Periodic Reporting for period 1 - JBinBA (Joint Bodies in Bilateral Agreements)
Okres sprawozdawczy: 2019-10-01 do 2021-09-30
One of the EU's key functions is to represent its 27 member states in international negotiations. For example, the EU has ‘exclusive’ competences in trade, which means that EU member states cannot conclude trade agreements on their own but have to rely on the European Commission to negotiate them. Also outside trade, the Commission often takes the lead in international negotiations, such as when concluding fisheries or cooperation agreements.
These international agreements spell important consequences for citizens in the EU and in third countries. For example, trade agreements may subject some businesses inside the EU to increased foreign competition but help other EU businesses to sell their goods and services abroad. At the same time, gaining access to the EU’s huge single market can help businesses in third countries. Still, all international agreements not only need to be concluded – they also need to be implemented. For example, certain provisions in agreements are very complex to turn into practice and may require further discussions among the EU and third country. Or new issues may come up, which have not been anticipated at the time of the negotiations.
To meet this demand for continued discussions, agreements often set up what we call ‘joint bodies’ (JBs). The names of these JBs vary, but examples include association councils (e.g. the EU-Turkey Association Council), cooperation councils (e.g. the EU-Uzbekistan Cooperation Council), joint committees (e.g. the CETA Joint Committee) or also joint working groups (e.g. the Joint Technical Working Group on nuclear energy with the USA). Overall, we identified almost 300 international agreements concluded by the EU since 1992 that set up at least one JB. Beyond meeting regularly, discussing problems, and issuing recommendations, half of them can even take decisions or amend agreements.
Another interesting aspect of JBs is that they, generally, put the European Commission in a good position to shape EU external relations. International agreements are often broad, which means that JBs can have an impact on many different areas. The Commission usually plays a key role in JBs. In about three quarters of them, for example, the Commission represents the EU. In 40 percent, it only needs support from a (qualified) majority of EU member states to define the EU position for JB meetings. Overall, the Commission is the primary beneficiary of JBs, enabling it to defend and promote EU interests during the implementation of international agreements.
In summary, this project made a significant contribution to our understanding of JBs. While it has come to an end, our interest in studying JBs is stronger than ever. For a continuously updated summary of our efforts to better understand JBs, please visit http://markus-gastinger.eu/joint-bodies/.
These international agreements spell important consequences for citizens in the EU and in third countries. For example, trade agreements may subject some businesses inside the EU to increased foreign competition but help other EU businesses to sell their goods and services abroad. At the same time, gaining access to the EU’s huge single market can help businesses in third countries. Still, all international agreements not only need to be concluded – they also need to be implemented. For example, certain provisions in agreements are very complex to turn into practice and may require further discussions among the EU and third country. Or new issues may come up, which have not been anticipated at the time of the negotiations.
To meet this demand for continued discussions, agreements often set up what we call ‘joint bodies’ (JBs). The names of these JBs vary, but examples include association councils (e.g. the EU-Turkey Association Council), cooperation councils (e.g. the EU-Uzbekistan Cooperation Council), joint committees (e.g. the CETA Joint Committee) or also joint working groups (e.g. the Joint Technical Working Group on nuclear energy with the USA). Overall, we identified almost 300 international agreements concluded by the EU since 1992 that set up at least one JB. Beyond meeting regularly, discussing problems, and issuing recommendations, half of them can even take decisions or amend agreements.
Another interesting aspect of JBs is that they, generally, put the European Commission in a good position to shape EU external relations. International agreements are often broad, which means that JBs can have an impact on many different areas. The Commission usually plays a key role in JBs. In about three quarters of them, for example, the Commission represents the EU. In 40 percent, it only needs support from a (qualified) majority of EU member states to define the EU position for JB meetings. Overall, the Commission is the primary beneficiary of JBs, enabling it to defend and promote EU interests during the implementation of international agreements.
In summary, this project made a significant contribution to our understanding of JBs. While it has come to an end, our interest in studying JBs is stronger than ever. For a continuously updated summary of our efforts to better understand JBs, please visit http://markus-gastinger.eu/joint-bodies/.
This project had the usual 24 project months but span over the three-year period due to a part-time reduction of the fellow’s working time. It was hosted at the Paris Lodron University of Salzburg (PLUS) and implemented by Dr. Markus Gastinger as Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow and supervised by Prof. Andreas Dür (https://sites.google.com/site/andduer/).
The project has three primary scientific outputs:
1) An article published in the Journal of European Public Policy on why some JBs are ‘stronger’ than others (e.g. meeting more frequently, at higher levels, taking decisions). We argue that stronger JBs generate greater costs and are primarily included in agreements promising greater benefits. Benefits, in turn, are greater if implementation helps the EU attain its goals (which is generally the case with bigger states), parties are interdependent (generally with geographically closer countries), and agreements with a broad scope. Drawing on an original dataset of 547 international agreements concluded by the EU since 1992 generated by this project, we find strong support for our argument. The article is available open access here: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2079708.
2) Another article published in European Union Politics on how much discretion the European Commission enjoys in JBs. Drawing on a principal–agent framework, we find that in complex agreements, agreements ratified by QMV in the Council, and if EU member states have different (policy) preferences, the Commission has more discretion. We furthermore suggest that JBs give the Commission ample opportunities to shape EU external relations. Our results are based on another original dataset covering nearly 300 joint bodies since 1992, not only based on agreement full texts but also ratification documents. This article is available open access here: https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165211027397.
3) A third article, which is not yet available in peer-reviewed form, explains the inclusion of JBs in trade agreements of the EU and beyond. This article draws on a third dataset including JB strength in over 500 PTAs that was, again, originally generated by this project. This article should be published in 2023. For updates, please visit http://markus-gastinger.eu/joint-bodies/.
In addition, the fellow has increased his skills and enhanced his career prospects through a number of other actions and achievements, such as three more peer-reviewed journal articles resulting from papers begun before the start of this project (including one devising an ‘EU Exit Index’ available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165211000138) seven blog posts, nine presentations at international scientific conferences, peer reviewing for international journals fourteen times, attendance of three methods’ schools, joining the Steering Committee of the ECPR SGIR (see https://standinggroups.ecpr.eu/sgir/) formation of a working group on European Integration at the School of Education (see https://www.plus.ac.at/soe/forschung/europaische-integration/) and successful applications for a Lise Meitner Fellowship at the Austrian Science Fund (https://pf.fwf.ac.at/en/research-in-practice/project-finder/55383) and a postdoc position at the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies (SCEUS).
The project has three primary scientific outputs:
1) An article published in the Journal of European Public Policy on why some JBs are ‘stronger’ than others (e.g. meeting more frequently, at higher levels, taking decisions). We argue that stronger JBs generate greater costs and are primarily included in agreements promising greater benefits. Benefits, in turn, are greater if implementation helps the EU attain its goals (which is generally the case with bigger states), parties are interdependent (generally with geographically closer countries), and agreements with a broad scope. Drawing on an original dataset of 547 international agreements concluded by the EU since 1992 generated by this project, we find strong support for our argument. The article is available open access here: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2079708.
2) Another article published in European Union Politics on how much discretion the European Commission enjoys in JBs. Drawing on a principal–agent framework, we find that in complex agreements, agreements ratified by QMV in the Council, and if EU member states have different (policy) preferences, the Commission has more discretion. We furthermore suggest that JBs give the Commission ample opportunities to shape EU external relations. Our results are based on another original dataset covering nearly 300 joint bodies since 1992, not only based on agreement full texts but also ratification documents. This article is available open access here: https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165211027397.
3) A third article, which is not yet available in peer-reviewed form, explains the inclusion of JBs in trade agreements of the EU and beyond. This article draws on a third dataset including JB strength in over 500 PTAs that was, again, originally generated by this project. This article should be published in 2023. For updates, please visit http://markus-gastinger.eu/joint-bodies/.
In addition, the fellow has increased his skills and enhanced his career prospects through a number of other actions and achievements, such as three more peer-reviewed journal articles resulting from papers begun before the start of this project (including one devising an ‘EU Exit Index’ available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165211000138) seven blog posts, nine presentations at international scientific conferences, peer reviewing for international journals fourteen times, attendance of three methods’ schools, joining the Steering Committee of the ECPR SGIR (see https://standinggroups.ecpr.eu/sgir/) formation of a working group on European Integration at the School of Education (see https://www.plus.ac.at/soe/forschung/europaische-integration/) and successful applications for a Lise Meitner Fellowship at the Austrian Science Fund (https://pf.fwf.ac.at/en/research-in-practice/project-finder/55383) and a postdoc position at the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies (SCEUS).
Overall, this project has contributed significantly to the scholarly and public understanding of JBs in the EU. The lack of systematic data on the existence and strength of joint bodies in EU agreements has been closed. Moreover, our understanding of the inter-institutional dynamic of JBs with regard to the European Commission, Council of the EU, and European Parliament received a major boost. Thanks to this project, we have a much greater understanding of JBs, whose actions can spell important socio-economic effects inside and outside the EU.
In terms of potential impact, we are making a sustained effort to establish JBs as a distinct type of intergovernmental organization (IGO) and key institutional form structuring international relations beyond the EU. Our work on JBs in trade agreements will help us learn more about how the EU uses these bodies compared to other international actors. This will drive home the point that the EU is far from the only actor to use JBs. We are optimistic that JBs will eventually spill over into the literature on International Relations (IR) and more work on joint bodies, not only by us but also by other colleagues, will soon come to pass. Our project may thus leave a mark on the scholarly literature on IR and global governance, more broadly.
In terms of potential impact, we are making a sustained effort to establish JBs as a distinct type of intergovernmental organization (IGO) and key institutional form structuring international relations beyond the EU. Our work on JBs in trade agreements will help us learn more about how the EU uses these bodies compared to other international actors. This will drive home the point that the EU is far from the only actor to use JBs. We are optimistic that JBs will eventually spill over into the literature on International Relations (IR) and more work on joint bodies, not only by us but also by other colleagues, will soon come to pass. Our project may thus leave a mark on the scholarly literature on IR and global governance, more broadly.