Cel
My research project is about the introduction of institutions in the theory of international negotiations on the production of public goods. A special focus is on international agreements on environmental standards. By institution I mean here any organized mechanism of production and allocation of resources. Traditional economic theory has focused on the characterization of optimal rates of emissions and self enforcing agreements to implement optimality, without addressing the issue of the role of institutions in the process of cooperation. Here I will consider one particular type of institution: the democratic process of allocation of resources, namely the voting mechanism. My claim is that strategic behaviours of leading coalitions in each country, aiming at maintaining power, can prevent certain Pareto Optimal international agreements from being implemented. This research is an attempt to formally analyze this issue, investigating which features of democratic process of allocation are likely to affect the outcome of negotiations, yielding different results from the one expected in a world of planned economies.
Zaproszenie do składania wniosków
Data not availableSystem finansowania
RGI - Research grants (individual fellowships)Koordynator
1348 LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE
Belgia