerships, Media Management, Security Products) to the implementation of the Stockholm Programme and other relevant EU policies as common evaluation standards.

The Potential Contribution to the Stockholm Programme in General
Chapter 12 of the EU-SEC II Manual, approved by the Consortium in November 2011, gave a provisional analysis of The House’s potential impact on the Stockholm Programme. As an early part of the implementation of the WP3 macro-task within THE HOUSE Project that succeeded it, and aimed simply at further validating its content from a practitioner’s more informed perspective, a group of representatives of the Task 3.1 leader were asked to review the chapter. Reported on at NSC#2 (19 Oct 2012, Paris) as part of the presentation as to the status of the macro-task’s implementation plan, their review confirmed the likely EU policy impact potential of the CTMs and the general human rights protection and security balance based emphasis of the EU-SEC II Manual.
Importantly, there was clear support for developing and implementing EU level regulation and policy in the field of Major Events. CEPOL, in particular, was seen as central to doing this in terms of realizing the Stockholm Programme’s objectives and the development of international cooperation accordingly. In particular, the potential to produce what one representative described as “a mature level of national European law enforcement culture” via networking and sharing of best practices.
The potential of the IPO Security Planning model (now being developed in a web-based format) was further confirmed in this light as “the basis of a core of minimum regulations” within the EU’s programme and EMER was seen as needing to become a primary development concern of The House with regard to online access to common experience based information.
As another representative put it with reference to the international dynamic that defines Major Events as object of strategic interest for the development of common EU policy: “It’s necessary to understand that Major Events are no longer the problem of one single country but a continental issue.” This echoed an overall recognition contained in the replies to the effect that a European police approach to Major Events is important because of what may be called the ‘cosmopolitan nature’ of the events and their participants.
Centrally, the Stockholm Programme points out one of the major challenges facing the development of international police cooperation in Europe. Discussed in the introduction to the EU-SEC II Manual in terms of ‘balance’, it is the need to ensure respect for fundamental freedoms and integrity while guaranteeing security in Europe: striking the right balance between law enforcement measures and measures to safeguard individual rights, the rule of law and international protection rules, is of paramount importance. Based on the findings of the three macro task studies, The House continues to see itself as being well placed to facilitate and promote such a common approach.
As indicated in the EU-SEC II Manual and further evidence in the three studies that informed this D3.1 report for THE HOUSE project, the specific services of The House CTMs are not provided by any other existing organization. They fulfil key objectives for Consortium Partners in relation to Major Event security planning. Including:
• The promotion of the standardization of Major Event security across the EU, ensuring that citizens face similar experiences (e.g. Security Standards, Media Management)
• The facilitation of effective design of best-practice security plans for Major Events (e.g. the IPO Security Model)
• The facilitation of enhanced cooperation between Consortium Partners over the sharing of knowledge, resources and experiences (e.g. STEP & EMER)
• The provision of a forum to develop unique solutions to emerging Major Event security issues (e.g. Networking & Training/CEPOL)
• The building of stronger relationships and enhanced innovation between the public and private sectors (e.g. PPPs)

Submission of Report to Relevant EC Policy Groups
The purpose of the D 3.1 report was to consolidate the evidence-based policy suggestions produced by the three Task studies for WP3. Intended for EU consideration as policy options, they concern the coordination and development of ‘common standards’ in the field of security planning for Major Events in Europe among hosting Member States. They represent the informed views and opinions of operational security planners on behalf of their national police authorities as stakeholders in EU policy development. The three individual Task reports upon which D3.1 was based were presented to the Consortium for further discussion and comment at the project’s third Network Steering Committee (NSC) in April 2013. The main messages coming from the Consortium for the purpose of EU policy suggestion to the European Commission were to:

1. Emphasize the strategic potential Major Event Security to the European Commission (EC) for the development of a common approach to policing in Europe.

2. Seek EC help to support the consolidation of existing EU policies that concern themselves with Major Event Security and international cooperation over its planning.

3. Ensure EC recognition of the need to share best practices and lessons learnt in the field of Major Event Security and EC acknowledgment of The House as an established European network of stakeholders in that field as a potential supporting mechanism.

The D 3.1 report was compiled with those views in mind. More particular views expressed by different groups, however, included recognition of the following issues that can also be stated here in conclusion:
1. The House ‘Major Event’ definition as based on the need for international cooperation is appropriate for strategic EU policy development and comparison of local definitions is not required.

2. The EC can act as a gateway for the D3.1 report to the relevant EU policy working parties (Law Enforcement Working Party & Terrorism Working Party) affecting the strategic convergence of their Major Events and Football Handbooks.

3. The strategic objective for policing in Europe rest in a commonality based upon values of the rule of law, democratic accountability and the European Convention on Human Rights.

4. The continued development of a common technical language as terminology, beyond just that of a common taxonomy (as a technical classification system) remains important.

5. The importance of understanding the deep-seated historical and cultural differences that are built into and expressed by policing institutions in different EU countries needs to be recognized in EU policy implementation and a ‘ground-up’ approach to policy based commonality allowed for.

6. The EU needs a forum for the continued discussion of strategic and tactical issues concerning Major Event Security Planning and that The House has the potential to provide it.

7. The sharing of hard (as well as soft) lessons learned and acceptance of constructive criticism between peers would be more acceptable and workable if done in confidence and reports restricted.

8. More recognition should be made of the fact that Major Event Security Planning involves a multi-agency approach at a transnational as well as international level – e.g. use of transnational EU instruments such as Frontex and Europol.

9. That the strategic opportunities presented by Major Events should be stressed for the relevant funding lobbies in respect of the EU’s ‘Horizon 2020’ funding programme’s ‘security’ allocations.

10. That the Task 3.3 report’s proposals concerning evaluation reporting mechanisms should be developed, with The House as a ready body of resources and contacts to help facilitate it.

Overall, the proposals of the three reports were met with approval. They can be taken as rough ideas generally acceptable to the NSC for continued development with the above areas of interest in mind. A critical point that was made and must be recognized is that there still seems to be a gap between THE HOUSE Project and its practical connection with or relationship to EU policy development.

Deliverable 3.2
Deliverable 3.2 (The feasibility study) is the culmination of the work of Task 3.4 and it’s role is to set the basis for the long-term sustainability of The House and for the future provision of coordination assistance to European security policy-makers. UNICRI, as Task 3.4 leader, has been responsible for the development of the feasibility study (designing the structure and drafting it) in consultation with the rest of the Consortium.
Based on the data collected at CTM provisions and the consultation and discussion with the Consortium, it is clear that there is a great desire to finally convert the sound theoretical basis of research conducted during EU-SEC, EU-SEC II and THE HOUSE project, into a product which can offer concrete practical assistance to security planners. The Consortium has agreed on the manner in which this vision can be realized and that is through the development of an electronic security planning tool which will offer all of the services of The House in one place. It will make use of CTM 1 – The IPO Security Planning Model as its starting point and will seek to incorporate CTM 2 – Public Private Partnerships, CTM 3 – Media Management and CTM 4 – Ethical and operational guidelines for the use of security products. It will further be purposely designed to facilitate the incorporation of the databases which prototypes were developed within THE HOUSE Project, STEP (The Special Technical Equipment Tool) and EMER (European Major Events Register). It will further incorporate CTM 7 – Training. In addition to these parts of THE HOUSE project which are to be consolidated together, the web based planning tool will incorporate a number of other databases for development which will be outlined below. All of the databases of the electronic planning tool, while potentially being stand alone in their own right, will be navigable and interlinked on one platform.
The findings of Deliverable 2.2 and Deliverable 2.3 clearly indicate that the standards of The House represent best practices as common planning and evaluation standards for major event security in Europe. Furthermore, the findings of Deliverable 3.1 have demonstrated the large potential of the services of The House, and their coordinative effect, for the implementation of the Stockholm Programme.
The conclusions from these reports also clearly dictate that in order to best support the activities of European security planners, The House should be developed into an all encompassing electronic security planning tool. The result of further consultation with partners was an unanimous approval for the development of such a electronic security planning tool based on the structure of an updated version of the IPO Security Planning Model and of the tools and methodologies and databases of The House.
The work of Task 2.1 in developing STEP and EMER revealed the potential for databases to serve the needs of security planners and opened up a range of possibilities for the interaction of such a tool with a number of other relevant databases (including some not featured in The House Project) to support the planners in their practical work.
The work of Task 2.4 revealed the extent of training gaps/needs in the training currently available to European security planners and therefore the potential for training tailored to these specific needs. The Training component of The House and the electronic security planning tool described in the D 3.2 report can clearly have a symbiotic relationship in that the tool can be linked to a training database for major events security planners thus promoting the training activities of The House. On the other hand, there will be a need for training on the use of the electronic security planning tool including table top simulation exercises where security planners are presented with a hypothetical set of circumstances for a major event and must use the electronic security planning tool to plan the security for the event in light of all the available information.
The idea behind such a tool is that it will provide security planners with a “one stop shop” to construct their security plans and research the best options available to them. In this respect, it has been a clear thread throughout the consultation process that the tool should not be prescriptive but instead allow for security planners to pick and choose the relevant elements based on the peculiarities of the particular event. Furthermore, it was made clear that given that it is envisaged to be used by security planners directly, it should not be over-complicated - its interface should be sufficiently detailed but at the same time interactive and user-friendly.
A number of advantages were identified in an electronic security planning tool such as the one outlined here. Inherent in such a system would be the possibility of interaction with a range of databases and checklists which support the activities of security planners. The simplicity of the system to update the progress in the planning process also makes it very easy for security planners to present interactive briefings of ongoing and completed stages of the planning processes to their planning teams.
Further benefits of an electronic planning tool over a paper one include the possibility of update and translation much more easily than a hard copy version. This will make it more easily available and cheaper to produce and update in accordance with changing needs and improved best practices and technologies. It is envisaged, however, that a paper version of the IPO Security Planning Model will also be maintained and regularly updated in the future.

Deliverable 4.2
The User Guide elaborated as D 4.2 has attempted to consolidate the underpinning ideas and main outputs of the development of coordination assistance services for major event security planning over the course of The House Project and for the practical reference and application of security planners and policy makers.
In conclusion, the following points that have emerged from Consortium discussion concerning the continuation of The House as a contributor to the development of common standards and policies for Major Event Security Planning in Europe can be made:
- The strategic potential Major Event Security for the development of a common approach to policing in Europe (via international cooperation over its planning) is valid and needs to be further emphasized in EU Policy development.
-
- The House is an established European network of EU policy stakeholders in the field of Major Event Security and potential supporting mechanism for the EC’s recognition of the need to share best practices and lessons learned in that growing field of studies and practices.

This User Guide has been compiled with those views in mind. More particular views expressed by The House include recognition of the following issues that can also be stated here in conclusion:
- The House ‘Major Event’ definition as based on the need for international cooperation is appropriate for strategic EU policy development. Comparison of local definitions is not required.

- The EC can act as a gateway for The House to the relevant EU policy working parties (LEWP & TWP) affecting the strategic convergence of their Major Events and Football Handbooks.

- The strategic objective for policing in Europe rests in a commonality based upon values of the rule of law, democratic accountability and the European Convention on Human Rights.

- The continued development of a common technical language as terminology remains important.

- The importance of understanding the deep-seated historical and cultural differences that are built into and expressed by policing institutions in different EU countries needs to be recognized in EU policy implementation and a ‘ground-up’ approach to commonality allowed for.

- The EU needs a forum for the continued discussion of strategic and tactical issues concerning Major Event Security Planning and that The House has the potential to provide it.

- The sharing of hard (as well as soft) lessons learned and acceptance of constructive criticism between peers is more acceptable and workable if done in confidence and reports restricted.

- More recognition should be made of the fact that Major Event Security Planning involves a multi-agency approach at a transnational as well as international level – e.g. use of transnational EU instruments such as Frontex and Europol.

Potential Impact:
Security in the EU requires an integrated approach where professionals share a common culture, effectively pool information and have appropriate technological infrastructure to support them. This project provided a response to these needs as well advancing the coordination of European research in the field. The project responded to the recommendation included in the Stockholm Programme that consideration is given to the establishment of ad hoc law enforcement cooperation at sporting events or large public gatherings.
The basic assumption of the Project was that Major Events are “windows of opportunity” insofar as they require a strong inter-agency coordination at national and regional level, the use of extra-ordinary resources and the definition of specific security plans. Additionally, often the security planning for a Major Event facilitates the elaboration and adoption of new strategies, tactics and techniques which might have a long-lasting impact on the standard national security planning of a country. This is why, by definition, a coordination action focusing on security at Major Events has the potential to significantly impact on the European security and policing approach well beyond the scope of the event itself.
This theoretical assumption has been proven within the framework of the EU-SEC/EU-SEC II projects. Starting from 2004, these two initiatives were able not only to synchronise their partners and create a robust cooperation platform among 22 EU Member States but also to elaborate effective coordination methodologies endorsed by all the participants.
The guidelines and common standards elaborated by EU-SEC II in a number of fields, from PPP to media management and, in general, security planning, opened the path toward a common policing approach in Europe. In addition, this approach fully responded to the specific needs of the end-users and security planners in the area of major event security planning. Consequently, the project has built upon and used the bottom-up approach developed and strengthened by EU-SEC II, ensuring continually improved communication, the establishment of a culture of reciprocal knowledge and trust-building as well as the systematic exchange of information and good practice. Further, the specific contents of The House project built upon the research priorities and strategic issues identified by EU-SEC II.
In this respect, the project took full advantage of this successful existing example of end-users cooperation by further enhancing the existing networking, coordination and cooperation of the EU-SEC II Consortium members, via The House.
The scope of The House was initially restricted to the EU Member States involved in the project, which were also the main beneficiaries of its services. Nevertheless, the Network Steering Committee has considered the possibility in the future of requests of admission coming from other Member States or Associated Countries. The rationale of this choice being that the core acquis of The House, i.e. its common standards and services, could be extended to the requesting countries willing to adopt its standards in order to further extend its impact, also outside the boundaries of the EU.
The national authorities in charge of security at Major Events have benefited from the improved coordination of research programmes in this field mainly in terms of effective strategic instruments at their disposal for the best planning of Major Events security. It has also been a very innovative aspect of the project that the services of The House have been provided on the basis of a “peer mechanism” through which the security planners/research managers of each requesting country have assisted by their counterparts from other EU countries. The potential impact of the project has been greatly increased by the inclusion of 8 test events instead of two to three as originally envisaged by the project document. There are a number of reasons why this was decided as advantageous. Most obviously, the inclusion of extra events ensures a much greater sample size of data upon which to base the findings of the project reports and thus ensures that these findings are more representative of the European context but there were many more complex reasons for the inclusion of extra test events, they are explained in detail now.
The staging of 8 test events instead of the original figure proposed in the project document is seen by the whole Consortium as very important to achieve a good balance between different types of events and to have a proper examination of each CTM. The EU-SEC II manual, whose taxonomy of major event typology forms the basis of The House project understanding of major events, contains a classification of major events dividing them into the following four categories:

• Political (e.g. international summits, state visits, meetings of the European Council)
• Sporting (e.g. international championships, Olympic games, marathons and comparable events)
• Cultural (e.g. international scale street carnivals, music festivals, religious celebrations, etc.)
• Other (e.g. major scientific conferences or commercial expos, or other events not fitting the above)

It was necessary, during the testing phase, to try to test the CTMs and the provision of assistance to national security planners, in relation to as many different event types as possible. In addition, in order to focus on the specific needs of the Task Teams of Work Package 2, it was necessary to conduct some of the test events in relation to pre-event planning and others in relation to post-event evaluation of the security planning processes.
It was also decided at the onset of the project that, given the level of detail involved in each CTM, it was not feasible to test more than two CTMs at any one CTM provision, in fact where CTM 1 (The IPO Security Planning Model) was involved, the scale of this CTM meant that it was necessary to involve it in a number of CTM provision meetings, in some cases whole meetings just concerning CTM 1, as it is by far the CTM with the most detail. In total five of the CTMs were tested over the course of the project in a number of different ways.
In terms of the political events involved in the testing phase of the project, once more than one partners requested a test event involving their hosting of the EU Presidency, it became a very interesting proposition in terms of data collection to test the same event in different Member States. The modality of the Council of the European Union for conducting “trio presidencies” was taken as an inspiration to experiment with something similar for the security planning of the presidencies also. In this respect, during the CTM provision in Ireland, the workshop involved security planners from: Cyprus, who hosted the presidency in the second half of 2012; Lithuania, who were the next to take the presidency after Ireland (in the second half of 2013); and Greece, who will host the presidency in the first half of 2014. In the case of this meeting the focus was on Media management issues and the IPO Security Planning Model in terms of post event evaluation of security plans. Then during the CTM provision for the presidency in Lithuania, the same format was followed. This meeting focused solely on the IPO Security Planning Model but, differently from in Ireland, it focused on the pre event planning thus examining a different dimension of the model. The modality in which these two events were conducted, bringing together four hosts of the EU Presidency (recent, current and future) was a great success in terms of passing on lessons learned from one event to the next and it is something which will be carried forward as a best practice by the Consortium in future.
The EU presidency is a six month long event which involves years of planning; it is a huge security operation with large scale opening and closing ceremonies but also with high level events and meetings taking place throughout the presidency, it is therefore not a regular political summit, like another of the test events – The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in the Netherlands. The NSS offered a very useful test event as it is a more regular type of political summit, lasting only a few days but equally involving a long planning process.
In terms of sporting events, the CTMs were also tested in a wide variety of settings. Similar to the proposition of using the two EU presidencies to test different CTMs and different aspects of the same CTMs, a unique opportunity presented itself when Poland requested to host two CTM provision meetings in relation to two sporting events over the course of the project. This allowed CTM 1 (The IPO security Planning Model) to be tested in relation to pre-event planning and post-event evaluation within the same national framework and in terms of the same type of major event – sporting. The gap between the two CTM provision meetings in Poland also allowed an analysis, one year on, of the impact of the first CTM provision meeting, especially concerning the IPO Security Planning Model given that it was presented once again. Thus when CTM 1 was presented during the CTM Provision for the Euro Volleyball event, it was not the first time many of the security planners had received a presentation on the IPO Planning Model. This was very evident from the presentation “Planning the security for the CEV European Volleyball Championship” which was made by a representative of the National Police. This presentation was structured following the 12 elements of the IPO Planning Model and looking at how the security planners considered each element in the planning for the CEV European Volleyball Championships. This was a very effective format as it allowed the audience to see exactly how the planners considered each aspect of the CTM and why some aspects were favored over others due to the peculiarities of the event.
In terms of empirical research, testing the same thing on different subjects and testing different things on the same subject, is an ideal way of ensuring a good comparative analysis. The House project was very fortunate to be able to achieve exactly this in many cases, especially in the cases of the two EU presidencies and the two events in Poland.
In relation to the European Athletics Championships in Finland, since 2010, these championships are now held every two years instead of every four years, as was previously the case thus affecting the timeframe for handover of the event between hosts and for consultation with the security planning authorities of previous hosts in respect of issues that may have arisen. As such, the proposition of planning the security for this event has changed drastically and, in addition, it is now an event that will be shared amongst the member States on a much more regular basis, making it a very interesting test event. Finland also provided an interesting opportunity to look at the management of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) from the perspective of a western EU Member State where PPP is a well established practice, whereas the other test event involving PPP was in Slovakia, providing a different perspective in a context of a less established system of PPP.
All of these previously mentioned sporting events were large scale security operations which lasted for a number of weeks. The project had the opportunity to test its methodologies on a different type of sporting event with the World Cup Qualification Match between Bulgaria and Italy, a one off fixture which itself involved a huge security operation. This event was particularly interesting as a test event given the history between the two teams. The last football game involving these two teams was marred with riots in 2008 and therefore this presented an opportunity for a test event where the historical background of the involved parties was one of the most important factors in the security planning considerations.
The Rainbow March in Bratislava, Slovakia provided a large scale cultural major event. As a test subject, it was chosen as it was a very interesting proposition offering a large scale security operation with the backdrop of some very sensitive and divisive issues such as sexual and gender rights, the rights of minorities and the right of freedom of expression. The presence of these issues and the fact that protests against the staging of the event were very likely made this a very interesting test event for Media Management, looking at the interaction between the Police and media, especially with the onset of citizen journalism and social media. It therefore provided something completely different from any of the other test events. In addition, as mentioned above Slovakia also provided a different perspective on Public Private Partnerships (PPP) – that of an eastern EU Member State where PPP is a relatively new concept, whereas the other test event involving PPP was in Finland, where the use of PPP is more widespread.
The use of such a wide variety of events allowed for the gradual collection of a large amount of varied data over the course of the project in the form of security planner feedback from the very first CTM Provision.
The role of UNICRI in this respect has been to ensure the smooth functioning of this coordination mechanism.
A number of elements that are considered as being the main added value of The House Project are listed below:
• The presence among the Consortium members of all the countries that hosted Major Events in Europe between 2012 and 2014 facilitated The House to be linked to the most relevant Major Events taking place in Europe. This provided a sounding board for The House’s technical assistance services and common standards;
• Major Events security research coordination strengthens the European Research Area (ERA) via the application of the effective research coordination tools/methodologies of The House, which have been identified to meet national exigencies;
• The implementation of the services offered by The House during specific Major Events constitutes a valid example of how the coordination of research can contribute to strengthen the European Research Area and, at the same time, respond to the end-users demand to receive strategic support from peer colleagues;
• The standards, guidelines and common procedures to coordinate the research in this area in Europe have reinforced and have been mutually reinforced by the existing policing codes, norms and legislation and have made a step further toward the adoption of a common policing approach across Europe;
• The partner led tasks, in addition to analysing the applicability of The House standards as common European standards, were devoted to analyse, in parallel to the provision of The House’s services, how these services foster the compliance of the European countries with the provisions of the Stockholm Programme. In this regard, the fact that the Consortium was made of security research programme owners, programme managers, Police and security end-users, ensured that the results of these tasks were put directly into practical use;
• All the coordination tolls/methodologies offered by the House resulted orininated from the application of a bottom-up approach during the predecessor projects (EU-SEC and EU-SEC II) where the end-users of such services have been involved in their design from the beginning. Consequently, the House responds to the specific needs of the security end-users groups;
• The application of the research coordination tools/methodologies offered by The House supports the better management and use of available technical, human and financial resources.
• The EU national authorities have received support from The House responding to the provisions of the Stockholm Programme and Internal Security Strategy;
• The project has been continually crafted and implemented to avoid overlap with other European research in these areas thus avoiding duplication of efforts and fragmentation of ideas in the ERA in this field of activity. This was achieved by consulting with Consortium partners who were also partners in other European fora dealing with issues related to Major Events security policies on potential overlap and duplication of effort. This was also greatly aided by the involvement of representatives from Europol and CEPOL on The House Project Advisory Board to provide further input in this respect.
• The House collaboration with the CEPOL for the definition of training curricula and activities on Major Events security ensures the widest possible adoption of the services of The House among the European security community;
• The research coordination tools/methodologies offered by the House are directly available to be used by all Member State national authorities.
• The Feasibility Study aimed at studying the future of The House after completion of the current project, emphasizing the strategic goal of the Consortium to ensure an impact of The House in the long-term and well beyond the scope of The House project. It outlined how The House can become a tool at the disposal of European security planners and the relevant European institutions to permanently foster the coordination of Major Events security in Europe and, more in general, the adoption of a common policing approach across the Union.
• The direct link of The House project with other European entities involved in the definition and implementation of the security policies in Europe, via its Advisory Board (Europol and CEPOL), ensured an even larger impact for this initiative.
• It is important to note that the full long term impact of The House in terms of coordination of European security planning and policing can only be truly realised with the development of the electronic security planning tool which was outlined in Deliverable 3.4 (The Feasibility Study). This vision for the future of European security planning has been elaborated on the basis of the feedback obtained from European security planners throughout the testing phase of The House project and is unanimously approved by The House Consortium as the means by which to reach the long term goal of The House – to achieve a common security planning and policing approach in Europe.
• In addition, European security product suppliers will directly benefit from improved coordination of national research programmes and policies through a coordinated platform of end-users to interface with, who have a critical mass of their interlocutors. In essence, by reinforcing the Institutional European Market of security end-users, this ERA-NET project will facilitate a more effective response to the exigencies for security products at national and European level.
• The House has positioned itself to act as a coordinated platform of Member States that through the application of the research coordination tools/methodologies that it offers will lead to a common approach to security planning. It would also facilitate the use of the common taxonomy developed in EU-SEC II that will further assist to bridge the gap between end-users (national authorities in charge of security at Major Events), technology suppliers (private sector) and experts/researchers.

In sum, The House Project has arrived at this stage where: the consortium, led by UNICRI, has established a strong Europe wide network of security experts in all areas of major event security planning, ready to assist the planners of other Member States upon such a request; the prototype of the databases to support the activities of major event security planners have been developed; it has been found that the services it offers are representative of common European standards; a mechanism for the provision of assistance in relation to these service has been fine tuned; a curriculum of training in relation to the services of The House has been developed; and, successful collaboration with CEPOL has ensured that such training can be carried out with the support of the volume of experience of CEPOL in organizing and delivering such training.

final1-deliverable-5-30-video-footage-to-promote-the-consortium-s-work.pdf

Powiązane dokumenty

final1-deliverable-5-30-video-footage-to-promote-the-consortium-s-work.pdf

Final Report Summary - THE HOUSE (Enhancing European Coordination for National Research Programmes in the Area of Security at Major Events)

Powiązane dokumenty

Udostępnij tę stronę

Pobierz