The Carthaginian defeat in the First Punic War (264-241 BC) marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of Carthage. Ruined by crippling economic investment resulting from the war and taxes imposed by Rome; discredited internationally for the loss of Sicily; and terrified by the advance of Libyan rebels and mercenaries towards Carthage; the future of the Phoenician city appeared grim. However, the undefeated general Hamilcar Barca took advantage of this critical juncture to gain the political support needed to carry out his socio-economic policies. The Carthaginian commander managed to put an end to the military conflict that was devastating the Carthaginian territories of North Africa and started an unprecedented campaign of territorial expansion. Thus, in less than twenty years, Carthage had not only compensated for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia but had extended its territorial power and its economic capacity to the point of being able to hold the Second Punic War on several fronts and to seriously jeopardize the final Roman victory. It is, in this sense, a key period in Ancient History as both its development and its outcome had consequences in the short, medium and long-term for most of the populations which inhabited the western half of the Mediterranean. During the last two years, we have been working on understanding the relationship between war and agriculture in the Carthaginian Empire during the late third century BC. We have been analyzing the way in which agricultural production was affected by the mobilization of tens of thousands of soldiers over a period of more than 30 years and, in turn, the way in which social, economic and military policies of the Carthaginian Empire were conditioned by these agricultural resources. We have developed a new method to estimate the agricultural production through a capacity calculation of the Carthaginian amphorae. This kind of pottery transport containers was used in the late third century BC for the export of agricultural surpluses and, as we have demonstrated, for supplying the Carthaginian army. Indeed, a study on their distribution has shown a direct relationship between the export of these amphorae and the main war fronts and the location of the Carthaginian outposts during Second Punic War. We have also analyzed one of the main measures undertaken by the Barcid commander to encourage an increase in agricultural production but also a land trade growth. We have been able to determine that these measures were two: first, they created dense surveillance system with huge interconnected watchtowers devoted to secure trade routes and to protect farmlands. Second, they gave some land grants for veterans for their settlement in the new territories under the Carthaginian rule as a reward for the long services but to protect the new settlers as well. We have also thoroughly studied the cost involved in maintaining the Carthaginian armies during the different phases of the conflict and the benefits obtained by Carthage from the exploitation of agricultural and, especially, mining resources. The results have shown that the balance during the first years of the war was very beneficial to Carthage and its Empire, but the loss of the Iberian New Carthage and its close mining district in 209 BC changed everything and, possibly, even explained the final Carthaginian defeat. Precisely in Carthago Nova’s hinterland, where the mining resources get along with other resources, like fishing, agricultural and salt-mines, we have conducted a field survey that has allowed us to define the Carthaginian economic pattern of exploitation of all these resources and its relation to the Barcid administration and the coexistence between state mining factories and private salt-fish factories and farms.
