Periodic Reporting for period 3 - KNOWLEDGELAB (Knowledge-First Social Epistemology)
Okres sprawozdawczy: 2024-01-01 do 2025-06-30
KnowledgeLab develops a new, knowledge-first research programme for social epistemology.
Social epistemology investigates the epistemic effects of social interactions: e.g. how we gain knowledge from social sources (others’ testimony, the media), how we should respond to disagreement, how groups (scientific teams, organisations) can know. It is among the most thriving areas in contemporary philosophy.
We are highly social creatures, dependent on each other for flourishing in all walks of life. Our epistemic endeavours make no exception: due to our physical, geographical, and psychological limitations, most of the knowledge we have is sourced in social interactions. We must inescapably rely on the intellectual labour of others, from those we know and trust well, to those whose epistemic credentials we take for granted online. Results in social epistemology have wide, direct impact on: (1) scientific practice (e.g. concerning academic publishing, guidelines for scientific authorship and collaboration, knowledge policy and debates over the role of the Internet in knowledge transmission and creation); (2) society at large (e.g. concerning voting, legal standards for criminal conviction, cross-cultural communication barriers, licensing mass communication policies, increasing social cohesion).
KnowledgeLab develops a novel research programme for social epistemology, one that puts knowledge first: it starts with the function of social epistemic interactions, i.e. that of generating knowledge, and investigates the epistemic normative structure that is borne out by this function: how should we proceed in social epistemic interactions in order to generate knowledge? KnowledgeLab employs this methodology in the service of the epistemology of testimony, disagreement, and groups, and develops an integrated account of the epistemology of the media. This framework is highly relevant in the context of a globalised society, replete with both easy-access information and misinformation: it is more important than ever to know what separates trustworthy sources of information from untrustworthy ones.
Social epistemology investigates the epistemic effects of social interactions: e.g. how we gain knowledge from social sources (others’ testimony, the media), how we should respond to disagreement, how groups (scientific teams, organisations) can know. It is among the most thriving areas in contemporary philosophy.
We are highly social creatures, dependent on each other for flourishing in all walks of life. Our epistemic endeavours make no exception: due to our physical, geographical, and psychological limitations, most of the knowledge we have is sourced in social interactions. We must inescapably rely on the intellectual labour of others, from those we know and trust well, to those whose epistemic credentials we take for granted online. Results in social epistemology have wide, direct impact on: (1) scientific practice (e.g. concerning academic publishing, guidelines for scientific authorship and collaboration, knowledge policy and debates over the role of the Internet in knowledge transmission and creation); (2) society at large (e.g. concerning voting, legal standards for criminal conviction, cross-cultural communication barriers, licensing mass communication policies, increasing social cohesion).
KnowledgeLab develops a novel research programme for social epistemology, one that puts knowledge first: it starts with the function of social epistemic interactions, i.e. that of generating knowledge, and investigates the epistemic normative structure that is borne out by this function: how should we proceed in social epistemic interactions in order to generate knowledge? KnowledgeLab employs this methodology in the service of the epistemology of testimony, disagreement, and groups, and develops an integrated account of the epistemology of the media. This framework is highly relevant in the context of a globalised society, replete with both easy-access information and misinformation: it is more important than ever to know what separates trustworthy sources of information from untrustworthy ones.
A novel , knowledge-first functionalist methodology for social epistemology was developed. This methodological approach takes the function of our practice of inquiry to be generating knowledge, and, in turn, norms governing moves in inquiry - such as social epistemic interactions (e.g. testimonial exchanges, disagreements, group inquiries)- to be governed by norms that drop out of this function.
A novel, knowledge-first account of the epistemology of testimony has been developed and defended. For the first time in the literature, the account deals with both permissions to believe based on the say-so of others, and corresponding duties to believe when presented with testimony from reliable sources. Several important applications of the account have been explored, such as e.g. applications to the nature and rationality of trust and trustworthiness, knowledge resistance, and trustworthy AI.
A novel, knowledge-first account of the epistemology of disagreement has been developed, and applications to issues having to do with bias in group disagreement have been explored.
A novel, knowledge-first account of the nature of group belief and group responsibility has been developed.
A novel account of the nature of disinformation has been developed and defended.
A novel, knowledge-first account of the epistemology of testimony has been developed and defended. For the first time in the literature, the account deals with both permissions to believe based on the say-so of others, and corresponding duties to believe when presented with testimony from reliable sources. Several important applications of the account have been explored, such as e.g. applications to the nature and rationality of trust and trustworthiness, knowledge resistance, and trustworthy AI.
A novel, knowledge-first account of the epistemology of disagreement has been developed, and applications to issues having to do with bias in group disagreement have been explored.
A novel, knowledge-first account of the nature of group belief and group responsibility has been developed.
A novel account of the nature of disinformation has been developed and defended.
(1) Methodology
Traditional methodologies approach social epistemology by starting with either the individual (What are permissible individual doxastic responses to social epistemic interactions?) or the social environment (How should the social environment be in order to facilitate a successful social epistemic interaction?) KnowledgeLab has developed a novel methodology for the field of social epistemology. This methodology analyses what we should believe based on the testimony of others, in cases of disagreement, in cases in which we inquire as a group, and based on media reports, in terms of how conducive these interactions are to us gaining knowledge.
(2) Epistemology of Testimony
KnowledgeLab has developed a novel account of the Epistemology of Testimony according to which hearers are justified to believe what they are being told by speakers just in case they inhabit an environment where testimony is governed by a knowledge norm of the form: 'assert only if you know!', and they don't have independent reasons to distrust the speaker. For the first time in the literature, KnowledgeLab has also developed an account of duties to believe on the say-so of others, which explains what goes wrong in cases in which hearers reject testimony from reliable experts (such as e.g. vaccine and climate change scepticism). On this view, a hearer has a duty to believe what they are told just in case the testimony received puts them in a position to know what they are told.
KnowledgeLab has also developed novel views of rational trust and trustworthiness. On the accounts developed, an agent is trustworthy just in case they have a stable disposition to fulfil their obligations, and one is rational to trust an agent when they are justified to believe they are trustworthy. KnowledgeLab has also developed corresponding theories of trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (AI) and rational trust in AI.
(3) Epistemology of Disagreement
KnowledgeLab has developed the first account of one’s epistemic obligations in the face of real-life disagreement. On this view, when faced with disagreement, one should improve one’s epistemic status via increasing one’s closeness to knowledge.
(4) Epistemology of Groups
KnowledgeLab has developed a novel view of group belief, on which groups are epistemic agents. The account has also been successfully applied to investigate group responsibility and how it transmits to group members..
(5) Epistemology of the Media
KnowledgeLab has developed a novel account of the nature of disinformation, as ignorance-generating content. The account, if correct, carries high stakes upshots, both theoretically and practically: disinformation tracking will need to go well beyond mere fact checking.
Further expected results:
- A full knowledge-first theory of social conceptual engineering and applications to issues in ethics and political philosophy
- Novel accounts of the justification of degrees of belief, epistemic norms governing inquiry, epistemic norms governing attention, the epistemology and semantics of ignorance, interrogative attitudes, the nature and normativity of doubt.
Traditional methodologies approach social epistemology by starting with either the individual (What are permissible individual doxastic responses to social epistemic interactions?) or the social environment (How should the social environment be in order to facilitate a successful social epistemic interaction?) KnowledgeLab has developed a novel methodology for the field of social epistemology. This methodology analyses what we should believe based on the testimony of others, in cases of disagreement, in cases in which we inquire as a group, and based on media reports, in terms of how conducive these interactions are to us gaining knowledge.
(2) Epistemology of Testimony
KnowledgeLab has developed a novel account of the Epistemology of Testimony according to which hearers are justified to believe what they are being told by speakers just in case they inhabit an environment where testimony is governed by a knowledge norm of the form: 'assert only if you know!', and they don't have independent reasons to distrust the speaker. For the first time in the literature, KnowledgeLab has also developed an account of duties to believe on the say-so of others, which explains what goes wrong in cases in which hearers reject testimony from reliable experts (such as e.g. vaccine and climate change scepticism). On this view, a hearer has a duty to believe what they are told just in case the testimony received puts them in a position to know what they are told.
KnowledgeLab has also developed novel views of rational trust and trustworthiness. On the accounts developed, an agent is trustworthy just in case they have a stable disposition to fulfil their obligations, and one is rational to trust an agent when they are justified to believe they are trustworthy. KnowledgeLab has also developed corresponding theories of trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (AI) and rational trust in AI.
(3) Epistemology of Disagreement
KnowledgeLab has developed the first account of one’s epistemic obligations in the face of real-life disagreement. On this view, when faced with disagreement, one should improve one’s epistemic status via increasing one’s closeness to knowledge.
(4) Epistemology of Groups
KnowledgeLab has developed a novel view of group belief, on which groups are epistemic agents. The account has also been successfully applied to investigate group responsibility and how it transmits to group members..
(5) Epistemology of the Media
KnowledgeLab has developed a novel account of the nature of disinformation, as ignorance-generating content. The account, if correct, carries high stakes upshots, both theoretically and practically: disinformation tracking will need to go well beyond mere fact checking.
Further expected results:
- A full knowledge-first theory of social conceptual engineering and applications to issues in ethics and political philosophy
- Novel accounts of the justification of degrees of belief, epistemic norms governing inquiry, epistemic norms governing attention, the epistemology and semantics of ignorance, interrogative attitudes, the nature and normativity of doubt.