Final Report Summary - SERON (Security of road transport networks)
Interdisciplinary interaction of expertise and innovative simulation methods has been the basis for the development of the new SERON methodology. It is a four-step approach which provides a common framework to identify critical infrastructure (CI) objects and to investigate protection measures at CI object level in detail with regard to their impacts onto risk mitigation and the road network. Its modular structure facilitates a stepwise application of the relevant analyses, adjusted to the respective level of detail required. It also allows using a wide range of other models than the ones taken or replacing the models by expert knowledge.
To examine improvements of the security level due to protection measures, the quantitative risk analysis (QRA) method has been applied. Hereby, the probability / likelihood of an event, as well as the related degree of damage was taken into account. Cost effectiveness of measures is determined based on the difference between risk with and without the implementation of the respective protection measure.
Based on a bow-tie analysis using fault trees (before event) and event trees (after event) the probabilities of the final states in the course of events and the corresponding risk were determined. Highly sophisticated models like computational fluid dynamic (CFD) models, short-time dynamics / blast models and finite element method (FEM) models have been taken to calculate the effects and to quantify the impacts on infrastructure objects and road users in case of event. The effects on road users have been identified using an evacuation model which describes pedestrian movements depending on external influences, taking into account perception and behaviour. To determine the impacts of an event on the transport network a traffic and transport model was used.
Finally, in order to be able to compare the different protection measures examined with regard to their cost effectiveness, the risks are monetised. Cost effectiveness was determined from the above-described direct and indirect consequences in case the infrastructure object fails due to an event. Hereby, the basis of assessment for decision-making whether a protection measure is cost-effective or not, can be adapted, if considered necessary, in order to be able to represent the characteristics of the network considered. The SERON methodology allows road owners and operators identifying critical road infrastructure objects (like bridges and tunnels) and selecting suitable and cost-efficient measures to improve the resilience of the road transport network. Thus, it provides support in developing short-term and long-term strategies to improve the security of transport infrastructures and offers guidance for future investments into protection measures and risk mitigation strategies. Hence, available financial means can be used optimally, i.e. in a purpose and goal-oriented way, to protect the road network for the benefit of the security of European citizens.
For more information on the SERON approach and its results, visit the project website under http://www.SERON-project.eu(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie)
Project context and objectives:
In line with the objectives formulated in the Directive of the Council 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European CI and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, the SERON project was set up. It responded to the Call: FP7-ICT-SEC-2007-1, activity: 'Security' theme, area: 'Security systems integration, inter-connectivity and interoperability', topic: ICT-SEC-2007-1.0-01: 'Risk assessment and contingency planning for interconnected transport or energy networks' of the European Commission (EC)'s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7).
The European road network is of major importance for the European economy and equally for the mobility of the European citizens. For example, TEN-T road projects (like Elbe crossing A20 or Øresund bridge) play a major role. Therefore, one of the main challenges of road owners and operators in Europe is to ensure the availability of important links. Even smaller disruptions due to traffic disturbances or failure of some infrastructural elements of the road network may lead to severe traffic disruptions and result in high economic follow-up costs and negative environmental impacts. Due to the interdependence of the road transport network with other traffic modes like rail, air and shipping, failing important traffic connections could even have cascading effects.
Particularly, bridges and tunnels are key elements of the road network. Based on geographical constraints they often have a bottleneck function. Besides severe accidents, e.g. involving trucks carrying dangerous goods, man-made attacks are one of the most dangerous threats to that kind of key infrastructure.
Transportation infrastructures are attractive targets for man-made attacks. They are rather easily accessible and their failure may have great impact on human lives and economic activities. Attacks may cause considerable damage, including structural damage or complete demolition, substantial numbers of human casualties, socio-economic losses (unemployment, relocation of firms, reconstruction costs) and socio-political damage (public uncertainty, confidence loss) and also result in environmental consequences; each damage being accompanied by the related costs.
The SERON project focused on security issues of the road transport network and its infrastructure objects. Its main objective was to investigate the risk and the impacts of possible man-made attacks on the transport network, in particular the resulting effects on long-distance transport links and their economic impacts. SERON focused on the development of a methodology which is to help owners and operators to analyse critical road transport networks or parts thereof with regard to possible man-made attacks. It evaluated suitable protection measures for critical road transport infrastructure objects concerning their impact on security and cost-effectiveness. Finally, SERON gives adequate recommendations on the application of the SERON methodology for owners and operators of CI to assist them in strengthening the robustness of their infrastructure objects.
In order to reach the project objectives, a holistic risk-based approach was undertaken. Research work distinguished between object level, i.e. the individual infrastructure object, and network level, i.e. the impacts of any attack onto the larger road network. This distinction reflects the general idea that infrastructure objects like bridges or tunnels may be regarded as critical due to object-inherent factors, e.g. its structural prerequisites but also due to the wider network-related implications such as failure of a given bridge or tunnel and the consequences for the overall traffic flow, either region-wide, country-wide, or even European Union (EU)-wide.
The SERON project was broken down into seven research-related work packages (WPs): First of all, a comprehensive threat analysis for transport infrastructures focusing on man-made attacks was undertaken (WP100). Then data on relevant infrastructure types and classes of the trans-European road network was gathered from infrastructure owners and operators in Europe (WP200). Apart from data already available to project partners or relevant owners, further survey data was obtained by questionnaires and interviews, contacting infrastructure owners and operators of road networks all over Europe, who have gathered these data, for example, in the course of national security research programmes. Road infrastructure owners and operators were ensured that data would be treated accordingly; data access was restricted to prevent unauthorised access. The data provided was evaluated to identify generic infrastructure types and classes critical in terms of vulnerability to man-made attacks, e.g. due to their type of construction. Infrastructure objects were classified according to the risk they are exposed to; the results of such classification were necessary input data for the developed knowledge database (WP300). Then suitable protection measures to reduce the risk and to improve the redundancy of vulnerable bridge and tunnel infrastructures were identified, broken down into structural, operational and organisational measures. They cover the time before (prevention), during (mitigation) and after (reconstruction and re-commissioning) an attack. Specific data relating to possible protection measures was equally obtained contacting owners and operators of road networks in Europe; the results again provided input data for the knowledge database developed.
As mentioned above, within SERON a knowledge database was established to bring together data gathered on the different objects (bridges and tunnels). It is a tool to manage and maintain categorised CIs and associated possible protection measures. Such object-level information is needed for the calculations done at network level. The structure of the database is made available on the SERON project server.
Then the importance of the individual infrastructure for the transport network was determined. Using scenario analyses and macroscopic traffic flow models a road network or parts of it were analysed and the impacts of a failure of one or more CI objects as well as the resulting traffic disturbances, disruptions or diversions examined (WP400). Network data included information on location and importance of infrastructures within the road network, traffic loads. Following the analysis at network level CI objects of the road network could be identified and ranked according to priority and benefit components for the risk assessment were calculated.
For each relevant structure a risk assessment was undertaken, taking into account countermeasures to thwart attacks (WP500). In addition to the assessment of the probabilities of the course of the scenarios the calculation of risks included the analysis of impact on the respective object with specific occurrence scenarios accounted for in a bow-tie approach. The impact was then estimated using traffic and transport models as well as other simulation models, e.g. escape simulations, explosives and smoke propagation simulations. Security improvements in the road network by measures applied to one or more infrastructures were determined. The monetary and economic impacts of the different measures were also examined by means of cost-benefit analyses in order to identify the cost-effective security measures.
Finally the newly developed SERON methodology was validated by applying the approach to other infrastructure objects on different European highway links (WP600).
Throughout the project the formulation and dissemination of project recommendations were in the focus of work (WP700). External expert knowledge and advice was gathered during project workshops to which selected experts (e.g. network owners and operators from different member states) had been invited. The concluding recommendations summarise the findings and include technical, institutional and macro-economic items. The developed and validated innovative methodology of SERON provides a common framework for the identification of critical road infrastructure objects with respect to their importance within the European transport network by means of an interdisciplinary interaction of expertise and innovative simulation methods. Furthermore, applying this methodology, road infrastructure owners and operators can select suitable protection measures and evaluate them regarding their cost-effectiveness, which enables them to make reasonable use of their usually limited budget.
Project results:
The European consortium of seven project partners consisting of PTV Planung Transport Verkehr AG as coordinator of the project, Federal Highway Research Institute, BASt (both DE), Parsons Brinckerhoff (UK), Technical University of Graz (A), Traficon (B), Ernst Basler + Partner (CH) and NIRAS (DK) has developed a risk-based, stepwise, holistic approach which allows to identifying critical road infrastructure objects (like bridges and tunnels) in a road network and selecting suitable and cost-efficient measures to protect them against man-made hazards. It is primarily aimed at owners and operators of potentially critical road infrastructure objects who want to improve the robustness of their objects. Thus, it contributes to the overall resilience of the European road network and its infrastructures.
The newly developed SERON approach consists of the following four steps:
- Step 1: Road corridor selection and identification of potentially CI objects.
- Step 2: Calculation of network importance.
- Step 3: Risk analysis (without measures).
- Step 4: Measure analysis.
Step 1: Road corridor selection and identification of potentially CI objects
Step 1 serves the purpose of identifying potentially CI objects located on a given road corridor. Therefore, first of all, road operators or owners select the road corridor they want to investigate. It could be any reasonably large road corridor they are responsible for as owners or operators, e.g. a TEN-T corridor which has a vital function in the overall road network of a country or within the EU.
Once the road corridor has been selected, the relevant technical constructional and traffic-related data of the infrastructure objects along the selected corridor have to be collected. This includes general technical data of bridges and tunnels such as:
- length;
- type of bridge or tunnel;
- road network data such as Average daily traffic (ADT) and Heavy goods vehicle (HGV) percentage.
Usually, road operators will have this data at hand in their own infrastructure databases.
Further parameters fed into the database and taken into account are:
- location;
- reconstruction time; and
- symbolic relevance.
After that, all infrastructure objects on the selected road corridor are investigated according to their potential criticality. To do so, the gathered data are entered or imported into the knowledge database which has been developed within the project. The knowledge database is a template for an extendable list of infrastructure objects including different assessment tools on Microsoft Excel basis and contains 27 different parameters for bridges and 40 different parameters for tunnels, which are not only needed to execute step 1, but also the later steps 2, 3 and 4.
The assessment tool called 'CI pre-selection method' then automatically calculates the values of the criticality criteria, using a binary logic (1 = potentially critical; 0 = not critical). These criticality criteria are:
- traffic volume;
- damage potential;
- economic consequences; and
- probability of attack.
For each criticality criterion threshold values can be defined. In SERON, for example, as far as traffic volume is concerned, an ADT of more than 100 000 vehicles per day or a percentage of HVG volume higher than 20 % on a given road infrastructure object was used. If the set threshold values are exceeded, the infrastructure object is considered critical regarding that criterion. Such threshold values may be adjusted according to the infrastructure stock and the particularities of the road network to which the method is to be applied. Based on their total criticality scores covering all criteria (ranging from 0 = no criticality to 4 = highest criticality) the infrastructure objects can be sorted and ranked, with the potentially most CI objects at the top.
All in all, step 1 serves as a first selection for the identification of potentially CI objects in a given road corridor. It can be conducted by every road infrastructure owner or operator himself based on their data at hand. To find out whether these infrastructure objects are also critical at network level it has to be proceeded with step 2 of the SERON methodology.
Step 2: Calculation of network importance
The infrastructure objects previously identified as potentially critical (step 1) have to be analysed in a more detailed manner (steps 3 and 4). Further analyses will take into account specific threats and protection measures which have been determined to be relevant for the respective bridge or tunnel.
However, since the analyses undertaken in step 3 and 4 can be very complex and require a lot of effort; it may not be possible to include all infrastructure objects identified as being potentially critical. Therefore, step 2 undertakes the determination of the network importance of potentially CI objects and their ranking according to their network importance. The result allows limiting the subsequent analyses to those potentially CI objects having top importance in the network. Here, detailed road network data are required and a specific traffic and transport model, e.g. PTV's Visum, should be used.
It is strongly recommended to apply the assessment procedure of step 2 to be able to focus the detailed analyses on those infrastructure objects which are most important for the transport network in order to optimise the use of resources.
Network importance is defined as the benefit which arises from the prevented non-availability or failure of a certain infrastructure object. Hereby, the network importance of a road infrastructure object is not only reflected by the consequences of its non-availability for road transport, but by any kind of socio-economic effects resulting from a man-made attack, for example, on the transport infrastructure. Therefore, the developed assessment procedure is based on the comparison of two uniformly defined scenarios.
- Scenario A: Full destruction of infrastructure object due to an unspecified event, object not available for any kind of user.
- Scenario B: 'Normal' situation, no incident has taken place.
The procedure takes into account that road users, traffic flow, the infrastructure object itself as well as the surrounding regional economy may also be affected, should an infrastructure object fail.
For both scenarios, the resulting direct and indirect consequences are quantified, monetised and summed up to a final importance value. The obtained importance value describes the benefit resulting from the prevented failure or non-availability, and thus, the importance of the infrastructure object for a given road network.
In contrast to the consequences for the road users and the infrastructure itself, which are calculated based on input data from the knowledge database, the consequences for traffic flow have to be calculated by applying the traffic and transport models. Experts who are very familiar with the transport network in question may be able to estimate the consequences for traffic flow. However, models will always achieve a higher validity and greater significance of the results due to the complex interdependencies. Therefore, despite the effort it constitutes to elaborate a specific one, it is recommended to use a traffic and transport model for step 2, as it will also be needed for steps 3 and 4.
From a network level point of view the highest-ranking infrastructure objects among those previously identified as critical at object level (step 1) are then selected for further, more detailed investigation, i.e. for risk assessment.
Step 3: Risk analysis (without measures)
In step 3, a risk assessment is carried out for the preselected infrastructure objects of step 2 in order to assess the monetised risk of one threat scenario on a specific infrastructure object (without protection measures) and to identify key risk contributors to enlighten the selection of protection measures done in step 4, i.e. to allow selecting suitable protection measures which reduce the risk of the key risk contributors.
First of all, for all infrastructure objects to be analysed detailed technical data has to be gathered including technical drawings, information about materials, existing protection measures, life cycles. Then previously determined risk or threat scenarios are investigated based on most likely threat/object combinations, which were identified by the Initial relevance assessment method (InRA) developed in SERON. InRA addresses feasibility of attack, damage potential, shock effect, and symbolic relevance. Hereby, it turned out that the most relevant threats in terms of man-made attacks are:
- attacks with explosives on both bridges and tunnels;
- attacks with fires in tunnels.
However, the approach can equally be applied to other threat / object combinations. The subsequent risk analysis is composed of two elements: probability analysis and consequence analysis. Hereby, a bow-tie analysis has been adopted to assess probabilities in relation to the occurrence of an attack. It is graphically represented by a bow-tie diagram.
Because not all preconditions of successful attack can be addressed, the probability of an event was set / normalised to 1. Therefore, the resulting probability will not be absolute but rather conditional. Therefore, the term of conditional probability has been introduced. In the above diagram each branch of the event tree (right hand side of bow-tie diagram) represents a consequence scenario. For each scenario, the consequences (impacts) on the analysed object as well as the surrounding traffic network, differentiated into direct (i.e. fatalities as flat rate per deceased and structural damage, e.g. reconstruction time and costs) and indirect consequences (i.e. economic costs, e.g. increased emissions, higher number of accidents, additional travel time), are taken into account.
Risk is understood as the product of the probability (that an attack occurs) multiplied by the (expected/calculated) consequences if it occurs. Therefore, in the final risk assessment the conditional monetary risks of all branches of the bow-tie analysis are summed up to the total conditional monetised risk (in Euro).
The result of step 3 of the SERON methodology is the monetised risk for a given scenario without considering any possible protection measure.
Step 4: Measure analysis
In step 4 of the SERON methodology, suitable protection measures for the relevant scenarios are analysed by cost-benefit calculations. Hereby, different pre-selected protection measures are included in the risk assessment calculation. This means that for each scenario, the monetised risk is calculated without the implementation of a certain protection measure (as done in step 3) and after the 'hypothetical' implementation of the selected protection measure.
The identification of suitable protection measures may involve some creative thinking as every combination of infrastructure objects and threats is unique. Therefore, protection measures have to be selected on a case-by-case basis. A list of protection measures, though not exhaustive, has been compiled in project deliverable D200.
Once selected, the protection measure has to be conceptually designed. The level of detail here should allow determining two aspects: Annual costs and effectiveness of the protection measure in terms of risk reduction.
The annual costs include all the costs associated with the protection measure, in terms of:
- direct costs of planning, design and implementation of the measure;
- direct costs of operation, maintenance and monitoring of the protection installations during its lifespan;
- indirect costs of restrictions and delays of the traffic caused by implemented measures.
The effectiveness of a protection measure should be assessed based on analysis, experience, demonstration, simulation, expert judgement.
Then the total monetised conditional risk is recalculated after implementing the protection measure with exactly the same method as applied to the risk assessment in step 3.
However, the probabilities or consequences are updated due to the influence of the selected protection measure. As a result, the total monetised conditional risk after implementing a protection measure should be lower than before its implementation. The difference between the two situations, i.e. the monetised risk reduction, is then compared to the costs of the protection measure in order to assess the cost effectiveness of the protection measure.
Based on the risk reduction and the costs of the selected protection measure, the break-even frequency of the considered scenario is calculated. This break-even frequency defines the point at which a particular protection measure can be evaluated as cost-effective. The break-even frequency is one of several factors relevant for decisions on the implementation of protection measures. If the break-even frequency is above a plausible frequency, then the measure should be implemented solely from a cost-effectiveness point of view. Otherwise, the measure is not cost-effective. However, other factors or combinations of factors such as reduction of risk regarding safety aspects or other factors (e.g. information on homeland security from sources such as national intelligence services, taking into account international developments as well as the national or political attitudes) may influence the decision for implementing of measures, even if assessed 'not cost-effective' when applying SERON criteria.
This above-described procedure allows selecting specifically suitable protection measures for all considered scenarios and all investigated infrastructure objects. Thus, infrastructure owners and operators are provided with a basis for decision-making in order to make best use of the available budget and the knowledge which measures to implement in order to improve the resilience of a specifically CI object. It has to be noted, that the effort needed for the application of the described risk based approach can be rather high. Therefore it should be applied especially for tunnels and bridges with a high criticality.
Required input data
The SERON approach requires some basic infrastructure and network data to be collected before starting with its above-described steps. Data includes general technical data of bridges and tunnels such as, for example, length, and type of construction or materials used. In step 2, in particular, detailed network data is needed in order to calculate detailed traffic simulations. For steps 3 and 4, further technical infrastructure object data needs to be collected including structural particularities, details on operation and incident management, as well as traffic volume data.
A full list of relevant data required has been compiled in the project deliverables D200 and D300 of this project. The knowledge database developed within the project supports this process and may be used as a template for collecting relevant data and providing data for the subsequent calculations. The structure of the database can be downloaded from the SERON project website http://www.SERON-project.eu(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie)
Conclusions from the project
Taking the research results of the SERON project into account, the SERON consortium gained important knowledge and experience regarding the identification and protection of CI objects in the road network of the EU.
It developed a comprehensive four-step methodology that can be used on a modular basis. Road infrastructure owners or operators using the approach may opt to use step 1 only to do a 'rough' assessment and classification of their infrastructure stock regarding potentially CI objects, or, they may apply step 2, 3 and / or 4 to consider the network criticality of a given object and additionally to identify cost-effective protection measures (step 3 and 4).
However, the application of steps 2, 3 and 4 requires mandatorily expert knowledge. The range of possible supporting tools that may be used to follow the methodology in steps 2 - 4, even though a greater technical ability is required, also means that the entire approach can be implemented by external experts not being part of the consortium.
For the practical use of the approach, however, decisive experience has been gathered and should be considered when further developing the approach.
First of all, due to the so far low numbers of terrorist attacks in Europe only few cost-effective measures could be identified for the selected infrastructure objects to which the approach was applied. This is a result of the statistical insignificance of terrorist attacks which renders the calculation of cost-effective measures very unlikely. Furthermore, within the application of the methodology for selected objects, the risk reduction effects were reduced to security aspects (not taking into account risk mitigation from a safety point of view). If the understanding of terrorist intent and actions has improved or the available approaches estimating this 'threat' have improved, the range of measures that become cost-effective may increase. These changes, if they occur, may be incorporated in the methodology at a later date.
Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that damage to CIs may occur also by non-intentional, severe accidents (as the tunnel catastrophes in the Alps have shown) or even due to extreme weather hazards to be expected due to the changing climate. Given that the SERON approach is able to integrate both security and safety aspects within a wider context of resilience, it could therefore be used as a universally applicable tool to identify CI objects, to rank them, and to determine effective protection measures which strengthen the overall resilience of the European road transport network. To achieve this, it is necessary to extend the hazard focus of the SERON approach to natural hazards and severe traffic accidents.
In general, the SERON consortium made the experience that less expensive measures sometimes have the greatest effects on infrastructure objects considered critical. This effect is even raised for protection measures that may be relevant and therefore can be applied to multiple scenarios. For instance, fencing that might have a protective effect against terrorist attacks as well as accidents, or protection measures that may have relevance in terms of protection against natural hazard scenarios like flooding, too.
Following the suggestions of the European Programme for CI Protection (EPCIP) directive, the SERON approach provides a basis for a unified approach that can be used by all Member States to identify and protect their critical road infrastructures. However, the actual implementation and usage of the approach still lies in the responsibility of the respective Member State or the individual road infrastructure owner or operator. The aim of the SERON consortium therefore will be to further disseminate the SERON approach in European and national boards and bring in and implement their experience and knowledge gained into respective directives and guidelines. Their efforts will be accompanied by further developing and extending the approach to different hazards and to practical applications.
Potential impact:
The EPCIP directive issued in 2008 defines the need to identify and designate European CIs. The developed SERON methodology could be used as a proper tool to meet that demand, thus supporting the implementation of the EPCIP directive at national level. A precondition would be that the SERON approach is used as a European CI standard identification tool, allowing the EU and its Member States, as well as road infrastructure owners and operators to identify CIs throughout Europe in a comparative way.
A coherent approach would show which infrastructure objects are the most critical and for which the additional expenditure for protection measures may be justified based on objective and cost-effectiveness considerations. To achieve that, there is the need to implement the SERON approach at European and national boards or committees as well as in EU directives. For its practical use, however, the approach still needs to be made more specific and broken down to a simple level with standardised procedures. The methodology, in particular the sections on risk analysis and the cost-effectiveness calculation of protection measures, is open to the use of different assessment tools. This may lead to slightly different outcomes for the same set of objects.
Furthermore, the full application of the SERON approach requires a lot of expert knowledge. A first assessment of infrastructures can be done easily, for in-depth assessment expert knowledge is necessary. Therefore, it is essential to make the approach more easily applicable to non-experts, too.
Further research needs are also arising due to the fact that from the cost-benefit view it showed that most investigated protection measures are not effective when terrorist attacks are considered only. In practice, network operators have to deal with a variety of external threats, such as climate change, extreme weather hazards, general safety concerns. Therefore, it is reasonable to investigate the developed methodology in a more comprehensive context to determine the cost-effectiveness of measures and to adapt the procedure to a broader range of application. Also, not only infrastructure objects within the trans-European network may be the target for terrorist attacks, but also other kinds of infrastructure such as energy supply infrastructure or objects with high symbolic character could be considered within further research work. From a transport sector point of view, there is a need to extend the methodology and results of SERON to intermodal aspects, including rail, air and waterways.
The economic success of the SERON methodology and tools is very closely linked with the above-mentioned points. The SERON approach could also be extended to an all-hazard approach. The consideration of other threats such as extreme weather hazards and traffic accidents would make the approach universally applicable and thus raise its market opportunities.
The SERON methodologies and tools not only support risk management for existing infrastructure objects but also for planned infrastructure objects in the design stage. The significance of an impact on infrastructure is assessed in terms of cross-cutting criteria comprising the following:
- casualties (assessed in terms of the potential number of fatalities or injuries);
- economic impacts (assessed in terms of the significance of economic loss and/or degradation of products or services; including potential environmental impacts);
- public effects (assessed in terms of the loss of public confidence, physical suffering and disruption of daily life; including failure of essential services).
The SERON methodology and tools together with the experience made during the specific analyses of bridges and tunnels provide a major contribution to the recommended analyses in EPCIP, with the potential of saving costs for road administrators and owners.
Main dissemination activities
During the SERON project a great variety of dissemination activities was undertaken by the consortium to address stakeholders like road transport infrastructure owners and operators as well as other interested parties, among them:
SERON project flyer
For dissemination purposes a project flyer was designed by BASt and PTV providing the interested public with the relevant information on the project. It was updated and revised mid-project to address a wider, interested public.
SERON project website
First of all a SERON project website was established, which can be found at http://www.SERON-project.eu(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie) The website provides all relevant information on the project, its purpose and objectives, the consortium and the contact details. Concise public versions of the submitted deliverables submitted to the EC can be downloaded there. Under the 'News & Events' tag the newsletters as well as all presentations held during the events organised by the consortium are available, in addition to any other publications like lectures and presentations held on related conferences and meetings. As a discussion forum an open web observatory has been established and linked to the project website.
SERON newsletters
In the course of the project two SERON newsletters were produced and sent to more than 350 interested parties like road infrastructure owners and operators and other stakeholders in order to provide information on the project itself, to describe the progress of research work and to communicate preliminary results to as well as to announce upcoming major events like the SERON workshops.
SERON workshops
According to the description of work of the project two major events, i.e. workshops with external experts, were planned during the project lifetime to gain input from external experts and to present the project results. Therefore, on 3 November 2010 the first SERON workshop was held in Berlin, on the premises of the German Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (BMVBS). This 1st workshop was designed to get input from stakeholders to be considered in future project work and to inform stakeholders about the project and its first results. In total 30 experts from eight European member states (including SERON partners) participated in the workshop.
As an outcome of the workshop the SERON consortium gained good insight in the national experience and procedures followed in different countries and got valuable feedback from the participating experts concerning the assessment of the criticality of infrastructure objects in their countries. The participants showed great interest in the final knowledge database, which will implement an important part of the SERON methodology by the connected external tools. The feedback obtained from the experts attending the workshop was taken into account in the further project work particularly as far as the knowledge database and the risk assessment were concerned.
The 2nd SERON workshop held on 26 April 2012 in Cologne was conceptualised as a follow-up event of the first workshop. The purpose of the workshop was twofold, on the one hand, to inform interested workshop participants of the previous event but also others about the progress made and the results of the SERON project obtained so far; on the other hand, to receive expert feedback and input for the finalisation of the project regarding the methodology of the SERON approach.
After the presentations the more than 40 workshop participants, among them the SERON project officer, Mr Ortiz de la Torre and the project's external expert, Mr Polidori, discussed the approach undertaken in SERON and their own experience made as private or public operators of major infrastructure objects. One of the final conclusions made was that the SERON approach should integrate both security and safety aspects in order to be used as a universal tool to identify CI objects, rank them, and determine effective protection measures to strengthen the overall resilience of the European road transport network.
Infrastructure risk and resilience conference
The infrastructure risk and resilience conference was an additional, i.e. originally not planned, major event towards the end of the project. It took place on 11 October 2012 at the Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in London. The IET was very interested in informing their members on current research results of EC projects in the field of security. They used their network for the invitations, took care of the organisation and hosted the conference.
The purpose of the conference was sharing knowledge about the issues of assessing and managing infrastructure risk and resilience with respect to natural, man-made and terrorist hazards in which the topics of the SERON project were embedded. It allowed presenting the SERON project work and results in a wider context and their further dissemination beyond potential users addressed so far.
Apart from the above-mentioned dissemination activities, the SERON project results were presented and discussed with experts and stakeholders on various conferences and committee meetings, e.g. TRA Europe 2010, IABSE-IASS Symposium 2011, ISTSS 2012, RILEM workshop 2011, SUSI 2012. A fair number of publications in peer reviewed publications were made or respectively are going to made within the next few weeks after the end of the project.
Exploitation of results by SERON partners
During the SERON project, the project partner PTV has been able to deepen its understanding of indirect costs. The findings and the developed tools for assessing such costs will be the basis for further research work in this field. Research work will especially focus on developing a multi-modal approach which takes all transport modes into account: Up to now the assessment procedure allows analysing infrastructure objects which are part of the road network. Other transport modes are considered in case their routes:
- were tracked beneath the bridge or above the tunnel to be analysed; or
- passed the bridge or tunnel considered.
In that case it is assumed that the affected transport route of other modes was closed. However, other transport modes are considered in case of modal shifts. Within the SERON project intermodal shifts have been considered to some extent:
- For reasons of simplicity it was assumed that road users (passenger and freight transport) would normally stick to their transport mode. Taking into account that road traffic is more flexible especially in terms of freight transport than rail or even shipping traffic, this assumption seemed reasonable. Nevertheless, there will always be road users who decide to shift to other transport modes in case a specific road link is closed.
- In SERON such modal shifts have only been incorporated in case no attractive alternative road transport routes other than the one passing the analysed bridge or tunnel are available. In that case modal shifts to railway traffic or shipping traffic were considered. In order to simulate real-world conditions, the assessment procedure has to be developed further so that:
- modal shifts can generally be taken into account; and
- infrastructure objects of other transport modes can also be assessed in terms of indirect costs.
In addition, further need for research has been identified in terms of assessing long-term impacts of man-made attacks on the transport infrastructure. The current assessment procedure allows quantifying indirect consequences which arise during the reconstruction period of the damaged infrastructure. Hereby, it is assumed that road users will return to their old habits in terms of travel behaviour after the infrastructure object has been reconstructed.
The assumption is reasonable in the current situation in which terrorist attacks on road infrastructure are still quite rare. Should the frequency of man-made attacks change, e.g. five subsequent spectacular attacks on road bridges of symbolic values happen, road users may become frightened and stop using transport routes with many bridges. In that case, changes in travel behaviour have to be taken into account for the indirect costs calculation. Further research activities should also focus on that aspect.
Work on the SERON project took PTV also a further step towards a better quantification and assessment of risks concerning man-made attacks. Additionally PTV has also been able to gain further experience in and improve fire simulation and the determination of the degree of damage of events.
BASt will use its involvement in several boards like World Road Association (PIARC), technical committee C4 road tunnel operation), in International Tunnelling Association (ITA-COSUF), in the Transport Research Board (TRB) (US) ABE 40 critical transportation infrastructure protection committee and the national Richtlinien für die Ausstattung und den Betrieb von Straßentunneln (RABT) to implement the SERON approach here aiming at its placement in the respective national and international guidelines and directives. From a research point of view, the results of SERON as well as of other, national projects SKRIBT and SKRIBT+ have been widely considered also within the SECMAN project, initiated by BASt together with ILF consulting engineers, ELEA and DARS. It conceptualises a security manual for road infrastructure owners and operators regarding security risk management processes (see http://www.secman-project.eu(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie) online for further details). It responds to the demand of making the SERON approach more easily applicable to non-experts.
With respect to academic purposes TU Graz will use the gained expertise in future student projects and for teaching purposes. The application of knowledge in line with practical application has always been very beneficial for the students' understanding. The relevance of the learning matter can be visualised in a very figurative way, which represents a step towards application-oriented lecturing.
Regarding marketing issues for the educational and research institutes within the consortium, the project offers the perspective of gaining more relevance as a service provider. The consortiums' research institutions intend to play a key role in consulting network operators, for example, who are interested in applying the methodology. Based on the results of the SERON project Traficon has been able to improve its video-based Automatic incident detection (AID) algorithms, more specifically in terms of stopped vehicle, left luggage and pedestrian detection. Said improved algorithms have been, still are and will be implemented into any upgrade versions of Traficon's AID systems, products and services. SafeWalk and C-Walk, for instance, are being launched as pedestrian detection solutions based on the findings and results of the SERON project at hand.
EBP will use the developed methodological approach and the findings of the SERON project within other projects regarding CIs in Switzerland and - if possible - abroad. Since the developed methodological approach is not limited to road infrastructures, EBP will try to apply it within other fields.
With reference to our core expertise in physical protection of buildings, infrastructure, installations and other assets NIRAS will exploit the experience gained through contributions to assessments of consequence and risk with:
- continued development of the SERON four-step risk assessment methodology - what NIRAS would consider a commercially interesting development includes, for example, an approach including natural disaster threats and other threats not connected to malicious intent;
- use of risk assessment in projects in general and risk assessment in connection with infrastructure protection in particular;
- analyses of blast propagation and loads on structures using commercially available three-dimensional (3D) software HEXDAM;
- modelling of blast propagation, loads on structures and structural dynamic behaviour with commercially available 3D LS-Dyna finite element code.
Project website: http://www.SERON-project.eu(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie)
To examine improvements of the security level due to protection measures, the quantitative risk analysis (QRA) method has been applied. Hereby, the probability / likelihood of an event, as well as the related degree of damage was taken into account. Cost effectiveness of measures is determined based on the difference between risk with and without the implementation of the respective protection measure.
Based on a bow-tie analysis using fault trees (before event) and event trees (after event) the probabilities of the final states in the course of events and the corresponding risk were determined. Highly sophisticated models like computational fluid dynamic (CFD) models, short-time dynamics / blast models and finite element method (FEM) models have been taken to calculate the effects and to quantify the impacts on infrastructure objects and road users in case of event. The effects on road users have been identified using an evacuation model which describes pedestrian movements depending on external influences, taking into account perception and behaviour. To determine the impacts of an event on the transport network a traffic and transport model was used.
Finally, in order to be able to compare the different protection measures examined with regard to their cost effectiveness, the risks are monetised. Cost effectiveness was determined from the above-described direct and indirect consequences in case the infrastructure object fails due to an event. Hereby, the basis of assessment for decision-making whether a protection measure is cost-effective or not, can be adapted, if considered necessary, in order to be able to represent the characteristics of the network considered. The SERON methodology allows road owners and operators identifying critical road infrastructure objects (like bridges and tunnels) and selecting suitable and cost-efficient measures to improve the resilience of the road transport network. Thus, it provides support in developing short-term and long-term strategies to improve the security of transport infrastructures and offers guidance for future investments into protection measures and risk mitigation strategies. Hence, available financial means can be used optimally, i.e. in a purpose and goal-oriented way, to protect the road network for the benefit of the security of European citizens.
For more information on the SERON approach and its results, visit the project website under http://www.SERON-project.eu(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie)
Project context and objectives:
In line with the objectives formulated in the Directive of the Council 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European CI and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, the SERON project was set up. It responded to the Call: FP7-ICT-SEC-2007-1, activity: 'Security' theme, area: 'Security systems integration, inter-connectivity and interoperability', topic: ICT-SEC-2007-1.0-01: 'Risk assessment and contingency planning for interconnected transport or energy networks' of the European Commission (EC)'s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7).
The European road network is of major importance for the European economy and equally for the mobility of the European citizens. For example, TEN-T road projects (like Elbe crossing A20 or Øresund bridge) play a major role. Therefore, one of the main challenges of road owners and operators in Europe is to ensure the availability of important links. Even smaller disruptions due to traffic disturbances or failure of some infrastructural elements of the road network may lead to severe traffic disruptions and result in high economic follow-up costs and negative environmental impacts. Due to the interdependence of the road transport network with other traffic modes like rail, air and shipping, failing important traffic connections could even have cascading effects.
Particularly, bridges and tunnels are key elements of the road network. Based on geographical constraints they often have a bottleneck function. Besides severe accidents, e.g. involving trucks carrying dangerous goods, man-made attacks are one of the most dangerous threats to that kind of key infrastructure.
Transportation infrastructures are attractive targets for man-made attacks. They are rather easily accessible and their failure may have great impact on human lives and economic activities. Attacks may cause considerable damage, including structural damage or complete demolition, substantial numbers of human casualties, socio-economic losses (unemployment, relocation of firms, reconstruction costs) and socio-political damage (public uncertainty, confidence loss) and also result in environmental consequences; each damage being accompanied by the related costs.
The SERON project focused on security issues of the road transport network and its infrastructure objects. Its main objective was to investigate the risk and the impacts of possible man-made attacks on the transport network, in particular the resulting effects on long-distance transport links and their economic impacts. SERON focused on the development of a methodology which is to help owners and operators to analyse critical road transport networks or parts thereof with regard to possible man-made attacks. It evaluated suitable protection measures for critical road transport infrastructure objects concerning their impact on security and cost-effectiveness. Finally, SERON gives adequate recommendations on the application of the SERON methodology for owners and operators of CI to assist them in strengthening the robustness of their infrastructure objects.
In order to reach the project objectives, a holistic risk-based approach was undertaken. Research work distinguished between object level, i.e. the individual infrastructure object, and network level, i.e. the impacts of any attack onto the larger road network. This distinction reflects the general idea that infrastructure objects like bridges or tunnels may be regarded as critical due to object-inherent factors, e.g. its structural prerequisites but also due to the wider network-related implications such as failure of a given bridge or tunnel and the consequences for the overall traffic flow, either region-wide, country-wide, or even European Union (EU)-wide.
The SERON project was broken down into seven research-related work packages (WPs): First of all, a comprehensive threat analysis for transport infrastructures focusing on man-made attacks was undertaken (WP100). Then data on relevant infrastructure types and classes of the trans-European road network was gathered from infrastructure owners and operators in Europe (WP200). Apart from data already available to project partners or relevant owners, further survey data was obtained by questionnaires and interviews, contacting infrastructure owners and operators of road networks all over Europe, who have gathered these data, for example, in the course of national security research programmes. Road infrastructure owners and operators were ensured that data would be treated accordingly; data access was restricted to prevent unauthorised access. The data provided was evaluated to identify generic infrastructure types and classes critical in terms of vulnerability to man-made attacks, e.g. due to their type of construction. Infrastructure objects were classified according to the risk they are exposed to; the results of such classification were necessary input data for the developed knowledge database (WP300). Then suitable protection measures to reduce the risk and to improve the redundancy of vulnerable bridge and tunnel infrastructures were identified, broken down into structural, operational and organisational measures. They cover the time before (prevention), during (mitigation) and after (reconstruction and re-commissioning) an attack. Specific data relating to possible protection measures was equally obtained contacting owners and operators of road networks in Europe; the results again provided input data for the knowledge database developed.
As mentioned above, within SERON a knowledge database was established to bring together data gathered on the different objects (bridges and tunnels). It is a tool to manage and maintain categorised CIs and associated possible protection measures. Such object-level information is needed for the calculations done at network level. The structure of the database is made available on the SERON project server.
Then the importance of the individual infrastructure for the transport network was determined. Using scenario analyses and macroscopic traffic flow models a road network or parts of it were analysed and the impacts of a failure of one or more CI objects as well as the resulting traffic disturbances, disruptions or diversions examined (WP400). Network data included information on location and importance of infrastructures within the road network, traffic loads. Following the analysis at network level CI objects of the road network could be identified and ranked according to priority and benefit components for the risk assessment were calculated.
For each relevant structure a risk assessment was undertaken, taking into account countermeasures to thwart attacks (WP500). In addition to the assessment of the probabilities of the course of the scenarios the calculation of risks included the analysis of impact on the respective object with specific occurrence scenarios accounted for in a bow-tie approach. The impact was then estimated using traffic and transport models as well as other simulation models, e.g. escape simulations, explosives and smoke propagation simulations. Security improvements in the road network by measures applied to one or more infrastructures were determined. The monetary and economic impacts of the different measures were also examined by means of cost-benefit analyses in order to identify the cost-effective security measures.
Finally the newly developed SERON methodology was validated by applying the approach to other infrastructure objects on different European highway links (WP600).
Throughout the project the formulation and dissemination of project recommendations were in the focus of work (WP700). External expert knowledge and advice was gathered during project workshops to which selected experts (e.g. network owners and operators from different member states) had been invited. The concluding recommendations summarise the findings and include technical, institutional and macro-economic items. The developed and validated innovative methodology of SERON provides a common framework for the identification of critical road infrastructure objects with respect to their importance within the European transport network by means of an interdisciplinary interaction of expertise and innovative simulation methods. Furthermore, applying this methodology, road infrastructure owners and operators can select suitable protection measures and evaluate them regarding their cost-effectiveness, which enables them to make reasonable use of their usually limited budget.
Project results:
The European consortium of seven project partners consisting of PTV Planung Transport Verkehr AG as coordinator of the project, Federal Highway Research Institute, BASt (both DE), Parsons Brinckerhoff (UK), Technical University of Graz (A), Traficon (B), Ernst Basler + Partner (CH) and NIRAS (DK) has developed a risk-based, stepwise, holistic approach which allows to identifying critical road infrastructure objects (like bridges and tunnels) in a road network and selecting suitable and cost-efficient measures to protect them against man-made hazards. It is primarily aimed at owners and operators of potentially critical road infrastructure objects who want to improve the robustness of their objects. Thus, it contributes to the overall resilience of the European road network and its infrastructures.
The newly developed SERON approach consists of the following four steps:
- Step 1: Road corridor selection and identification of potentially CI objects.
- Step 2: Calculation of network importance.
- Step 3: Risk analysis (without measures).
- Step 4: Measure analysis.
Step 1: Road corridor selection and identification of potentially CI objects
Step 1 serves the purpose of identifying potentially CI objects located on a given road corridor. Therefore, first of all, road operators or owners select the road corridor they want to investigate. It could be any reasonably large road corridor they are responsible for as owners or operators, e.g. a TEN-T corridor which has a vital function in the overall road network of a country or within the EU.
Once the road corridor has been selected, the relevant technical constructional and traffic-related data of the infrastructure objects along the selected corridor have to be collected. This includes general technical data of bridges and tunnels such as:
- length;
- type of bridge or tunnel;
- road network data such as Average daily traffic (ADT) and Heavy goods vehicle (HGV) percentage.
Usually, road operators will have this data at hand in their own infrastructure databases.
Further parameters fed into the database and taken into account are:
- location;
- reconstruction time; and
- symbolic relevance.
After that, all infrastructure objects on the selected road corridor are investigated according to their potential criticality. To do so, the gathered data are entered or imported into the knowledge database which has been developed within the project. The knowledge database is a template for an extendable list of infrastructure objects including different assessment tools on Microsoft Excel basis and contains 27 different parameters for bridges and 40 different parameters for tunnels, which are not only needed to execute step 1, but also the later steps 2, 3 and 4.
The assessment tool called 'CI pre-selection method' then automatically calculates the values of the criticality criteria, using a binary logic (1 = potentially critical; 0 = not critical). These criticality criteria are:
- traffic volume;
- damage potential;
- economic consequences; and
- probability of attack.
For each criticality criterion threshold values can be defined. In SERON, for example, as far as traffic volume is concerned, an ADT of more than 100 000 vehicles per day or a percentage of HVG volume higher than 20 % on a given road infrastructure object was used. If the set threshold values are exceeded, the infrastructure object is considered critical regarding that criterion. Such threshold values may be adjusted according to the infrastructure stock and the particularities of the road network to which the method is to be applied. Based on their total criticality scores covering all criteria (ranging from 0 = no criticality to 4 = highest criticality) the infrastructure objects can be sorted and ranked, with the potentially most CI objects at the top.
All in all, step 1 serves as a first selection for the identification of potentially CI objects in a given road corridor. It can be conducted by every road infrastructure owner or operator himself based on their data at hand. To find out whether these infrastructure objects are also critical at network level it has to be proceeded with step 2 of the SERON methodology.
Step 2: Calculation of network importance
The infrastructure objects previously identified as potentially critical (step 1) have to be analysed in a more detailed manner (steps 3 and 4). Further analyses will take into account specific threats and protection measures which have been determined to be relevant for the respective bridge or tunnel.
However, since the analyses undertaken in step 3 and 4 can be very complex and require a lot of effort; it may not be possible to include all infrastructure objects identified as being potentially critical. Therefore, step 2 undertakes the determination of the network importance of potentially CI objects and their ranking according to their network importance. The result allows limiting the subsequent analyses to those potentially CI objects having top importance in the network. Here, detailed road network data are required and a specific traffic and transport model, e.g. PTV's Visum, should be used.
It is strongly recommended to apply the assessment procedure of step 2 to be able to focus the detailed analyses on those infrastructure objects which are most important for the transport network in order to optimise the use of resources.
Network importance is defined as the benefit which arises from the prevented non-availability or failure of a certain infrastructure object. Hereby, the network importance of a road infrastructure object is not only reflected by the consequences of its non-availability for road transport, but by any kind of socio-economic effects resulting from a man-made attack, for example, on the transport infrastructure. Therefore, the developed assessment procedure is based on the comparison of two uniformly defined scenarios.
- Scenario A: Full destruction of infrastructure object due to an unspecified event, object not available for any kind of user.
- Scenario B: 'Normal' situation, no incident has taken place.
The procedure takes into account that road users, traffic flow, the infrastructure object itself as well as the surrounding regional economy may also be affected, should an infrastructure object fail.
For both scenarios, the resulting direct and indirect consequences are quantified, monetised and summed up to a final importance value. The obtained importance value describes the benefit resulting from the prevented failure or non-availability, and thus, the importance of the infrastructure object for a given road network.
In contrast to the consequences for the road users and the infrastructure itself, which are calculated based on input data from the knowledge database, the consequences for traffic flow have to be calculated by applying the traffic and transport models. Experts who are very familiar with the transport network in question may be able to estimate the consequences for traffic flow. However, models will always achieve a higher validity and greater significance of the results due to the complex interdependencies. Therefore, despite the effort it constitutes to elaborate a specific one, it is recommended to use a traffic and transport model for step 2, as it will also be needed for steps 3 and 4.
From a network level point of view the highest-ranking infrastructure objects among those previously identified as critical at object level (step 1) are then selected for further, more detailed investigation, i.e. for risk assessment.
Step 3: Risk analysis (without measures)
In step 3, a risk assessment is carried out for the preselected infrastructure objects of step 2 in order to assess the monetised risk of one threat scenario on a specific infrastructure object (without protection measures) and to identify key risk contributors to enlighten the selection of protection measures done in step 4, i.e. to allow selecting suitable protection measures which reduce the risk of the key risk contributors.
First of all, for all infrastructure objects to be analysed detailed technical data has to be gathered including technical drawings, information about materials, existing protection measures, life cycles. Then previously determined risk or threat scenarios are investigated based on most likely threat/object combinations, which were identified by the Initial relevance assessment method (InRA) developed in SERON. InRA addresses feasibility of attack, damage potential, shock effect, and symbolic relevance. Hereby, it turned out that the most relevant threats in terms of man-made attacks are:
- attacks with explosives on both bridges and tunnels;
- attacks with fires in tunnels.
However, the approach can equally be applied to other threat / object combinations. The subsequent risk analysis is composed of two elements: probability analysis and consequence analysis. Hereby, a bow-tie analysis has been adopted to assess probabilities in relation to the occurrence of an attack. It is graphically represented by a bow-tie diagram.
Because not all preconditions of successful attack can be addressed, the probability of an event was set / normalised to 1. Therefore, the resulting probability will not be absolute but rather conditional. Therefore, the term of conditional probability has been introduced. In the above diagram each branch of the event tree (right hand side of bow-tie diagram) represents a consequence scenario. For each scenario, the consequences (impacts) on the analysed object as well as the surrounding traffic network, differentiated into direct (i.e. fatalities as flat rate per deceased and structural damage, e.g. reconstruction time and costs) and indirect consequences (i.e. economic costs, e.g. increased emissions, higher number of accidents, additional travel time), are taken into account.
Risk is understood as the product of the probability (that an attack occurs) multiplied by the (expected/calculated) consequences if it occurs. Therefore, in the final risk assessment the conditional monetary risks of all branches of the bow-tie analysis are summed up to the total conditional monetised risk (in Euro).
The result of step 3 of the SERON methodology is the monetised risk for a given scenario without considering any possible protection measure.
Step 4: Measure analysis
In step 4 of the SERON methodology, suitable protection measures for the relevant scenarios are analysed by cost-benefit calculations. Hereby, different pre-selected protection measures are included in the risk assessment calculation. This means that for each scenario, the monetised risk is calculated without the implementation of a certain protection measure (as done in step 3) and after the 'hypothetical' implementation of the selected protection measure.
The identification of suitable protection measures may involve some creative thinking as every combination of infrastructure objects and threats is unique. Therefore, protection measures have to be selected on a case-by-case basis. A list of protection measures, though not exhaustive, has been compiled in project deliverable D200.
Once selected, the protection measure has to be conceptually designed. The level of detail here should allow determining two aspects: Annual costs and effectiveness of the protection measure in terms of risk reduction.
The annual costs include all the costs associated with the protection measure, in terms of:
- direct costs of planning, design and implementation of the measure;
- direct costs of operation, maintenance and monitoring of the protection installations during its lifespan;
- indirect costs of restrictions and delays of the traffic caused by implemented measures.
The effectiveness of a protection measure should be assessed based on analysis, experience, demonstration, simulation, expert judgement.
Then the total monetised conditional risk is recalculated after implementing the protection measure with exactly the same method as applied to the risk assessment in step 3.
However, the probabilities or consequences are updated due to the influence of the selected protection measure. As a result, the total monetised conditional risk after implementing a protection measure should be lower than before its implementation. The difference between the two situations, i.e. the monetised risk reduction, is then compared to the costs of the protection measure in order to assess the cost effectiveness of the protection measure.
Based on the risk reduction and the costs of the selected protection measure, the break-even frequency of the considered scenario is calculated. This break-even frequency defines the point at which a particular protection measure can be evaluated as cost-effective. The break-even frequency is one of several factors relevant for decisions on the implementation of protection measures. If the break-even frequency is above a plausible frequency, then the measure should be implemented solely from a cost-effectiveness point of view. Otherwise, the measure is not cost-effective. However, other factors or combinations of factors such as reduction of risk regarding safety aspects or other factors (e.g. information on homeland security from sources such as national intelligence services, taking into account international developments as well as the national or political attitudes) may influence the decision for implementing of measures, even if assessed 'not cost-effective' when applying SERON criteria.
This above-described procedure allows selecting specifically suitable protection measures for all considered scenarios and all investigated infrastructure objects. Thus, infrastructure owners and operators are provided with a basis for decision-making in order to make best use of the available budget and the knowledge which measures to implement in order to improve the resilience of a specifically CI object. It has to be noted, that the effort needed for the application of the described risk based approach can be rather high. Therefore it should be applied especially for tunnels and bridges with a high criticality.
Required input data
The SERON approach requires some basic infrastructure and network data to be collected before starting with its above-described steps. Data includes general technical data of bridges and tunnels such as, for example, length, and type of construction or materials used. In step 2, in particular, detailed network data is needed in order to calculate detailed traffic simulations. For steps 3 and 4, further technical infrastructure object data needs to be collected including structural particularities, details on operation and incident management, as well as traffic volume data.
A full list of relevant data required has been compiled in the project deliverables D200 and D300 of this project. The knowledge database developed within the project supports this process and may be used as a template for collecting relevant data and providing data for the subsequent calculations. The structure of the database can be downloaded from the SERON project website http://www.SERON-project.eu(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie)
Conclusions from the project
Taking the research results of the SERON project into account, the SERON consortium gained important knowledge and experience regarding the identification and protection of CI objects in the road network of the EU.
It developed a comprehensive four-step methodology that can be used on a modular basis. Road infrastructure owners or operators using the approach may opt to use step 1 only to do a 'rough' assessment and classification of their infrastructure stock regarding potentially CI objects, or, they may apply step 2, 3 and / or 4 to consider the network criticality of a given object and additionally to identify cost-effective protection measures (step 3 and 4).
However, the application of steps 2, 3 and 4 requires mandatorily expert knowledge. The range of possible supporting tools that may be used to follow the methodology in steps 2 - 4, even though a greater technical ability is required, also means that the entire approach can be implemented by external experts not being part of the consortium.
For the practical use of the approach, however, decisive experience has been gathered and should be considered when further developing the approach.
First of all, due to the so far low numbers of terrorist attacks in Europe only few cost-effective measures could be identified for the selected infrastructure objects to which the approach was applied. This is a result of the statistical insignificance of terrorist attacks which renders the calculation of cost-effective measures very unlikely. Furthermore, within the application of the methodology for selected objects, the risk reduction effects were reduced to security aspects (not taking into account risk mitigation from a safety point of view). If the understanding of terrorist intent and actions has improved or the available approaches estimating this 'threat' have improved, the range of measures that become cost-effective may increase. These changes, if they occur, may be incorporated in the methodology at a later date.
Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that damage to CIs may occur also by non-intentional, severe accidents (as the tunnel catastrophes in the Alps have shown) or even due to extreme weather hazards to be expected due to the changing climate. Given that the SERON approach is able to integrate both security and safety aspects within a wider context of resilience, it could therefore be used as a universally applicable tool to identify CI objects, to rank them, and to determine effective protection measures which strengthen the overall resilience of the European road transport network. To achieve this, it is necessary to extend the hazard focus of the SERON approach to natural hazards and severe traffic accidents.
In general, the SERON consortium made the experience that less expensive measures sometimes have the greatest effects on infrastructure objects considered critical. This effect is even raised for protection measures that may be relevant and therefore can be applied to multiple scenarios. For instance, fencing that might have a protective effect against terrorist attacks as well as accidents, or protection measures that may have relevance in terms of protection against natural hazard scenarios like flooding, too.
Following the suggestions of the European Programme for CI Protection (EPCIP) directive, the SERON approach provides a basis for a unified approach that can be used by all Member States to identify and protect their critical road infrastructures. However, the actual implementation and usage of the approach still lies in the responsibility of the respective Member State or the individual road infrastructure owner or operator. The aim of the SERON consortium therefore will be to further disseminate the SERON approach in European and national boards and bring in and implement their experience and knowledge gained into respective directives and guidelines. Their efforts will be accompanied by further developing and extending the approach to different hazards and to practical applications.
Potential impact:
The EPCIP directive issued in 2008 defines the need to identify and designate European CIs. The developed SERON methodology could be used as a proper tool to meet that demand, thus supporting the implementation of the EPCIP directive at national level. A precondition would be that the SERON approach is used as a European CI standard identification tool, allowing the EU and its Member States, as well as road infrastructure owners and operators to identify CIs throughout Europe in a comparative way.
A coherent approach would show which infrastructure objects are the most critical and for which the additional expenditure for protection measures may be justified based on objective and cost-effectiveness considerations. To achieve that, there is the need to implement the SERON approach at European and national boards or committees as well as in EU directives. For its practical use, however, the approach still needs to be made more specific and broken down to a simple level with standardised procedures. The methodology, in particular the sections on risk analysis and the cost-effectiveness calculation of protection measures, is open to the use of different assessment tools. This may lead to slightly different outcomes for the same set of objects.
Furthermore, the full application of the SERON approach requires a lot of expert knowledge. A first assessment of infrastructures can be done easily, for in-depth assessment expert knowledge is necessary. Therefore, it is essential to make the approach more easily applicable to non-experts, too.
Further research needs are also arising due to the fact that from the cost-benefit view it showed that most investigated protection measures are not effective when terrorist attacks are considered only. In practice, network operators have to deal with a variety of external threats, such as climate change, extreme weather hazards, general safety concerns. Therefore, it is reasonable to investigate the developed methodology in a more comprehensive context to determine the cost-effectiveness of measures and to adapt the procedure to a broader range of application. Also, not only infrastructure objects within the trans-European network may be the target for terrorist attacks, but also other kinds of infrastructure such as energy supply infrastructure or objects with high symbolic character could be considered within further research work. From a transport sector point of view, there is a need to extend the methodology and results of SERON to intermodal aspects, including rail, air and waterways.
The economic success of the SERON methodology and tools is very closely linked with the above-mentioned points. The SERON approach could also be extended to an all-hazard approach. The consideration of other threats such as extreme weather hazards and traffic accidents would make the approach universally applicable and thus raise its market opportunities.
The SERON methodologies and tools not only support risk management for existing infrastructure objects but also for planned infrastructure objects in the design stage. The significance of an impact on infrastructure is assessed in terms of cross-cutting criteria comprising the following:
- casualties (assessed in terms of the potential number of fatalities or injuries);
- economic impacts (assessed in terms of the significance of economic loss and/or degradation of products or services; including potential environmental impacts);
- public effects (assessed in terms of the loss of public confidence, physical suffering and disruption of daily life; including failure of essential services).
The SERON methodology and tools together with the experience made during the specific analyses of bridges and tunnels provide a major contribution to the recommended analyses in EPCIP, with the potential of saving costs for road administrators and owners.
Main dissemination activities
During the SERON project a great variety of dissemination activities was undertaken by the consortium to address stakeholders like road transport infrastructure owners and operators as well as other interested parties, among them:
SERON project flyer
For dissemination purposes a project flyer was designed by BASt and PTV providing the interested public with the relevant information on the project. It was updated and revised mid-project to address a wider, interested public.
SERON project website
First of all a SERON project website was established, which can be found at http://www.SERON-project.eu(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie) The website provides all relevant information on the project, its purpose and objectives, the consortium and the contact details. Concise public versions of the submitted deliverables submitted to the EC can be downloaded there. Under the 'News & Events' tag the newsletters as well as all presentations held during the events organised by the consortium are available, in addition to any other publications like lectures and presentations held on related conferences and meetings. As a discussion forum an open web observatory has been established and linked to the project website.
SERON newsletters
In the course of the project two SERON newsletters were produced and sent to more than 350 interested parties like road infrastructure owners and operators and other stakeholders in order to provide information on the project itself, to describe the progress of research work and to communicate preliminary results to as well as to announce upcoming major events like the SERON workshops.
SERON workshops
According to the description of work of the project two major events, i.e. workshops with external experts, were planned during the project lifetime to gain input from external experts and to present the project results. Therefore, on 3 November 2010 the first SERON workshop was held in Berlin, on the premises of the German Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (BMVBS). This 1st workshop was designed to get input from stakeholders to be considered in future project work and to inform stakeholders about the project and its first results. In total 30 experts from eight European member states (including SERON partners) participated in the workshop.
As an outcome of the workshop the SERON consortium gained good insight in the national experience and procedures followed in different countries and got valuable feedback from the participating experts concerning the assessment of the criticality of infrastructure objects in their countries. The participants showed great interest in the final knowledge database, which will implement an important part of the SERON methodology by the connected external tools. The feedback obtained from the experts attending the workshop was taken into account in the further project work particularly as far as the knowledge database and the risk assessment were concerned.
The 2nd SERON workshop held on 26 April 2012 in Cologne was conceptualised as a follow-up event of the first workshop. The purpose of the workshop was twofold, on the one hand, to inform interested workshop participants of the previous event but also others about the progress made and the results of the SERON project obtained so far; on the other hand, to receive expert feedback and input for the finalisation of the project regarding the methodology of the SERON approach.
After the presentations the more than 40 workshop participants, among them the SERON project officer, Mr Ortiz de la Torre and the project's external expert, Mr Polidori, discussed the approach undertaken in SERON and their own experience made as private or public operators of major infrastructure objects. One of the final conclusions made was that the SERON approach should integrate both security and safety aspects in order to be used as a universal tool to identify CI objects, rank them, and determine effective protection measures to strengthen the overall resilience of the European road transport network.
Infrastructure risk and resilience conference
The infrastructure risk and resilience conference was an additional, i.e. originally not planned, major event towards the end of the project. It took place on 11 October 2012 at the Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in London. The IET was very interested in informing their members on current research results of EC projects in the field of security. They used their network for the invitations, took care of the organisation and hosted the conference.
The purpose of the conference was sharing knowledge about the issues of assessing and managing infrastructure risk and resilience with respect to natural, man-made and terrorist hazards in which the topics of the SERON project were embedded. It allowed presenting the SERON project work and results in a wider context and their further dissemination beyond potential users addressed so far.
Apart from the above-mentioned dissemination activities, the SERON project results were presented and discussed with experts and stakeholders on various conferences and committee meetings, e.g. TRA Europe 2010, IABSE-IASS Symposium 2011, ISTSS 2012, RILEM workshop 2011, SUSI 2012. A fair number of publications in peer reviewed publications were made or respectively are going to made within the next few weeks after the end of the project.
Exploitation of results by SERON partners
During the SERON project, the project partner PTV has been able to deepen its understanding of indirect costs. The findings and the developed tools for assessing such costs will be the basis for further research work in this field. Research work will especially focus on developing a multi-modal approach which takes all transport modes into account: Up to now the assessment procedure allows analysing infrastructure objects which are part of the road network. Other transport modes are considered in case their routes:
- were tracked beneath the bridge or above the tunnel to be analysed; or
- passed the bridge or tunnel considered.
In that case it is assumed that the affected transport route of other modes was closed. However, other transport modes are considered in case of modal shifts. Within the SERON project intermodal shifts have been considered to some extent:
- For reasons of simplicity it was assumed that road users (passenger and freight transport) would normally stick to their transport mode. Taking into account that road traffic is more flexible especially in terms of freight transport than rail or even shipping traffic, this assumption seemed reasonable. Nevertheless, there will always be road users who decide to shift to other transport modes in case a specific road link is closed.
- In SERON such modal shifts have only been incorporated in case no attractive alternative road transport routes other than the one passing the analysed bridge or tunnel are available. In that case modal shifts to railway traffic or shipping traffic were considered. In order to simulate real-world conditions, the assessment procedure has to be developed further so that:
- modal shifts can generally be taken into account; and
- infrastructure objects of other transport modes can also be assessed in terms of indirect costs.
In addition, further need for research has been identified in terms of assessing long-term impacts of man-made attacks on the transport infrastructure. The current assessment procedure allows quantifying indirect consequences which arise during the reconstruction period of the damaged infrastructure. Hereby, it is assumed that road users will return to their old habits in terms of travel behaviour after the infrastructure object has been reconstructed.
The assumption is reasonable in the current situation in which terrorist attacks on road infrastructure are still quite rare. Should the frequency of man-made attacks change, e.g. five subsequent spectacular attacks on road bridges of symbolic values happen, road users may become frightened and stop using transport routes with many bridges. In that case, changes in travel behaviour have to be taken into account for the indirect costs calculation. Further research activities should also focus on that aspect.
Work on the SERON project took PTV also a further step towards a better quantification and assessment of risks concerning man-made attacks. Additionally PTV has also been able to gain further experience in and improve fire simulation and the determination of the degree of damage of events.
BASt will use its involvement in several boards like World Road Association (PIARC), technical committee C4 road tunnel operation), in International Tunnelling Association (ITA-COSUF), in the Transport Research Board (TRB) (US) ABE 40 critical transportation infrastructure protection committee and the national Richtlinien für die Ausstattung und den Betrieb von Straßentunneln (RABT) to implement the SERON approach here aiming at its placement in the respective national and international guidelines and directives. From a research point of view, the results of SERON as well as of other, national projects SKRIBT and SKRIBT+ have been widely considered also within the SECMAN project, initiated by BASt together with ILF consulting engineers, ELEA and DARS. It conceptualises a security manual for road infrastructure owners and operators regarding security risk management processes (see http://www.secman-project.eu(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie) online for further details). It responds to the demand of making the SERON approach more easily applicable to non-experts.
With respect to academic purposes TU Graz will use the gained expertise in future student projects and for teaching purposes. The application of knowledge in line with practical application has always been very beneficial for the students' understanding. The relevance of the learning matter can be visualised in a very figurative way, which represents a step towards application-oriented lecturing.
Regarding marketing issues for the educational and research institutes within the consortium, the project offers the perspective of gaining more relevance as a service provider. The consortiums' research institutions intend to play a key role in consulting network operators, for example, who are interested in applying the methodology. Based on the results of the SERON project Traficon has been able to improve its video-based Automatic incident detection (AID) algorithms, more specifically in terms of stopped vehicle, left luggage and pedestrian detection. Said improved algorithms have been, still are and will be implemented into any upgrade versions of Traficon's AID systems, products and services. SafeWalk and C-Walk, for instance, are being launched as pedestrian detection solutions based on the findings and results of the SERON project at hand.
EBP will use the developed methodological approach and the findings of the SERON project within other projects regarding CIs in Switzerland and - if possible - abroad. Since the developed methodological approach is not limited to road infrastructures, EBP will try to apply it within other fields.
With reference to our core expertise in physical protection of buildings, infrastructure, installations and other assets NIRAS will exploit the experience gained through contributions to assessments of consequence and risk with:
- continued development of the SERON four-step risk assessment methodology - what NIRAS would consider a commercially interesting development includes, for example, an approach including natural disaster threats and other threats not connected to malicious intent;
- use of risk assessment in projects in general and risk assessment in connection with infrastructure protection in particular;
- analyses of blast propagation and loads on structures using commercially available three-dimensional (3D) software HEXDAM;
- modelling of blast propagation, loads on structures and structural dynamic behaviour with commercially available 3D LS-Dyna finite element code.
Project website: http://www.SERON-project.eu(odnośnik otworzy się w nowym oknie)
