Final Report Summary - SANDERA (The Future impact of security and defence policies on the European Research Area) Executive summary: SANDERA has focused on the future relationship between the European Union (EU) strategy since Lisbon moved towards the European Research Area (ERA) and those EU policies that focused on the security of the European citizen in the world. The EU has developed a defence and security dimension: the externally-oriented Common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the internally-oriented policies for countering terrorism and to protect among others the EU's borders, critical infrastructures or energy supplies. These developments have been complemented by a science and technology policy dimension most clearly expressed in the security research activities under the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) and the defence research activities of the European Defence Agency. The EU has also adopted policies to create an ERA. This means to build more appropriate framework condition (e.g. mobility, free circulation of knowledge, world class research infrastructures); pursue a new way of overcoming fragmentation which has to be understood as a phenomenon not only of research performing, but also of research funding, and to move towards a challenge based approach for research, technology and development funding in the EU. The overall ERA idea was to do away with a traditional multi-layer and fragmented governance of research in Europe, and to follow a more holistic ambition. These two policy domains have developed more or less separately from one another. The ERA policy community and the European security and defence policy community represent distinct groups with different interests and objectives. SANDERA began from the position that there was a need for greater dialogue between these communities as a means of developing a shared understanding of the opportunities and challenges posed by policy actions and developments at the intersection of these two European policy domains. SANDERA has had four specific objectives: - to identify drivers of change in the relationship between European security and defence policies and the ERA; - to develop exploratory scenarios of alternative futures for the relationship between security and defence policies and the ERA; - to analyse the policy implications of the scenarios and develop indicators of change; - to stimulate dialogue and promote stronger networking. As a foresight project SANDERA has not sought to predict the future but has instead aimed to initiate debate and to provide useful inputs for policymakers and associated stakeholders recognising the existence of deep uncertainty, and allowing for structured thinking about the possible paths by which these relationships may evolve. While looking towards the year 2030 SANDERA has attempted to provide insights that inform policy making in the near future. SANDERA has achieved its goals by: - preparing a number of scoping papers based on desk research and an extensive programme of about 100 interviews with stakeholders and experts; - developing four scenarios of the future relationship between the ERA and defence Research and innovation (R&I) policies, used to engage stakeholders at two workshops held in Brussels in November 2010 and May 2011 respectively; - producing reports on policy recommendations, on indicators of change and creating a toolkit that provide policy makers with guidance for future decisions. SANDERA has contributed to an improved understanding of the potential implications of developments in security policy for the move towards the ERA, as well as of the security policy implications of knowledge dynamics and developments in the ERA. Moreover, SANDERA has strengthened the EC's strategic policy intelligence capacity and has stimulated dialogue between stakeholders and facilitated new policy networks. It has also attracted more researchers to the field of forward looking studies. Project context and objectives: The starting point for SANDERA was the hypothesis that the establishment of security as an element of the European policy mix is the start rather than the end of policy innovation in this field. This is a highly contested area. There are those who see great opportunities arising from future developments in the relationship between security and defence and European science and technology policy. There are others, however, who worry about the potentially dangerous consequences of the emergence of a security and defence dimension to European science and technology policy. SANDERA is a foresight project about the future relationship between ERA and the EU's security and defence policies and has had four specific objectives: - to identify drivers of change in the relationship between European security and defence policies and the ERA; - to develop exploratory scenarios of alternative futures for the relationship between security and defence policies and the ERA; - to analyse the policy implications of the scenarios and develop indicators of change; - to stimulate dialogue and promote stronger networking between the security and defence policy and science and technology policy communities. As a foresight project SANDERA has not sought to predict the future at any particular point in time but has instead sought to initiate debate and to provide useful inputs for policymakers and associated stakeholders, recognising the existence of deep uncertainty but allowing for structured thinking about the possible paths by which these relationships may evolve. At the outset, three qualifications are in order: First, the conceptual framework that we have developed during the SANDERA project specifies the relationship between the ERA and European security and defence policies as the interaction between defence R&I policies and the ERA. Such a focus is also in line with the wider ERA debate and with the focus of much of the ERA policy at EU level, which is very much around innovation. Second, our main focus has been on the potential future relationship between the ERA and European defence R&I. During the course of the two years of the SANDERA project, the work of the consortia has addressed the aforementioned goals carefully and systematically. As a result, an in-depth discussion emerged about the actual and future relationship between the domains of defence on the one hand and of security on the other, and naturally about how to approach this analytically when dealing with security research and defence research areas. It became quite clear from the beginning of the SANDERA project that 'security' is a broad notion referring to the security of the European citizen in the world (with an external and an internal dimension), whereas 'defence' is a particular aspect of that broader notion of security focusing on the military dimension of it. While the external dimension of security refers inter alia to the Petersberg tasks and, hence, may entail military aspects, the internal dimension refers to functional aspects of security such as infrastructure or disaster relief. The overall policy areas of security and defence are not becoming as blurred as initially assumed by the SANDERA consortium in the description of the project work. The area of security R&I is already in FP7 and further security research activities are overseen by directorate-general (DG)s Home Affairs, TREN and MARE. The size and structure of the defence industry and of defence institutions at EU level make any kind of link to the ERA a much more complex phenomenon compared to the link with security research. For all these three reasons we started with a broad focus on all three policy domains - ERA, security and defence R&I policy - which is also reflected in the context and driver analysis, but subsequently decided to focus on the link between ERA and defence R&I, a focus that is visible in the scenarios, policy recommendations, the indicators and the policy toolkit. The third qualification concerns the time horizon of SANDERA. We chose to think about the relationship of ERA and defence R&I in 2030. Project results: Main Science and technology (S&T) results SANDERA has had four objectives and here we will review those objectives and identify what we believe to be the achievements of project SANDERA. Objective 1: To identify drivers of change in the relationship between defence policies and the ERA At the outset, we recognised that to understand the potential future relationship between defence policies and the ERA we must begin by understanding the factors that may drive change in that relationship. We have done so through examining change in three broad fields: in security and defence policy; knowledge dynamics; and European science and technology policy, as well as in the relationships between them. Our identification of these drivers of change combined desk based research and interviews. Our desk based research was undertaken by three multi-disciplinary groups comprising members of the SANDERA consortium that looked at: security dynamics, ERA dynamics, and technology dynamics. Each analytical task group collated and analysed public domain material drawn from secondary sources including government reports, academic studies and reports produced by think tanks and expert bodies. They also identified and reviewed the results of foresight exercises relevant to SANDERA. There is a growing body of reports from foresight exercises that focus in whole or in part on security-related issues. Equally, there are a number of European Commission (EC)-sponsored foresight studies on the future of the ERA. We also drew on other Commission funded studies as a source of drivers. In particular, 'wild cards' derived from the IKNOW project and on evolving security threats from the FESTOS project. In addition, we conducted approximately 100 interviews. These interviews were conducted with a variety of experts across EU including policy makers, stakeholders, scientists in key disciplines and experts located in universities and think tanks. We conducted interviews across four groups: ERA policy, security R&I policy, defence R&I policy, and a fourth group comprising independent analysts, civil society and those we have characterised as 'dissenting voices' (i.e. who have expressed critical perspectives on current developments). The desk research and interviews identified a large number of trends and drivers. From these, we identified key trends and drivers in terms of what we regarded as the importance of their potential impact on the relationship between the policy domains. The lists and groups of drivers we identified with regard to each of the four ideal type tones were validated and refined during the next phase of our project, in which we built the scenarios. In doing so, SANDERA has contributed to a better understanding of the key driving forces and the complex inter-relationships that exist between the policy fields. The context for these drivers is briefly summarised below. We refer the interested reader to the final scientific report and the series of SANDERA Scoping Papers that provide a detailed discussion of these drivers. In this way, we believe that SANDERA has provided improved policy-relevant insight into developments which we believe could have far-reaching implications for European science and technology. For the examination of the context of the relationship between the ERA and defence R&I policy we have distinguished three elements that influence this relationship: Knowledge dynamics means the dynamics of innovation and technological change. The structure and modes of functioning of innovation systems reflect the underlying knowledge dynamics, i.e. the processes of creation, accumulation and use of knowledge. The nature of these processes changes continuously. One of the hallmarks of recent decades has been the rapid expansion of the generic capabilities that create technological commonalities across seemingly unrelated innovation domains. Closely associated with this is the internationalisation, indeed globalisation, of the innovation process. These developments affect virtually all fields of innovation, not least those of security and defence. The simultaneous growth and integration of the knowledge base of technology offers both opportunities and challenges. It creates unprecedented 'economies of scope' for innovation. But it also increases technological uncertainty because disruptive innovations may now occur in a much greater number of fields and locations. This in turn can lead to heightened techno-economic and techno-military rivalry both regionally and globally. Furthermore, the diffusion of technological capabilities can change the security landscape by empowering new actors. Finally, our growing dependence on complex high-technology infrastructures creates new structural vulnerabilities calling for technological remedies. All of this puts considerable pressure on the defence and security innovation systems of individual countries. A typical response to this pressure has been the efforts to increase the connectivity between the defence and civilian innovation systems, with the dual use technologies playing the role of lynchpins. However, even the largest countries will not be capable to internalise the required knowledge base to stay self-sufficient. We must therefore expect a growing need for international cooperation. The SANDERA project examines possible future roles for the EU in that process. ERA dynamics refers to the changing landscape due to policy initiatives that deliberately try to shape and influence R&I in the Union. ERA was launched in 2000 and has changed the governance of research (and innovation) across Europe considerably, having led to new forms of functional coordination and integration in the governance of research. ERA is a broad, deliberately ill-defined concept to tackle perceived institutional challenges of research and research funding in Europe such as fragmentation of research funding and research efforts, the openness of data, mobility of researchers, horizontal and vertical coordination of funding and policy making and subsequently of research activities. The ERA has sought to create a truly open market for research and knowledge and by re-organising governance for research and creating new institutions and organisations for funding in Europe. It is hoped that, as a result, research will be able to contribute much more directly, effectively and efficiently to tackling societal challenges and to improve European's position in the innovation performance with the United States, Japan and a whole set of emerging economies. The main policy innovation within the ERA concept has been the commitment of all Member States to a set of goals, such as to invest 3 % of Gross domestic product (GDP) on research, to engage in mutual learning and benchmarking exercise through the open method of coordination and to set up new transnational networks for joint activities (such as ERA-Net and technology platforms). This has led to new, flexible approaches of joint funding (joint programming) of Member States and the Commission as well as new public private partnerships at EU level (joint technology initiatives). The multi-level nature of governance in research has thus been modified, with new forms of engagement between Member States and between Member States and the Commission. In addition, new EU institutions have been created to support research excellence (European Research Council - ERC) and knowledge networks (European Institute for Technology - EIT). More recently, the research focus of ERA has been enlarged to encompass innovation much more systematically, striving for a more integrated approach in knowledge creation and application that shall be implemented through a comprehensive common strategic framework. Security dynamics refers to the changing security and defence environment as we start the 21st century. After the end of the Cold War, the last 20 years have seen tremendous changes in the security environment of European countries. European states face new security threats and risks connected to the rising interdependence between states, as well as the spread of new technologies upon which our societies increasingly rely for everyday life, the security of infrastructures, of energy, or of international transportation, in addition to the traditional defence challenge. The boundaries between security and defence have blurred in terms of threats and technologies utilised, yet they have remained very strong and distinct at the institutional level. In fact, although non-state actors such as terrorist groups have emerged on the global scene, and the EU has re-shaped the European security landscape also by providing a dense environment of coordination and multiple means for common actions, each national government remains in charge of its own defence and security policy. Particularly the defence sector retains some distinctive characters, regarding for example the research and development but also the procurement process, and has experienced a lower degree of 'vertical' integration than other sectors. A typology of security threats and missions structured along the clusters of 'traditional defence' (of the territory against outside aggression), 'expeditionary security' (the Petersberg tasks of CSDP), 'functional security' (e.g. the protection of infrastructure, energy supplies), 'traditional security' (such as petty crime, public order), may help to grasp a reality as variegated as dynamic. In particular, 'expeditionary security', being concerned with threats and risks stemming from state failure or regional conflicts, as well as the interruption of trade routes, implies close links between national level and CSDP mission. 'Functional security' is related to the risk of severe domestic disruption occurring within EU societies, i.e. with ensuring the critical functions of society such as working of critical infrastructures, free and safe movement of people, goods, information. It naturally intertwines national governments with a number of policies carried on by the EU, including the security research funded by FP7. In contrast, 'traditional defence' is dealt with by European countries on a national basis or through NATO, while 'traditional security' refers to the maintenance of law and order within national borders and is brought at EU level mainly between Justice and Home Affairs institutions. We note developments at EU level in the funding of security and defence research although we emphasise that this field remains primarily the domain of Member States. We note the security research programme established under FP7. We also note the role of the European Defence Agency. SANDERA also emphasises the growing attempts to promote closer linkages between the Framework Programme and the European Defence Agency's defence R&D agenda. The key issue addressed in the SANDERA project has been whether this relationship between defence R&I policy and the ERA may change in the future. It will be noted that our scenarios provide contrasting visions and one of the key differences between the scenarios is the extent of horizontal integration (between defence research and the ERA) and vertical integration (between Member States and the EU level within a single policy domain). Objective 2: To develop exploratory scenarios of alternative futures of the relationship between security policy and the ERA Our second objective has been to develop robust, credible and relevant visions of possible future relationships between defence R&I policies and the ERA. We have sought to develop scenarios that enable policy makers, stakeholders and the scientific community to explore the consequences of future developments at the interface between defence R&I policy and science and technology policy. In this way, policy makers will be able to make better informed choices in the present and to be better able to apprehend and comprehend future developments as they unfold. The SANDERA scenarios represent an original approach since there has been little European attention paid to these issues despite their considerable potential importance for science and technology policy. The SANDERA scenarios are also original because they take a European perspective that sees EU as an important emerging actor. This is novel in since work on defence R&I has been dominated by analyses from national and particularly U.S. perspectives. We have developed four scenarios for the year 2030. The four scenarios can be summarised as follows: Indifference By 2030, the relationship between ERA and European defence R&I is predominantly characterised by indifference. Despite the legal possibilities provided by the Lisbon Treaty defence R&I has not become a cornerstone of the ERA concept and has not entered the mainstream ERA debate. Defence is largely seen as a technology follower rather than a technology leader; innovations in defence technologies draw on civilian technologies, borrowing and modifying those solutions. While the policies for the ERA are pursued at EU and national levels, defence R&I activities are conducted primarily through bilateral relationships between Member States, that is, outside the EU framework. - The indifference scenario is characterised by defence R&I not being featured among the ERA grand challenges. - ERA and defence R&I policies are set and implemented independently, without any noteworthy communication between the two policy communities. There is no institutionalised structure to discuss defence technology needs with ERA, i.e. the EDA remains unconnected to ERA. Hence, there is no flow of resources between ERA and defence R&I policy domains. - IPR and research funding rules are kept separate. - Finally, actors from both policy domains are keen to keep this separation, although some companies active in both civilian and defence technologies, take advantage of ERA instruments (e.g. FP projects). However, there are no dedicated FP schemes for defence companies and Research and technology organisation (RTO)s. Cooperation By 2030, the relationship between the ERA and defence R&I is characterised by co-ordination. The distinction between security and defence R&I has remained in place and the FP continues to be restricted to civil security with non-lethal applications. However, policy actors on all sides agree that working together generates mutual benefits. Coordination between the EC and the EDA develops along the lines of the framework cooperation on security and defence research to promote synergies. ERA and defence R&I policy-makers identify many common interests - while retaining their distinctive goals, regulations and rules, and largely working with separate funding mechanisms. - Defence is not featured among the ERA grand challenges but receives increasing attention in ERA policy goals and rationales. - ERA and defence R&I policies are set independently, but well-designed structures and mechanisms are put in place to coordinate policy implementation, e.g. several joint schemes are launched. Regular, systematic dialogue on distribution of resources leads to efficient use of financial and human resources. - IPR rules are kept separate, stemming from the different research cultures and rationales in these two domains. Associate countries to the EU Framework Programme may be excluded from participation in joint R&I projects where it is deemed necessary on security grounds. - Security is perceived as a societal grand challenge and security R&I is addressed with the full range of ERA policy instruments. Integration By 2030, defence R&I is fully integrated into the ERA and has become another element of the EU R&I policy very much like security, space or aeronautics. The Lisbon Treaty has opened up the legal possibility for EU defence research and a political decision has been taken by the European Council that defence research should be included in the Framework Programme and FP funds should be used for technology development in support of CSDP tasks. There is recognition by policy actors from the ERA and defence R&I policy fields that working together generates mutual benefits and that these can be best achieved through common policy instruments and funding mechanisms. - Defence has become a grand challenge and defence R&I is fully integrated into the ERA and has become another element of the EU R&I policy very much like security, space or aeronautics. - Defence R&I for CSDP missions is integrated across Member States and EU institutions. ERA is a tool at the disposal of CSDP. - Appropriate, carefully designed structures and mechanisms are in place to establish common rules and regulations (e.g. on funding and IPR) and to recognise mutual restrictions. - As security is perceived as a societal grand challenge and security R&I is addressed with the full range of ERA policy instruments. There are supranational elements of R&I policy coordinated by DGs according to sectoral needs. Competition By 2030, the relationship between ERA and European security and defence R&I policies is characterised by competition between their rationales and visions for European science and innovation. Civil society actors, distinguished European scientists and some EU institutions have raised concerns about the 'militarisation' of European science. They propose an alternative normative model for European R&I emphasising scientific openness to the world and the free circulation of knowledge. The relationship between the ERA and European defence R&I becomes a highly contested area with developments in one policy area perceived to be in competition or actively antagonistic to one another. - Any collaboration with defence R&I policy is openly opposed by ERA policy makers. Civil society actors, distinguished European scientists and some EU institutions have raised concerns about the 'militarisation' of European science. They propose an alternative normative model for European R&I emphasising scientific openness to the world, the free circulation of knowledge and 'human security'. - ERA and defence R&I policies are set independently. Financial and human resources are contested between ERA and defence R&I policy-makers. Objective 3: To analyse the policy implications of the scenarios and develop indicators of change Our third objective has been to analyse the policy implications of our scenarios and develop a series of indicators that policy makers may use as an 'early warning system' of change. We emphasise once again that project SANDERA is not an advocate of a particular future relationship between security and defence policies and ERA. With regard to our analysis of the policy implications of our scenarios, our intention has been to carefully and deliberately assess the policy opportunities and challenges presented by each of the four scenarios that we have developed. For each scenario, we have set out policy recommendations for European policy makers who - having carefully considered the policy opportunities and challenges presented by a particular scenario - decide that a move in the direction of that scenario may be beneficial for the development of the ERA. In so doing, we believe that SANDERA has delivered improved policy-relevant insight by identifying the opportunities and threats for the ERA posed by evolving defence R&I policies, and the opportunities to maximise complementarities between the development of the ERA and of European defence R&I policies. SANDERA has also sought to begin the process of strengthening strategic policy intelligence capacity in Europe through the development of our indicator monitoring framework and policy analysis toolkit. SANDERA has also sought to strengthen the strategic policy intelligence capacity of EC, Member States and other interested stakeholder organisations by developing a series of indicators that policy makers will be able to use as an 'early warning system' of change. In terms of indicators - observable data that we can use to assess the state of an issue that concerns us - the question for SANDERA has been one of indicators that bear upon the relationships between a number of institutions, communities, and practices. One class of indicator of particular relevance has been early warning indicators and weak signals. These resemble lead indicators but are more focused on emerging issues and new developments, rather than on cyclical patterns or familiar trends. Some signals are described as 'weak' because they are ambiguous and need further confirmation to go beyond being hints that some new phenomenon is emerging. Indicators in this context are proposed by SANDERA to give us ideas of just what sort of future is evolving. We have sought to address questions such as: how far do developments suggest that we are moving more in the direction of one scenario or tone rather than another? How far do they point to some mixture of the scenarios or tones, and if so, what? Are there developments that suggest that we are moving in quite different directions, for example that unexpected factors are shaping the relationship between subsystems, or that these relationships are taken unanticipated forms? How are the complex relationships evolving, in terms of the four tones? We provide a number of illustrative examples of indicators for each tone. The indicators do not answer the aforementioned questions, but they should provide a more solid base upon which the answers can be explicated and explored further as the relationships between the domains evolve. Systematic indicator analysis is intended to help us better understand the topics of interest into the future. If unexpected factors are emerging, or drivers that we had identified are having effects contrary to those envisaged, what does this tell us about our underlying models of the evolution of the three subsystems, and how we need to improve them? This is not a purely academic exercise, of course, because it is these models that are guiding our strategy and action. The SANDERA work on indicators is relevant to all stages of the 'policy cycle' - strategic thinking, policy development, policy implementation and policy maintenance. The SANDERA policy analysis toolkit aims to provide decision makers with questions to pose in order to assess their policy proposals in the light of implications for ERA-defence R&I relationships. The key question that this toolkit is concerned with is: What effects is this policy liable to have on the relationship between defence R&I and ERA? To this end the toolkit systematically breaks up this question into different elements and outlines a number of sub-questions that can guide policy makers in their decision making. Objective 4: To stimulate dialogue and promote stronger networking between the security policy and science and technology policy communities The final objective of SANDERA has been to stimulate dialogue and promote stronger networking between the defence R&I policy and science and technology policy communities and begin the process of developing a shared understanding of the opportunities and threats posed by policy actions at the intersection of defence R&I policy and the ERA. We believe that this SANDERA objective represents an original vision that has - in a small way - improved the quality of European policy debate. SANDERA has gone beyond the established Brussels policy thinking. The defence R&I policy and ERA policy communities are very different and rarely (if ever) talk to each other. We were struck that many defence policy makers were unaware of ERA as a policy initiative. Equally, we have noted how the ERA policy community has little appreciation of neither defence research nor developments in defence research policy at the European level. SANDERA has enabled and structured a first, tentative dialogue between these two policy communities. The feed-back from participant in our workshops and final project conference suggests that the facilitation of this dialogue has been appreciated by both policy communities. SANDERA has stimulated dialogue between the defence research policy and S&T policy communities and has sought to facilitate the emergence of new policy networks that cross the boundary between science and technology policy and security policy. Our project stemmed from the belief that there was a need for greater dialogue between the two communities as a means of developing a shared understanding of the opportunities and threats posed by policy actions and developments at the intersection of security policy and science and technology policy. We emphasise here that the Commission's Blue Skies project tender called for risk taking in research. We have attempted to bring together two policy communities that are by and large separate. Each has its own discrete set of policy concerns, stakeholders and policy networks. This initiative brought with it considerable risk. We also believe that this objective represents a creative approach to the problem of promoting policy discourse between two communities that remain relatively isolated from one another despite the fact that developments in one policy field may have direct or indirect implications for the other policy field. Potential impact: Potential impact and main dissemination activities and exploitation results We now consider the potential impact of SANDERA, our main dissemination activities and how we are exploiting our results. Impact The methodology of Project SANDERA was explicitly designed to focus on delivering against the Commission's three expected impacts listed in the work programme for SSH-2007-7.4.1 namely: - improved policy relevant insight; - provision of useful inputs for the preparation of FP8; - the attraction of more researchers to the field of forward looking studies. Improved policy-relevant insight SANDERA has focused on generating improved policy-relevant insight and this was discussed in the context of our achievement of our objective 3 and objective 4 (see above). We will not repeat the discussions of the last section save to make the following points that reinforce our project's contribution to generating improved policy relevant insight. Our work has confirmed one of the hypotheses that motivated SANDERA. Namely, despite the obvious importance of these issues, there are very few policy makers, stakeholders or academics in the science and technology policy community in Europe who are considering how security policy may play a role in the future shape and direction of ERA. Similarly, the security and defence policy community, whilst aware of the importance of research and research policy for their remit, has not as yet systematically reflected on how ERA dynamics may impact upon them. Instead, the relationship between European science and technology policy and security policy has been at the margin of policy - and academic - agendas. We also observe that there has been little dialogue between the science and technology policy and security policy communities on matters that should be of common concern and mutual benefit. Accordingly, we contend that SANDERA has contributed a first step towards an improved understanding amongst policy makers and other stakeholders of the potential implications of developments in defence R&I policy for the move towards the ERA. SANDERA has raised awareness of the meaning of security developments for ERA. At the same time, as we discussed in the previous section, we have contributed to the strengthening of EC's strategic policy intelligence capacity through our work on indicators of change. Again, our work on indicators of change provides a useful step that - if it is of interest to policy makers - could provide the basis for further development. Above all, SANDERA has contributed to improved policy relevant insight by actively stimulating dialogue between the security and defence policy and S&T policy communities. We have discussed this point in objective 4 (previous section) and here it is sufficient to say that SANDERA is perhaps unique in that it has sought to facilitate the emergence of new policy networks that cross the boundary between science and technology policy and security policy. SANDERA has represented a first step towards promoting greater dialogue between the two communities as a means of developing a shared understanding of the opportunities and threats posed by policy actions and developments at the intersection of security policy and science and technology policy. Useful inputs for the preparation of FP8 The SANDERA proposal and description of work contained details of the scientific approach that we intended to use with the aim of providing useful inputs for the preparation of FP8. Although the original description of work for SANDERA proposed a discussion of the implications of our scenarios for FP8, we did not address FP8 issues. The decision to not address FP8 issues was undertaken with the full knowledge and agreement of the Commission project officer responsible for SANDERA. Contractual issues delayed the start of SANDERA by 12 months and this meant that the final SANDERA report would not be delivered until many of the key policy decisions on FP8 were well advanced. Accordingly, it was agreed with the SANDERA project officer that a focus on longer term policy implications would be more useful and in line with the Blue Skies theme of the original call for proposals. The attraction of more researchers to the field of forward looking studies SANDERA has attracted more researchers to the field of forward looking studies. The formation of the SANDERA consortium itself had the effect of attracting new researchers into the field of forward-looking studies. At the organisational level, the SANDERA consortium included some organisations that had considerable collective experience of conducting forward-looking studies (MIoIR and IE-HAS) and some organisations that had had little or no previous experience with such studies (SWP; IAI; EGMONT). Equally, at the individual researcher level, SANDERA has combined researchers who have considerable experience in forward-looking studies (for instance, Ian Miles, Attila Havas) with other researchers who had little or no prior experience of such studies. An element of implicit and explicit training in foresight techniques was built into the SANDERA project. The scenario exercise was led by Professor Ian Miles but provided considerable opportunities for learning-by-doing as other less experienced and more junior researchers engaged in the scenario exercise. They were engaged through contributing to the writing of background material for the scenario workshop and through participation in the scenario workshops themselves. SANDERA has improved awareness of foresight techniques amongst organisations and individuals who have not been exposed to them before and has also had the effect of diffusing some foresight-related experience to those individuals. Other national or international research activities SANDERA has engaged with other European activities in the field. In particular we have engaged with a number of other FP7 foresight projects as follows: - AUGUR (Europe and the world in 2030). - IKNOW, an internet-based foresight platform, provided valuable input for SANDERA, first, by providing a list of relevant foresight studies in the different domains of SANDERA and later, in the discussion of scenarios, by pointing to wild cards and weak signals. SANDERA team members contributed to the discussion of wild cards and weak signals at the IKNOW platform. - FESTOS - a project funded under the FP7 security research theme. - SECURENV - SANDERA researchers contributed to the discussion of scenarios and the development of policy recommendations of the SECURENV project at a workshop organised in Stockholm in November 2010. SECURENV is a research project that is financed by the EU FP7 for security research and deals with security threats resulting from or amplified by natural environment. The exchange provided valuable input for the scenario building in SANDERA. - INFU foresight project - SANDERA researchers contributed to the FP7 funded INFU Foresight project. In a workshop held in Manchester, SANDERA contributed to the discussion of different modes of innovation that might evolve in the future. - European Foresight platform (EFP) project - SANDERA is contributing to EFP project. A policy brief of SANDERA will be published by the EFP project in August 2011. SANDERA will be the first project to be mapped in EFP. It will allow EFP to draw lessons for the development and improvement of foresight techniques. Dissemination SANDERA has sought to disseminate the results of the research in the following ways: - The scenario exercise - Scenario activities have their greatest influence through the effects on the participants in workshops and related activities and the participants in our scenario activities have been key agents for the dissemination of our results. It will be recalled that SANDERA held a first workshop with 23 experts from ten EU countries and European institutions, in November 2010. - The Final SANDERA conference held in May 2011 in Brussels brought together 32 experts. It provided a forum at which the results of the scenario exercise were presented and debated by stakeholders. In break out groups we had another opportunity to engage discuss the policy implications in greater detail. Through the participation of experts from think tanks and various European institutions we hope to integrate SANDERA into the European policy agenda both for the ERA and for security. - Presentations of the results of SANDERA as follows: i. Presentation of the SANDERA project at the AUGUR project conference Sharing Visions on Europe in 2030: Lessons from comparative approaches of recent foresight exercises in June 2010 in Brussels. AUGUR (Europe and the world in 2030) is a project of the FP7. The paper from the conference was selected to be part of a special issue of the journal foresight to be edited by AUGUR. ii. Presentation of the SANDERA project at the Finland Futures Research Centre conference Security in Futures: Security in Change in Turku, Finland in June 2010. iii. Presentation of the SANDERA project at the University of Tel Aviv to members of the FESTOS team at a workshop in July 2010. FESTOS is a project funded under the FP7 security research theme and addresses the security threats potentially arising from the abuse of the results of science and technology. SANDERA researchers also contributed to two further FESTOS workshops held in Berlin and London and provided input based on the results of the SANDERA project. A project presentation of SANDERA was published in the FESTOS newsletter. iv. Poster presentations at the Commission's security research conference in September 2010 in Ostend and at the fourth edition of the international Seville conference on Future-oriented technology analysis (FTA) in Seville, May 2011. - Background briefings about SANDERA to important stakeholders, such as the European Parliament, the Aerospace and Defence Industry Association (ASD), EC (DG Enterprise) and the European Defence Agency. SANDERA has also offered to brief DG R&I. - Website: SANDERA set up a project website (www.sandera.net). It has presented the SANDERA project, its aims and objectives and participants; was and is used as a channel to publish deliverables from the project and to inform about SANDERA events. - Three executive reports directed at different audiences (European science and technology policy community; European security policy community; the general scientific community and the general public) have been prepared. They will be distributed in paper and electronic form. These executive reports summarise our scenarios and their implications for European science and technology policy and EU security and defence policy. Future dissemination In our final scientific report we talk about 'next steps' and express the view that we are conscious that all too often reports and indeed projects such as SANDERA have a very short half-life. Long scientific reports are - by their very nature - only read by a small number of people. The networks that emerge during the course of a scenario workshop can be temporary. The future-oriented thinking stimulated by exposure to scenarios can be forgotten once practitioners return to their offices and the day-to-day concerns of public policy. We expressed the belief that the emergence of an explicit defence and security dimension to EU science and technology policy represents a policy innovation of potentially profound importance to the future character of European science and technology policy and the move to the ERA. Accordingly, we believe that SANDERA should be the beginning rather than the end of dialogue between policy communities as a means of promoting an open debate in Europe on these issues. In that spirit, we are continuing the dissemination of SANDERA's results beyond the formal end of the project as follows: - a workshop with S&T and defence experts was held in Spain in June 2011; - a similar workshop is planned to take place in the autumn 2011 in Lund, Sweden; - SANDERA results will also be disseminated in the activities of the Jean-Monet Centre of Excellence at the Copenhagen Business School; - in Hungary the Chair of the Committee on National Security, Parliament has agreed to organise a dissemination event (scheduled for the autumn of 2011), probably in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence, and the Defence Strategy Research Institute, Miklós Zrínyi National Defence University; - several policy publications are planned in form of policy papers at IAI and Egmont. List of websites: www.sandera.net Powiązane dokumenty Final Report - SANDERA (The Future impact of security and defence policies on the European Research Area)
